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This book comprises eight essays that consider the politics and polemics of monuments in Africa in the wake of the #RhodesMustFall movement in 2015. The removal of the 
Rhodes statue from UCT main campus is the pivot on which 
the discussion of monuments as heritage in South Africa turns. 
It raised a number of questions about the implementation of 
heritage policy and the unequal deployment of memorials in the 
South African and other postcolonial landscapes. The essays in this 
volume are written by authors coming from different backgrounds 
and different disciplines. They address different aspects of this 
event and its aftermath, offering some intensive critique of existing 
monuments, analysing the successes of new initiatives, meditating 
on the visual resonances of all monuments and attempting to map 
ways of moving forward.
In the essays in this book the authors tackle policy questions, 
aspects of history and some of the new monuments aimed at 
redress in the present South African climate. It is to be hoped 
that a reading of this book will inform the decisions made by 
politicians and culture brokers when they spend taxpayers’ 
money on the erection of monuments. It would be refreshing if 
the artists commissioned to make such monuments could look at 
African traditions of figuration and commemoration which fall 
outside the monumental, and if the artists could be professional 
and theoretically informed of the ways in which monuments are 
commissioned, planned and accessed.
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Introduction
Mathias Alubafi Fubah & Anitra Nettleton
South Africa, like most African postcolonial nations has gone through 
a history of cultural representation that was largely one-sided. 
The end of colonialism and apartheid has resulted in the exposure of 
a cultural landscape that was largely seen as normal in past, but which 
is problematic at the present moment. One notable outcome of South 
Africa’s new dispensation, however, has been the difficulty of matching 
the cultural landscape, especially in terms of cultural representation 
to the ideals of the new democratic state. Like the rest of the African 
continent, South Africa is undergoing a socio- political and cultural 
renaissance that has necessitated a rethinking of the country’s cultural 
representation and aesthetic practices. In an attempt to rethink South 
Africa’s cultural landscape, historical statues and monuments are 
increasingly becoming visible. This visibility, according to Coombes 
(2003) is entirely “contingent upon the debates concerning the 
reinterpretation of history that takes place at moments of social and 
political transitions.” 
If we take into consideration the extent to which the South African 
cultural landscape has transformed over the past twenty-three years, 
we cannot overlook the fact that historical statues and monuments 
still dominate public spaces in major cities such as Johannesburg, 
Pretoria, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban. Moreover, the 
continuous existence of these cultural heritage resources has affected 
the way in which people view certain public spaces and institutions 
for a number of reasons. For example, most of these spaces are 
seen as restrictive, provocative and a symbol of failure by certain 
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institutions to transform. The failure to transform certain institutions, 
and in particular, the cultural landscape was one of the main reasons 
for the #RhodesMustFall Movement that started at the University of 
Cape Town (UCT) in 2015. From its humble beginnings, it attracted 
nation-wide attention and left the population aghast at the physicality 
of the rejection of these symbols. There was, in some quarters sheer 
bewilderment as to why historical statues and monuments, heretofore 
promoted as part of South Africa’s diverse cultural heritage, should 
now be at the centre of the transformation debate.
Against the above background, the Human Sciences Research 
Council (HSRC) took upon itself the task of working with the research 
community to understand the rationale behind the call for the removal 
of historical statues and monuments and what they envisaged as the 
ideal cultural landscape for the country. Professor Vasu Reddy, then 
Executive Director of the Human and Social Development (HSD) 
Research Programme at the HSRC and current dean of Humanities at 
the University of Pretoria must receive credit for contacting Dr Alubafi 
to come up with a title and to write a project proposal focusing on 
the #Rhodes Must Fall Movement. The title: “The Symbols South 
Africans Want: Documenting and Assessing the Impact of Symbols in 
a Transformative State” was accepted by the HSRC and a proposal for 
a research project was drafted following this theme. 
The proposal was first presented and discussed at the HSD Business 
Lekgotla (meeting) in April 2015. Thereafter, it was refined and 
submitted to the HSRC Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO) Discretionary 
Fund for assessment and approval for funding. This was at a time when 
the then CEO, Dr Olive Shisana was on her way out of the organisation 
and as a result could not decide on whether or not to fund the project. 
Her response was simply that her successor would decide when he 
or she was appointed. Later in 2016, Professor Crain Soudien took 
over and was very keen to see the project implemented. By this time, 
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Professor Vasu Reddy had left and Professor Sharlene Swartz was the 
acting Executive Director of the HSD and facilitated the negotiations 
with the new CEO’s office. He allocated funds for the project (for which 
we are grateful) in October 2015 and the author refined the proposal 
again and submitted it to the HSRC Research Ethics Committee for 
assessment and approval. Ethics approval was granted in February 2016 
and the research team embarked on fieldwork in three major cities, 
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Pretoria. Fieldwork was conducted 
using quantitative and qualitative research methods. 
In April 2016, the author and professor Sharlene Swartz organised a 
symposium at the HSRC focusing on the project. Representatives were 
invited from the Universities of the Western Cape, Witwatersrand, 
Cape Town, Rhodes, Fort Hare, University of South Africa, and the HSRC 
to provide a variety of views and arguments on the call for the removal 
of historical statues and monuments from the South African cultural 
landscape. Scholars were also invited from the University of Ghana, 
Legon to gain an alternative perspective as was an artist from Canada 
who has been practising for some time and whose work examines both 
his ability as an artist, and the capacity of the spectator to participate in 
alternative historical, social, institutional and national narration. Some 
of the chapters were also presented at a session organised by the author 
and sponsored by the Centre of Excellence (CoE, Wits University) at the 
Science Forum South Africa, in December 2016. The book results from 
the above narration, although not all the participants at the symposium 
are represented in the book. Professor Nettleton was invited to 
participate as editor and contributor only after the symposium and the 
papers for the book were submitted.
The messages conveyed through the research in these essays may 
well disturb and disrupt the settled views of the cultural landscape 
that are currently promoted and preserved in South Africa and further 
abroad in Africa. They could offer alternative avenues to government 
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policy makers in South Africa, as they pinpoint governments’ failure 
to adopt and promote an African iconography of memorialisation. 
Perhaps the book will help to awaken the policy makers of Africa to 
the need for change in the ways in which public heritage resources are 
allotted in present day. We need not continue to replace or exchange 
large-scale and intimidating historical bronze statues and marble or 
stone monuments with others using the same materials and styles in 
the name of constructing a post-colonial and post-apartheid cultural 
landscape. There are alternative ways of doing this, and this book 
highlights the course for action to disrupt the current trajectory.
This book comprises eight essays that consider the politics and 
polemics of monuments in Africa in the wake of the #RhodesMustFall 
movement in 2015. The removal of the Rhodes statue from UCT 
main campus is the pivot on which the discussion of monuments as 
heritage in South Africa turns. It raised a number of questions about 
the implementation of heritage policy and the unequal deployment 
of memorials in the South African and other postcolonial landscapes. 
The essays in this volume are written by authors coming from different 
backgrounds and different disciplines. They address different aspects 
of this event and its aftermath, offering some intensive critique of 
existing monuments, analysing the successes of new initiatives, 
meditating on the visual resonances of all monuments and attempting 
to map ways of moving forward.
In the first chapter Sharlene Swartz, Benjamin Roberts, Steven 
L. Gordon and Jarè Struwig use nationally representative public opinion 
poll data to consider how far the adult public could be gauged to have 
accepted the #RhodesMustFall’s principal goals. They first examine 
attitudes towards the removal of South Africa’s pre-transitions statues 
(such as Cecil John Rhodes, King George and Jan van Riebeeck) from 
public spaces. Subsequently, they investigated what members of the 
general population think about collective decision-making on this 
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important restitution issue. The emphasis of their analysis is on how 
attitudes differ between important socio-demographic groups with 
a particular focus on age cohorts. Its conclusions set the stage for 
locating the debate about the relevance and use of memorial statues 
in a post-apartheid, democratic and egalitarian South Africa.
In chapter 2 Anitra Nettleton offers a critical, art-historically based, 
view of the western origins of large-scale bronze civic memorial 
statuary made to commemorate events and secular personages in the 
public sphere. Her analysis calls on both Riegl’s conceptualisation of the 
function of monuments and Habermas’s definition of the public sphere. 
She considers the ways in which such works, of which the statue of 
Cecil John Rhodes at the University of Cape Town was an example, were 
used in colonial contexts and their current demises, She critiques the 
redeployment of similar forms in post-colonial South Africa as a means 
of ‘equalising’ the memorial spaces of South Africa and the continuing 
patriarchal and non-democratic nature of its deployment.
Alude Mahali, in chapter 3 probes what is commemorated in South 
African memorials, and explores the tensions around where that 
commemoration takes place. Using a framework of discourse of pain, 
place and memory, the author considers how South African monuments 
have been constituted and contested. One of the forms of contest 
encompassed here, the queering of place, involves very close and critical 
examination of how memorial and monumental connotations of both 
buildings and public spaces could be stripped of their colonial residues 
and how this might aid in democratising access to memorialisation. 
Sipokazi Sambumbu Madida touches on similar ground in chapter 4, but 
addresses the issues through a different lens. She addresses a perceived 
failure in contemporary debates to understand post-apartheid heritage 
practice as constituting an exhibitionary complex. Comprising many 
practices, disciplines and approaches, this complex addresses questions of 
the governmentality of public citizenry in many different ways. To develop 
xvi
Exchanging Symbols
a nuanced understanding of knowledges and meanings embedded within 
these practices, this essay offers a critical analysis of post-apartheid 
monumentalisation, with a focus on the sporadic troubling of public 
statues over the period 1990-2015. In doing so the author focuses on how 
post-apartheid monumentalisation has been reproductive of continuities 
of the old traditions of knowing and understanding pasts and histories.
This theme is picked up by Thabo Manetsi in his essay, Chapter 5, which 
considers the ways in which the old style monuments of the apartheid 
era offer possibilities for deconstructing aspects of South African 
heritage. He interrogates the question of political instrumentality 
informing the denunciation of past monuments and the enunciation 
of heritage resources in the present state of South Africa. He centres 
his argument on the political uses of heritage as part of a post-colonial 
discourse on heritage management. He considers in particular the 
South African state’s prioritisation of ‘liberation’ heritage and the 
ways in which this interacts with the rewriting of histories and the 
reclamation of the public spaces of heritage by government, ostensibly 
in the name of the people.
Guy Königstein’s photo-essay in Chapter 6 speaks of similar concerns, but 
through a visualisation of absence and presence. He considers the ways in 
which monuments act as both the providers of presence, and the markers 
of absence, working with a process of removal of monuments in the context 
of digitally re-worked photographs. The author/artist, as a visitor to South 
Africa just after the #RhodesMustFall period of unrest at South African 
campuses, responded to the uproar by exploring the ways in which the 
removal of monuments from archival photographs could express aspects 
of the issues of memorialisation through marking monuments’ presences 
in photographs despite their removal from the frame.
Nancy Dantas in Chapter 7 takes both the exhibitionary and the 
visual aspects of the debate further. She looks at how selected South 
African artists, both modern and contemporary, engage with issues 
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of memory and trauma, employing strategies of verfremdung within 
the built environment. She argues that monuments are to be seen 
as personifications or embodiments of the forces that condition and 
shape our times, as artists respond to these. She selected artists from 
different generations and geographies, moving from Leonard Tshela 
Mohapi Matsoso who worked in the apartheid years, to Lungiswa 
Gqunta, Sikhumbuzo Makandula, and, most recently, Haroon Gunn 
Salie. All work with histories of trauma, albeit from different angles 
and with different approaches, in specific mediums which help to 
inform their, and by extension, our thoughts and perceptions of the 
cultural and lived landscapes we inhabit.
The final chapter, chapter 8, by Mathias Alubafi Fubah and Catherine 
Ndinda examine the rationale behind the newly constructed anti-
colonial and anti-apartheid statues at the Groenkloof nature reserve. 
In doing this, the authors aim to show that while the statues are largely 
a replication of the colonial imagery, they have become one of the 
embodiments of the ANC’s response to the cultural imbalance on the 
South African and Tshwane landscape. Working with participants in a 
workshop situation, and with students, they discuss their responses 
to seeing their heroes being commemorated through the use of 
bronze statuary. They consider both the positive impact that such 
memorialisation might have, and the problematics of the forms it takes.
In the essays in this book the authors tackle policy questions, aspects 
of history and some of the new monuments aimed at redress in the 
present South African climate. It is to be hoped that a reading of 
this book will inform the decisions made by politicians and culture 
brokers when they spend taxpayers’ money on the erection of 
monuments. It would be refreshing if the artists commissioned to 
make such monuments could look at African traditions of figuration 
and commemoration which fall outside the monumental, and if the 
artists could be professional and theoretically informed of the ways in 




Attitudes towards apartheid and colonial statues in 
South Africa
Sharlene Swartz, Benjamin Roberts, 
Steven L Gordon & Jarè Struwig

1
The concept of public memory is used to explain the many and varied ways in which communities deal with the past. However, public memory refers not only to what we remember 
about the past, but what we forget, and how we chose to frame these 
recollections.1 The idea of memory as including ‘what we forget’ is 
very relevant to South Africa, where historical and collective amnesia, 
as well as a resolute desire to live in the present and focus on today’s 
challenges,2 is sometimes an obstacle to rectifying past injustices. It is 
not uncommon to find that there is a worrying number of South Africans 
who would like to forget the past and move on. Consider some of the 
results of The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation’s (IJR) South 
African Reconciliation Barometer which indicated that two thirds of 
South Africans across all race groups agreed with the statement, ‘Forget 
Apartheid and move on’. This view is held almost equally by Black (63%) 
and White (69%) South Africans. Furthermore, White South Africans 
are less likely than other South Africans to acknowledge the relation 
between the apartheid legacy and post-apartheid poverty levels.3 
1 Matthew Houdek & Kendall R. Phillips, “Public Memory.” 
2 The work of Primo Levi, the Italian writer and Holocaust survivor, in relation to memory 
and trauma is particularly relevant here. He argued in The Drowned and the Saved (1986, 
187) that memories become distant and historical over time and across generations, and 
that young people increasingly “are besieged by today’s problems, different, urgent: 
unemployment, the depletion of resources, the demographic explosion, frenetically 
innovative technologies to which they must adjust”. This desire to focus on the present 
rather than the past is a salient aspect of ‘forgetting’ and resonates with South African 
debates about memory. 
3 Kim Wale, Confronting Exclusion: Time for Radical Reconciliation South Africa 
Reconciliation Barometer Survey: 2013, 37.
2
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Houdek and Phillips argue that public memory is socially constructed, 
with symbols and structures constituting powerful ways of analysing 
memory (2017, 2). Furthermore, as argued by Halbwachs and Nora,4 
the symbols and events through which these recollections are 
expressed can also function to consolidate a sense of nationhood. 
The social activism of a movement like #RhodesMustFall can be situated 
at the intersection between public memory and nationhood. This is 
because it critiques the way in which the past has been memorialised 
in the rainbow nation project and the manner in which symbols of the 
“ruins” of empire and segregationist and apartheid histories remain 
in the present as “documents to damage”,5 while simultaneously 
questioning the legitimacy and transformative competence of social 
and political institutions. It also raises questions around who should 
participate (victims, perpetrators, their descendants, or everyone) in 
the construction of public memory. On this question, Araujo (2010), 
in the case of the slave trade in the South Atlantic, describes public 
memory as plural because of the involvement of the descendants of 
both perpetrators and victims.6 This applies to the post-apartheid 
state as well.
The #RhodesMustFall campaign resulted in the removal of a statue 
of Cecil John Rhodes from the University of Cape Town (UCT) 
campus in April 2015. This action cast attention on broader issues 
of racial transformation imperatives such as redress, restitution, 
social cohesion and active citizenship and invites us to ask how the 
general South African population viewed the movement’s central 
goal.7 Questions such as these are important since public opinion is 
4 Maurice Halbwachs, On collective memory; Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: Rethinking 
the French Past.
5 Ann Laura Stoler, Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination. 
6 Ana Lucia Aruajo, Public Memory of Slavery: Victims and Perpetrators in the South Atlantic.
7 Redress, restitution, social cohesion and active citizenship have all featured as key 
concepts and issues in daily public discussion as well as academic and policy discourse 
on racial transformation in South Africa. See National Planning Commission (2012), 
Sharlene Swartz (2016), as well as Kate Lefko-Everett, Rajen Govender and Donald Foster 
(2017) for examples. While there remains substantive contestation about the definitions, 
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essential to policy debate in any functioning democracy. Wilson (2013) 
argues that public opinion has been an “orderly force”, contributing 
to democratic political life for thousands of years.8 The convergence 
between public opinion and public policy is often considered to 
be a crucial characteristic of successful democratic governance.9
How widely the goals of the #RhodesMustFall campaign were shared by 
the general adult population in South Africa is, therefore, an important 
question. Answering this question will help us understand the different 
ways people think about redress and restitution in the country.
The character and nature of the 2015 #RhodesMustFall movement 
provoked questions about who should be making decisions about 
racial redress and restitution policies in South Africa. The movement’s 
leaders wanted the student body to exert greater decision-making 
power in the case of the Rhodes statue. The movement provoked 
questions relating to who the final arbiter should ultimately be when 
deciding the fate of apartheid and colonial statues. Should such 
decisions fall to the general public (through say a referendum)10 or to 
those who suffered most from the policies of the previous regime? 
Or should the matter be left to the traditional powerholders, academic 
boards and government departments? This question invites wider 
inquiries about the way decisions about the pace and extent of racial 
transformation policy are currently made. In a polarised society like 
South Africa, public preferences concerning who should have the 
final say in making such decisions is perhaps just as important as the 
scope and practical implications of such concepts, they are nonetheless frequently 
invoked in engagements on transformation in the country. 
8 Francis Graham Wilson, A Theory of Public Opinion.
9 Stuart N. Soroka and Christopher Wlezien, Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion, 
and Policy.
10 It should be noted that the referendum, as a device of direct democracy, has increasingly 
become the subject of appreciable debate. This has been compounded by recent, 
contentious experiences, such as the Brexit vote in the UK (2016). Critics argue that 
referenda may enhance societal divisions, produce incoherent and ineffectual policy 
agendas, and are often based on weak levels of voter turnout, while supporters maintain 
that participation, strengthen democratic institutions and promote voter education and 
issue awareness (Morel 2001, 2011). 
4
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actions that stem from those decisions and will be interrogated as 
part of this chapter. 
The 2015, the #RhodesMustFall campaign’s platform garnered a 
considerable level of attention and debate in the international and 
domestic press. Political leaders, academics, media pundits and 
others have weighed in with their thoughts, but little is known about 
the views of the general public. In this chapter, using nationally 
representative public opinion poll data, we will look at how far the 
adult public accepted #RhodesMustFall’s principal goals. The chapter 
will first examine attitudes towards the removal of South Africa’s 
pre- transition statues (such as Cecil John Rhodes, King George and 
Jan van Riebeeck) from public spaces. Subsequently, it will show what 
the general population thinks about collective decision-making on 
this important restitution issue. The emphasis of our analysis will be 
on how attitudes differ between important socio-demographic groups 
with a focus on age cohorts. These findings will then be discussed, and 
their implications debated.
Literature review 
Ndletyana and Webb (2017) clearly state in a recent work that the 
depth and magnitude of the furore around statues and memorials 
should have been anticipated.11 According to these authors the initial 
approach circa 1994 to promote unity, social cohesion and a sense 
of nationhood through memorialisation was not based on intellectual 
rigour and lacked a well thought out approach. Policy approaches were 
essentially just an extension of the old regime’s approach to memorials 
and did not try and address past attachments or identities whilst 
dealing with the formation of new group identities or attachments. 
11 Mcebisi Ndletyana and Denver A. Webb, “Social divisions carved in stone or cenotaphs to 
a new identity? Policy for memorials, monuments and statues in a democratic South 
Africa”, 97-110.
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In a comprehensive examination of adult South African attitudes 
towards redress and redistribution policies, Gibson (2004) found 
that group attachments predicted individuals’ policy preferences 
in South Africa.12 This is because attitude formation is explained by 
the influence of culture on identity boundaries and values.13 It could 
therefore be expected that group identities would influence attitudes 
towards colonial and apartheid-era statuary. 
The most obvious of these group identities are race14 and political 
affiliation. The former is particularly important in a divided country 
like South Africa where the collective memories of the nation’s 
different population groups differ so dramatically. However, political 
affiliation is also significant as the country’s major political parties –
the African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and 
the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – all have different positions on 
racial transformation and restitution in the country.15 Consequently, 
there is a need to examine public attitudes in South Africa across 
these significant fault lines of group identity.
It is clear that statues, monuments and memorials are not value-free 
or neutral objects but important tools that have symbolic power and 
memory within a society. The recent protests around the statues have 
clearly highlighted the need for dialogue on this issue and this chapter 
is an attempt to get the broader public involved in discussions and 
decisions around the issue of statues. 
12 James L. Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?
13 Susan T. Fiske, and Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition: From Brains to Culture. Social 
Cognition; R. Michael Alvarez and John Brehm, Hard Choices, Easy Answers: Values, 
Information, and American Public Opinion; David Sears, Carl P. Hensler and Leslie K. 
Speer, “Whites’ Opposition to ‘Busing’: Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?”
14 While the authors acknowledge that there is no such thing as ‘race’ in biological or physical 
terms, at the same time, it must be recognised that race continues to play a salient factor 
in many aspects of South African society. It continues to inform discussions of historical 
injustices, as well as policies intended to promote restitution and redress. Through the 
long history of processes of classification, segregation, oppression, and persecution, the 
social construction of ‘race’ has come to assume meaning and purpose, and have a bearing 
on everyday life, and, by extension, may plausibly have a bearing on public opinion.
15 These three parties account for more than 80% of party support in the country, though the 
range of policy approaches to racial transformation and restitution is likely to be even 




Data from the 2015 round of the South African Social Attitudes 
Survey (SASAS) was used for this study. SASAS is an annual, nationally 
representative opinion survey with a realised sample of 3,115 people 
aged 16 years and older living in private homes. This sample excludes 
those living in places such as university residences, hospitals and 
old age homes. SASAS fieldwork was conducted between October 
and December 2015, roughly six months after the Rhodes statue was 
removed from the UCT campus. The questionnaire was translated into 
the major languages spoken in South Africa. Participation in the survey 
was voluntary and was conducted through face-to-face interviews. 
Respondents were assured of anonymity and signed consent forms 
detailing the confidentiality of their responses. 
One of the main limitations of a survey is the difficulty of knowing 
whether respondents have provided truthful and accurate answers to the 
interviewer. Extensive literature on “response bias” has been published 
to identify the optimal conditions under which survey participants 
give ‘truthful’ responses. In the case of this study, asking questions 
about colonial and apartheid-era statuary may invoke memories of 
apartheid “pain” in the respondents. Questions of this type may also 
prime respondents to the norms that govern racial interactions in 
South Africa. Under such circumstances, the opinions ventured to the 
interviewer may vary with the race match between the respondent and 
the person administering the survey. This assumption is in accordance 
with research on race-of-interviewer effects in other divided societies 
(like the United States).16 In order to resolve this problem, SASAS 
deploys its fieldworkers to ensure (as far as possible) that a respondent 
is interviewed by an interviewer of a similar race group.
16 Shirley Hatchett and Howard Schuman, “White Respondents and Race-of-Interviewer 
Effects”, 523-28; Nora Cate Schaeffer, “Evaluating Race-of-Interviewer Effects In a 
National Survey”, 400-419. 
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SASAS included several standard questions to gauge a respondent’s 
socio-demographic characteristics. These included age, race group, 
geographic status, formal educational attainment and political 
affiliation. In terms of the last, the survey obtained affiliation by asking 
the respondent which party they felt closest to. This is a more revealing 
technique to measure political partisanship than a simple question 
about voting behaviour as many people do not vote. To account for 
an individual’s socio-economic status, we used the Living Standard 
Measure (LSM). This indicator is comprised of more than 30 questions 
on household assets and access to services and was designed by the 
South African Advertising Research Foundation. This measure partitions 
the population into ten groups – ranging from the wealthiest (10) to the 
poorest (1) – based on their access to assets and services.
Results 
The results section is divided into three parts. First we will consider 
the public preferences for ‘if’ and ‘how’ apartheid and colonial statues 
should be removed. Then we examine the general population’s attitudes 
towards ‘who’ should make such an important decision. We will look 
specifically at how attitudes towards these questions vary between 
key socio-demographic groups in South Africa. Finally, we look at 
whether attitudes towards apartheid and colonial statues are related 
to individual preferences for other types of racial transformation. 
What should be done with apartheid and colonial statues? 
Respondents were asked: ‘In your opinion, what should be done 
with statues of South Africa’s apartheid and colonial leaders, such 
as Cecil John Rhodes, King George, Jan van Riebeeck?’ Responses to 
this question are presented in Figure 1.1 and demonstrated that close 
to half of the adult public (46%) believes that the statues should be 
removed. Of this group of ‘removers’, the main preference was for the 
8
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statues to be housed in a museum (27%) and just over a tenth (12%) 
felt they should be destroyed. A small portion (7%) of the general adult 
population favoured a different option – replacing the commemorative 
statues of the apartheid era with those of struggle heroes. Roughly 
a third (34%) of the adult public indicated that the memorialisations 
should be left alone while the balance (16%) expressed indifference 
or uncertainty. Between the ‘remove’ and ‘leave alone’ camps was a 
third option, which suggested that ‘statues of struggle heroes should 
be put up next to them’. By selecting this option, respondents could 
choose a strategy that ‘spoke back’ to the remembrance of apartheid 
and colonial monarchs and politicians with new artwork. Given the 
inclusivity of this option, it was surprising that it found only nominal 
support (4%) amongst adult South Africans. 
Figure 1.2 depicts how responses to the question on removing of 
symbolic representations of colonial and apartheid figures differ 
across age cohorts. The percentage favouring the removal ranged 
between 43% and 50% across the different cohorts. Given the apparent 
similarity in responses, it is appropriate to employ bivariate tests to 
assess how well the observed distribution fits with our expectations 
that our two variables (i.e. age cohort and attitudes towards statue 
removal) are independent. The results show clearly that the two 
variables are unrelated.17 The #RhodesMustFall campaign appeared 
to have many of the hallmarks of a general youth revolt, similar in 
character to the famous 1968 university student strikes in the Global 
North.18 We anticipated, therefore, to observe a sizeable age effect. 
17 To discern the probability of a correlation between these two variables, we used a Pearson’s 
Chi-square test and the results are as follows, Pearson chi2(36) = 39.359; Pr = 0.322. Of 
course, this type of test is only an assessment of the probability of independence of a 
distribution. We then used the more complex one-way analysis-of-variance model to 
further test whether attitudes towards statues and age are correlated. Here we treated age 
as a continuous variable. The results (F(6,3080) = 1.55, p= 0.157) confirm our earlier test and 
clearly show that age does not seem to be associated with preferences for the removal of 
statues of South Africa’s apartheid and colonial leaders at a statistically significant level. 
18 For more on the character and dynamics of the 1968 protests, see Ali 1978, 2009; 
Kurlansky 2004. 
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However, we found little evidence of intergenerational variation 
amongst the general population.
Figure 1.1 Views on what should be done with statues of apartheid and colonial leaders
Figure 1.2 Age group differences underlying preferred action on apartheid and 
colonial statues 
Looking beyond age cohort, Table 1.1 examines attitudes across four 
key socio-demographic characteristics in South African society: 
(i) educational attainment, (ii) spatial classification, (iii) political 
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affiliation, and (iv) population group. When reviewing the results of 
the table, it is important to remember how the characteristics of 
these groups intersect. Unsurprisingly, we noted distinct attitudinal 
variations between the country’s four major population groups. 
The first choice of the Black African majority was removal (52%) while 
members of the country’s different racial minorities were, on average, 
less willing to select this option. Relative to other population groups 
in South Africa, the Black African majority was also more in favour of 
the ‘destroy’ (14%) route. Compared to other racial minorities, White 
South Africans were the least likely to consider removal in general and 
considerably less willing to select destroy. A majority (61%) of White 
South Africans joined the ‘leave alone’ camp compared to about two-
fifths of Coloured and half of Indian adults.
Given the country’ post-transition history of party partisanship, 
political identity should exert an influence over individuals’ policy 
preferences in this study. As can be observed in Table 1.1, ANC supporters 
strongly believed in removal (53%), with the placement in museums 
the most preferred choice. EFF supporters voiced an even stronger 
preference for removal (63%). Between ANC and EFF partisans, the 
main difference was between the ‘museum’ and the ‘destroy’ options. 
EFF supporters exhibited higher than average popularity for the 
destroy option (22%) when compared to other subgroups in the table. 
‘Leave alone’ was the dominant response among DA supporters (51%), 
with less than a third (29%) favouring removal. Amongst those who 
were non-partisan – about 15% of the total adult population – primary 
support was again reported for the ‘leave alone’ (29%) and ‘don’t care’ 
(24%) options. We used multivariate analysis to disentangle these 
results from our population group findings described above. We found 
that an individual’s’ political affiliation did influence their preferences 
even when accounting for population group.19 
19 To better comprehend the correlation between political affiliation and preferences for the 
removal of statues, we used a logistic regression. Here, we were interested in those who 
favoured destroying the statues. We created a dichotomous variable that was coded 1 for 
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Black African 14.0 29.6 8.2 3.7 29.0 12.0 3.6
Coloured 3.8 21.3 2.6 3.4 43.6 21.7 3.6
Indian/Asian 6.7 15.5 4.9 6.0 49.2 9.6 8.1
White 2.0 19.0 2.0 4.4 61.1 6.2 5.4
Political Affiliation
ANC 15.5 30.8 8.1 3.1 27.2 11.8 3.4
DA 3.3 22.3 3.4 4.6 49.8 14.1 2.4
EFF 22.4 41.2 2.5 3.0 21.0 5.8 4.0
Other Parties 7.7 26.0 8.0 6.8 35.2 13.1 3.2
No Party 5.0 19.9 4.6 5.3 45.2 15.3 4.8
Undeclared 9.1 22.6 10.2 3.4 37.6 11.0 6.1
Educational Attainment 
Post-Matric 8.8 23.6 6.1 3.0 44.7 9.1 4.6
Matric 12.2 28.5 6.7 3.8 33.1 12.0 3.7
Incomplete 
Secondary 11.1 30.1 5.9 3.2 34.5 11.9 3.3
Senior Primary 13.7 22.4 8.0 6.2 28.2 18.2 3.3
Junior Primary 
and Below 16.5 18.5 16.0 4.1 26.1 11.6 7.1
Geographic Location
Urban formal 11.2 28.1 6.2 3.6 34.2 12.0 4.8
Urban informal 11.2 42.1 10.0 2.0 21.6 13.0 0.2
Rural trad. auth. 
Areas 12.3 22.3 8.7 5.0 37.9 11.4 2.5
Rural farms 18.8 17.4 2.8 2.6 29.1 24.4 5.0
Note: Row percentages.
‘selected remove and destroy’ and 0 ‘did not select remove and destroy’. We found that, 
even accounting for population group, the relative log odds of preferring that the statues 
be destroyed will decrease by 0.854 (SE= 0.368) if an individual supported the DA instead 
of the ANC. The relative log odds of preferring that destroy option will decrease by 1.033 
(SE= 0.324) if an individual had no political party association (versus supporting the ANC). 
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A preference for removal was highest in the country’s informal urban 
settlements where more than three-fifths of adults indicated an 
inclination to remove pre-transition leaders’ statues. Looking at this 
general desire for removal more closely, we can observe that adult 
informal urban dwellers were more likely than those in living elsewhere 
to select the ‘museum’ option. Approximately two-fifths (42%) of the 
informal urban dwellers favoured this approach, about twice the 
portion of those living in other types of geographic spaces. The spatial 
proximity of many informal urban areas to more economically affluent 
areas, may be informing attitudes. Research has shown that residing in 
economically unequal spatial environments can have an impact on how 
an individual sees the core facets of a society’s ethos.20 In this case, it may 
be that informal urban dwellers’ juxtaposition to economic inequality 
has had a specific effect on their desire for racial transformation.
We can observe an inverse association between formal educational 
attainment and removal of statues. Those with junior primary education 
or below were more inclined to support the ‘removal’ (51%) than other 
attainment groups in Table 1.1. Those with a post-matric education were 
the only group where the ‘leave alone’ (45%) option was more supported 
than the ‘remove’ possibility (39%). The observed relationship here may 
be informed by the overrepresentation of the racial minorities amongst 
the higher educational groups. We validated this thesis by using a 
multivariate testing and showed that formal educational attainment was 
not found to have a statistically significant association with preferences 
for the disposal of apartheid and colonial statues.21
20 Benjamin J. Newman, Christopher D. Johnston, and Patrick L. Lown, “False Consciousness 
or Class Awareness? Local Income Inequality, Personal Economic Position, and Belief in 
American Meritocracy”, 326-40.
21 We used a standard multinomial (polytomous) logistic regression to test the predictive 
power of educational attainment on attitudes towards statues. We produced a model 
that included formal educational attainment and population group as independent 
variables and preferences for the removal of statues as the dependent variable. Using the 
‘leave alone’ option as the base outcome, we found that years of formal educational 
attainment was not correlated with preferences when controlling for population group. 
This finding holds regardless whether we treated formal educational attainment as a 
continuous variable (i.e. years of completed formal education) or a categorical variable 
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This suggests that an individual’s position on the country’s socio-
economic ladder did not predict attitudes towards this issue. 
Who should decide about what should be done? 
In this section we move from the individual’s preferences for action 
to who should make decisions about historical redress. In SASAS 2015, 
respondents were asked ‘who should decide what happens to these 
statues of South Africa’s apartheid and colonial leaders?’ The most 
common selected option was ‘the government should decide’ (34%) 
while around a fifth (22%) favours a referendum on the matter to allow 
citizens to decide (Figure 1.3). There was surprisingly low support 
(10%) for the strategy of letting ‘those most hurt by the past’ decide, 
while one might similarly have expected a greater share to opt for the 
‘academics and historians’ option (15%). Around a tenth (11%) said they 
would choose ‘none of the above’, but these consist largely of those 
expressing indifference in the preceding question.
Figure 1.3: Public Views on who should decide what happens to the statues
(as it is treated in Table 1.1). If we substituted our LSM indicator with formal educational 




Figure 1.4: Age group differences underlying preferred group who decides on 
what happens to the apartheid and colonial statues
An individual’s preferences for who should decide had a robust 
correlation with how they wanted South African society to resolve 
the problem. Adults who thought that the statues should be removed 
were more likely to indicate a preference for allowing ‘those most hurt 
by the past’ to determine the statues’ future than those who preferred 
the status quo.22 This is particularly true of those who preferred that 
the statues be destroyed. In addition, we note that those who thought 
that the statues should be placed in a museum, were more inclined to 
trust the government to resolve the matter than those who favoured 
some other options. Remarkably, supporters of ‘leave alone’ were 
much more willing to trust the intelligentsia to determine the statues 
removal than those who backed removal. 
22 We noted that those who favoured removing the statues tended to prefer certain 
decision-making options. This suggests a correlation between these two attitudinal 
variables. The results of a Pearson’s Chi-square test (chi2(30) = 1644.827; Pr = 0.000) 
conforms to our expectations. In order to investigate this observation further we used a 
multinomial logistic regression to determine if this relationship held even when 
controlling for socio-demographic variables like population group, age, formal years of 
education, geographic location and political affiliation. The outcome of this regression 
confirmed that the statistically significant relationship between these variables persisted 
even accounting for these socio-demographic variables. 
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Preferences for which group should decide differ significantly by 
age cohort (Figure 1.4). It was interesting to note that twice as many 
16-19 year olds (33%) support the option of a referendum as the basis 
for deciding, compared to those of pensionable age (16%).23 To further 
explore attitudinal subgroup differences on this question, Table 1.2 
presents data on how attitudes vary across three important socio-
demographic groups in South African society. Black African adults 
were more likely than any of the nation’s racial minorities to identify 
government as the arbiter of such decisions. In contrast, less than a 
fifth of white, coloured or Indian adults selected government. Of all 
population groups, coloured adults were the least willing, on average, to 
consider the government option. Compared to other population groups, 
white South Africans tended not to favour a referendum on the question 
of statues. Unlike what was observed for other population groups in 
South Africa, even young white adults were disinclined to selected 
referendum as a desirable route. Instead, young white adults tended to 
agree with their elders and opted for academics and historians.
Substantive differences on who should decide were noted amongst 
supporters of the country’s major political parties. We note that 44% 
of ANC supporters were inclined to say that the government must 
decide – no other partisan subgroup displayed a similar level of faith in 
government. A correlation between age and decision-making attitudes 
play help explain why EFF supporters and the political unaffiliated have 
a strong preference for deciding by means of a referendum or vote. 
Both EFF supporters and the unaffiliated tend to be, on average, much 
younger than the supporters of other political affiliation subgroups. 
23 A one-way analysis of variance indicated that mean age differs significantly amongst the 
different decision-making options (F(5,3082) = 7.46, p = 0.000). We then used a Scheffe 
multiple-comparison test to determine which groups differed from each other. The 
results show that the age difference between options ‘government’ and ‘referendum or 
vote ‘ is 3.65, and this difference as statistically significant at the p<0.001 level. Statistically 
significant differences were also noted between ‘referendum’ and ‘none of the above’ as 
well as between ‘referendum’ and ‘do not know’. These observed differences remained 




Interestingly, EFF supporters were more likely to select government as 
an arbiter than supporters of the DA. It is noteworthy to observe that 
a large majority of the political non-aligned or undeclared indicated a 
preference for option other than government.
Table 1.2 How should it be decided what is done with the statues of South 



























































Black African 22.7 11.2 39.3 12.8 7.4 6.6
Coloured 22.9 5.9 16.4 15.1 19.3 20.4
Indian/Asian 21.0 5.5 19.2 16.1 25.5 12.6
White 12.6 6.3 17.0 30.4 24.1 9.6
Political Affiliation
ANC 20.7 10.5 44.0 11.6 7.3 5.9
DA 15.1 9.5 21.4 19.6 21.5 12.9
EFF 31.8 15.5 33.9 1.7 12.6 4.4
Other Parties 18.3 7.5 36.2 16.7 13.9 7.4
No Party 28.1 6.5 18.2 24.5 11.0 11.8
Undeclared 21.4 11.5 28.4 16.4 11.4 11.0
Living Standard Measurement (LSM)
LSM 1-3 9.6 3.2 50.5 17.2 9.1 10.3
LSM 4-5 19.4 10.9 44.1 11.4 7.7 6.4
LSM 6-7 23.8 11.0 33.2 14.5 7.6 9.9
LSM 8-9 23.8 12.8 26.8 13.8 14.8 8.0
LSM 10 16.4 3.4 16.6 29.3 27.0 7.2
Note: Row percentages. 
We detected substantive class-based differences in Table 1.2. Half 
of the poor (LSM 1-3) chose the state option, compared with 44% in 
the lower middle (LMS 4-5) and 33% of those in the upper middle 
(LSM 6-7). Compared to their less affluent counterparts, those in 
Chapter 1 | Statues of Liberty?
17
the upper LSM categorisations were the least likely to select the 
‘government’. Support for a referendum was higher among those with 
a medium living standard and lowest amongst the poor. Members of 
the top LSM group were found to be more likely to choose academics 
than all other LSM groups. A similar pattern was observed if we 
used formal educational attainment as a measure of socio-economic 
status. It could be argued that this apparent relationship is artificial 
– a product of existing racial inequalities in socio-economic class 
composition. Using multivariate analysis, however, we find that these 
effects hold even when controlling for population group and political 
partisanship.24 This outcome points to the salience of socio-economic 
position as a driver of attitudes towards redress in South Africa.
Support for existing policies of racial transformation 
People often have limited information about a subject and this presents 
a problem when they must make a decision on an unfamiliar matter. 
Using sophisticated experiments, researchers have shown that people 
make sense of the world using heuristics.25 Instead of engaging in 
exhaustive gathering and processing of information, individuals use 
cognitive mental shortcuts to categorise the limited information 
accessible to them and simplify attitude formation.26 Cognitive 
heuristics are especially employed when individuals are asked to frame 
attitudes towards a complex policy issue (such as the disposal of colonial 
and apartheid statues). Heuristics can include general assumptions 
24 In order to further explore the predictive affected played by LSM in selecting a preferred 
group to decide the problem, we used a multinomial logistic regression analysis. As our 
dependent variable we have preferences for decision-makers and we have population 
group and LSM as independent variables. Using government as the base outcome, we 
find that the relative log odds of selecting the ‘referendum’ (r=0.259; SE=0.054), ‘those 
hurt by the past’ (r=0.184; SE=0.067), and ‘academics and historians’ (r=0.115; SE=0.057) 
options will increase if an individual gained one LSM rank. These observed correlations 
were statistically significant at the p<0.05 level or higher. 
25 Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody, and Phillip E. Tetlock, Reasoning and Choice: 
Explorations in Political Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
26 Fiske & Taylor, Social Cognition.
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about human nature or political predispositions or even elite clues. By 
using these shortcuts, individuals can form attitudes that are ‘rational’ 
in the sense that these attitudes are internally consistent.27 This is a 
very limited conception of rationality, though, as it ignores any deeper 
rationality requirements for the content of attitudes.
We posit that people use their general predispositions about racial 
transformation policy as heuristics to shape attitudes towards the 
removal of apartheid and colonial statuary. The remainder of this section 
will seek to validate this thesis. In order to gauge understandings of 
transformation, we turned to data on specific redress policies. In SASAS 
2015, respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with three 
statements about specific forms of racial transformation. Responses 
to these questions are presented in Figure 1.5 for the country’s Black 
African majority and racial minorities. It is evident that the Black 
African population is predominantly in favour of these policies of racial 
transformation while racial minority members are more hesitant in their 
support. Although we note dissimilarities in how each of the country’s 
different racial minorities viewed these policies in 2015, these disparities 
are not as stark as may have been anticipated. While disagreement 
was also more prevalent amongst White South Africans, high levels of 
disagreement were observed for adult members of the Coloured and 
Indian groups (see Roberts 2014 for a more comprehensive examination 
of redress attitudes of this type).28 
27 James H. Kuklinski, and Paul J. Quirk, “Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, 
Heuristics, and Mass Opinion.” In Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of 
Rationality, edited by Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins and Samuel L. Popkin (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 153–82.
28 Benjamin J. Roberts, “Your Place or Mine? Beliefs about Inequality and Redress 
Preferences in South Africa.” Social Indicators Research 118, no. 3 (2014): 1167-90, https://
doi:10.1007/s11205-013-0458-9.
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Figure 1.5: Public Attitudes towards Different Forms of Racial Redress across 
Selected Groups 
In order understand whether individual attitudes towards racial 
transformation affected preferences for the disposal of statues we 
created a Racial Transformation Index. This indicator was constructed 
by combining responses to the three questions depicted in Figure 1.5 
and converting them into a 0-10 index.29 ‘Don’t know’ responses to 
these statements were treated as missing. The higher the score on the 
Racial Transformation Index, the greater the reported support for racial 
redress. Mean results on this index are depicted across the statutory 
disposal preferences in Table 1.3 and we can clearly see evidence of 
a substantive correlation. Individuals who favour the ‘remove and 
destroy’ (M=8.02; SE=0.13) or ‘replace with heroes’ (M=7.64; SE=0.14) 
options tended to have a high index score.30 Conversely, low support 
29 To determine the internal consistency of the Racial Transformation Index, we used 
Cronbach’s alpha to examine the index’s reliability. The result (α=0.78) suggested that the 
three items have shared covariance and probably measure the same underlying concept. 
The national mean on the index was 6.73 (SE= 0.062), indicating a more moderate position 
on this measure than may be expected given the country’s history. Examining the 
skewness (-0.945) and kurtosis (3.117) confirm that the index has a symmetric distribution 
with well-behaved tails. 
30 When investigating the mean Racial Transformation Index score on the ‘remove and 
destroy’ option we noted that the statistical distribution has a higher kurtosis (6.36) than 
the curvature you would expect to find in a normal distribution. In other words, the 
index mean values are clustered at the end of the distribution indicating a uniformity of 
opinion within the ‘removed and destroyed’ camp. This leptokurtic distribution result 
can be contrasted with how the index distribution looks in the ‘leave alone’ camp (2.10) 
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for redress was associated with the ‘leave alone’ (M=5.75; SE=0.12) 
option. This demonstrates that attitudes towards pre-transition 
statuary cannot be understood independently of attitudes towards 
existing policies of racial redress.
Table 1.3: Mean Racial Transformation Index Score across Attitudes towards the 






Individual Preferences for Colonial and Apartheid Statues 
Removed and 
destroyed 8.02 0.13 7.78 8.27 -1.44 6.36
Replaced with 
struggle hero 
statues 7.64 0.14 7.36 7.92 -1.09 4.63
Removed and placed 
in a museum 7.30 0.10 7.10 7.50 -1.38 5.23
Struggle hero 
statues placed next 
to them 7.04 0.20 6.65 7.43 -1.08 4.38
(Do not know) 6.48 0.38 5.73 7.23 -0.64 2.37
I don’t really care 
what happens to 
them 6.45 0.19 6.08 6.82 -0.62 2.26
They should be left 
alone 5.75 0.12 5.52 5.99 -0.44 2.10
Individual Preferences for Collective Decision-Making
Those most hurt by 
South Africa’s past 7.52 0.13 7.27 7.78 -1.03 4.69
Government 7.51 0.09 7.34 7.69 -1.39 5.65
Referendum or vote 6.89 0.12 6.65 7.12 -0.98 3.36
(Do not know) 5.77 0.26 5.25 6.29 -0.30 1.81
Academics and 
historians 5.74 0.20 5.35 6.13 -0.48 1.98
None of the above 5.30 0.22 4.86 5.74 -0.02 1.91
– here the distribution is more mesokurtic. People who are in this camp were found to 
be much less uniform in their support for racial transformation.
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An individual’s attitudes towards racial transformation policies seemed to 
be associated with their preferences for ‘who’ should make decisions on 
redressing post-apartheid memorialisation strategies. Those who were 
uncertain (M=5.77; SE=0.26), favoured leaving the decision to academia 
(M=5.74; SE=0.20) or selected ‘none of the above’ (M=5.30; SE=0.22) 
exhibited relatively low Racial Transformation Index mean scores. To 
better understand this apparent correlation we can use multivariate 
techniques to determine the predictive strength of the index relative 
to the following predictive variables: population group, socio-economic 
status and partisanship. In all cases, the predictive effect of the index 
was observed even controlling for these other variables.31 It is clear 
therefore, that the general public’s preferences for who should decide 
on how apartheid and colonial-era statues should be preserved (if at all) 
cannot be isolated from their general attitudes towards the country’s 
broader programme of racial redress and restitution.
Discussion 
Overall, we found that the public’s views on colonial and apartheid-
era statuary were polarised. Many demanded removal which seems 
to signal a desire for a new type of commemorative public culture 
– one that excludes statues of colonial and apartheid era masters. 
Others preferred the status quo, displaying a defence of the current 
monumentalising efforts of the post-apartheid state – where new 
heroes stand alongside villains of the past. Even greater polarisation was 
observed when respondents were asked about who should decide the 
fate of these statues. Some backed government while others favoured 
31 To test whether the relationship between the Racial Transformation Index and the 
individual preferences for who decides, we used a multinomial logistic regression. 
Preferences for decision-makers were the dependent variable while the index, age, 
population group, socio-economic status and political affiliation were the independent 
variables. Using ‘historians and academics’ as the base outcome, the relative log odds of 
selecting people most hurt by South Africa’s past (r=0.129; SE=0.044), government 
(r=0.259; SE=0.054) and referendum (r=0.212; SE=0.043) increased if the Racial 
Transformation Index score grows by one unit. These associations were statistically 
significant at the p<0.05 level or higher.
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a referendum and there was no majority position. Our analysis has also 
shown that how the public sees the statuary reflects a larger division 
about how South African society should be transformed. Perhaps 
this is not surprising. Pre-transition monuments (like the statue of 
Cecil John Rhodes on the UCT campus) represent a range of different 
symbolic continuities with the colonial and apartheid era. They are, in 
other words, symbols of a truncated decolonisation process. 
After the end of apartheid, the new democratic regime combined the 
preservation of colonial and apartheid monuments with the commission 
of new memorials next to or nearby the preserved monuments. 
This created spaces characterised by a multiplicity of different 
representations of the nation’s various cultural and historical elements. 
This post-apartheid attempt to create polyvocal spaces encouraged the 
diversification of the symbolic landscape.32 Holmes and Loehwing call 
this strategy ‘multiplicative commemoration’.33 This strategy, however, 
finds little support amongst the general population. We found that only 
a small portion of the South African adult public backed multiplicative 
commemoration with most preferring either preservation or removal. 
This outcome should lead us to question the standing, and therefore 
suitability, of the country’s current multiplicative strategy. Indeed, our 
results seem to support an existing critique of South Africa’s strategy of 
heritage preservation within the literature on memorialisation.34
The 2015 #RhodesMustFall campaign was a youth movement that 
seemed to speak to a common set of values amongst the wider (and so 
called) ‘Born Free’ generation. Consequently, we may have expected 
clear intergenerational differences to have emerged in our study.
32 Ali Khangela Hlongwane, “Commemoration, Memory and Monuments in the Contested 
Language of Black Liberation: The South African Experience.” Journal of Pan African 
Studies 2, no. 4 (2008): 135-70.
33 Carolyn E. Holmes, and Melanie Loehwing, “Icons of the Old Regime: Challenging South 
African Public Memory Strategies in #RhodesMustFall”, 1215.
34 Karel Anthonie Bakker and Liana Műller, “Intangible Heritage and Community Identity in 
Post-Apartheid South Africa”. 48-54; Elizabeth Rankin, “Creating/curating Cultural 
Capital: Monuments and Museums for Post-Apartheid South Africa”, 72-98.
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But we could not find proof for a strong age effect underlying statuary 
preferences. Despite the fact that today’s young adults grew up 
under a different political system from their older counterparts, the 
new post-apartheid generation seemed to favour broadly similar 
options to redress the problem of colonial and apartheid statues. 
This outcome seems to correspond with public opinion research by 
Mattes (2012)35 which found that South African youth was no more 
greatly predisposed towards principles such as equality and redress 
than older generations.36 However, we did note that the youth were 
more likely to support the most democratic of the decision-making 
options when asked about who should decide the statues’ fate. This 
outcome could serve as a possible contradiction of Mattes’s central 
thesis that the country’s post-apartheid generation is as “lukewarm” 
on democracy as their parents and grandparents. 
There is little evidence that the observed polarisation over pre-transition 
monuments is the product of class-based differences. Population 
group differences characterise the survey results with black African 
adults more likely to support removal than members of the country’s 
various racial minorities. It is possible to explain attitudinal differences 
amongst black African and white adults by referring to how individuals 
employ memories about their groups’ collective pasts to form attitudes 
about present-day events. However, the lack of attitudinal variation 
between the white, coloured and Indian adults is unanticipated given 
the country’s history. One admittedly contentious hypothesis is that 
this might be related to the popularity of the DA amongst the country’s 
racial minorities.37 Political support for the DA tended to correlate with 
backing for the status quo. This finding may be related to the brand 
of non-racialism currently employed and promoted by that party 
35 Robert Mattes, “The ‘Born Frees’: The Prospects for Generational Change in Post-
Apartheid South Africa”, 133-53.
36 Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid.
37 For a fuller discussion on the role of race and class in relation to voting patterns in South 
African elections, see Habib and Naidu (1999, 2006). 
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(see Anciano, 2016 for a fuller discussion).38 More work is needed to 
validate this thesis and better understand minority group differences 
on the question of colonial and apartheid statues. 
One of the most interesting findings of this chapter concerns how 
academics and historians are viewed by the general adult population. 
In our analysis those displaying greater levels of opposition to 
transformation policies tended to display more support for academics 
and historians having ultimate decision-making power over colonial 
and apartheid-era statuary. The basis for this preference will clearly 
require further follow-up investigation. 
Conclusion
The 2015 #RhodesMustFall campaign brought renewed attention 
on issues of race, redress, restitution, social cohesion, and active 
citizenship in South Africa. However, the general public remains 
divided on one of the campaign’s central calls – that of changing 
society’s approach to memorialisations of the old regime. This division 
signifies the difficulties and contestations likely to be encountered 
in pushing forward change on this issue. One of the possible 
contributions to confronting and minimising such divisions would 
be to advocate for greater public dialogue as a means of promoting 
a fuller, multi-perspective understanding on historic memorialisation 
that is rooted within a broader agenda of redress and restitution. An 
imperative of such dialogues, as argued in Swartz’s Another Country: 
Everyday Social Restitution (2016), would be to bring diverse groups 
of people together for conversations that recognise and acknowledge 
past injustice and the effects it continues to have on the present. 
Such intergroup dialogues also require meaningful location of oneself 
within these past histories and their legacies, and a consideration of 
38 Fiona Anciano, “A Dying Ideal: Non-Racialism and Political Parties in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa”, 195-214.
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the obligations one acquires by virtue of their location.39 While it by no 
means represents a social panacea to a complex debate, dialogues of 
this kind could prove transformative in creating a broader consensus 
on how we as a society deal with pre-transition memorials.
In the course of this chapter, we have analysed the attitudes of South 
Africa’s sampled population towards an issue of particular importance. 
The findings presented from this analysis are the first evidence 
concerning the predispositions of the public towards the symbolic 
representations of colonial and apartheid figures following the end 
of #RhodesMustFall campaign. The study was based on a limited 
number of questions and, as such, the researchers were restricted in 
their scope and exploration. There is a need for further quantitative 
analyses and to continue to monitor change in attitudes over time. 
Moreover, there are certain questions that even a more in-depth 
quantitative survey would be unable to answer. Careful, nuanced and 
in-depth qualitative explorations that seek to further understand the 
‘stubborn kernel’ of opposition to transformation (Dixon et al., 2007) 
that continues to exist in the country, especially amongst minority 
groups, is urgently required. 
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Chapter 2
By design, survival and recognition:
Exploring the contemporary significance of 




In the past 23 years, since the first democratic elections saw the ascendancy of the African National Congress to power in the Republic of South Africa, there has been a continuous, if somewhat 
muffled history of both the destruction and the erection of monuments 
that inhabit the public domain. With a constitutional democracy in 
place, South Africa could be said to have the ideal platform for the 
formation of a public domain, a space of open debate in which different 
views could be aired and compared. This public sphere, extrapolating 
from Habermas (1989), could possibly be stretched contain elements 
of both western and indigenous African principles of debate and 
deference to majority decisions. Yet, over the last three years tensions 
around the status of public monuments have, as it were, erupted from 
a volcanic substructure of reaction to colonialism and apartheid, 
resulting in a wide range of shock waves across the republic’s rather 
fragile politico-cultural landscape. 
In this chapter, I take a deeper look at the whole question of why 
monuments are such a focus of attention, for their makers, their 
audiences and their detractors/destroyers. Of all the fixed forms of 
visual art that appeared in the public domain in the past, with the 
exception of architecture, monuments have been the most visible and 
accessible. That, today, many monuments from the past are dwarfed 
in size and prominence by the rampant billboards and banners of 
commercial advertising, seems not to have diminished the symbolic 
importance attached to their presence as things that commemorate, 
or otherwise remind, their viewers of the past. For monuments are not 
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merely more public sculptures, they are, as Reynolds (1996) succinctly 
puts it, ‘embodiments and symbols of [our] traditions and values’.
In what follows, I explore what constitutes the significance of a 
monument, from historical circumstances to the contemporary 
domain. Because both the word ‘monument’ and the current 
secular and civic practices (as opposed to religious and royal/elite/
autocratic ones) of commemoration to which it refers, have largely 
(although by no means exclusively) been located within western 
cultural traditions and practices, it is important to unpack their 
origins and ostensible meanings to enable a forthright assessment 
of their relevance in a postcolonial and supposedly decolonising 
state. My argument, to some extent, derives from Alois Riegl’s (1982) 
tripartite definition of monuments, originally published in 1903, 
but only translated into English in 1982. Riegl’s concern was largely 
to establish how cultural and historical values of objects can be 
defined in relation to issues of preservation – so that anything at 
any scale or in any context may become a venerable ‘monument’ 
(Riegl 1982). My endeavour differs in that I want to understand 
why public, large-scale civic monuments having come into being 
particularly in the South African historical landscape, either live on or 
perish in relation to political and social imperatives. In other words, 
what makes their significance relevant or not?
Defining the field
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1964) definitions of the term 
“monument” are instructive in helping to circumscribe what may or 
may not be considered such. The word itself derives from the Latin 
monumentum: “Latin Monere = remind, and suffix -ment - result or 
means of visible action”, and I have picked out from a longer list the 
three definitions most relevant to my discussion:
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1. Anything that, by its survival, commemorates a person, action, 
period or event.
2. A structure, edifice or erection intended to commemorate a 
notable person, action or event.
3. A structure of stone or other material erected over the grave or in 
church etc in memory of the dead.
4. A carved figure, effigy. (Oxford English Dictionary 1964, 1278)
These definitions encompass both the kinds of things that may 
be considered monuments, and their function as memorials that 
commemorate, and thus implicate notions of memory. Thus the 
relationship between monuments and memorials becomes an important 
factor in understanding the symbolic domain in which monuments 
operate. Clearly a memorial is something intended to “remind” the person 
paying attention, to call something past into the present, and can take 
a number of forms including a memorial service, a memorial action, a 
commemorative bequest. The Oxford English Dictionary’s definitions of 
“memorial”, in its simple formulation, is “sign of remembrance, memorial, 
monument” (Oxford English Dictionary 1964, 1232). But it then continues 
to outline the following substrata of “memorial”:
1. Remembrance, recollection; (a person’s) memory or power of 
recollection. 
2. A memorial act; an act of commemoration
3. A thing, as a monument, a custom, etc., by which the memory of a 
person, thing, or event is preserved. 
4. A record, a chronicle; esp. in pl., memoirs. (Oxford English Dictionary 
1964, 1232) 
It is a common contention that the memorial act, that is, the act of 
remembering, and so the remembrance, on one hand, and the thing, 
custom and/or record on the other are inextricably linked in closing 
the symbolic circle which makes the monument relevant in any context. 
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Once the thing is no longer part of an active form of remembering, 
it cannot act as a monument, or even as a memorial. The memorial 
aspect of monuments is reflected in the fact that many monuments 
are called memorials, as in the German denkmal, the Nederlands 
gedenkteken and the isiZulu term isikhumbuzo.
However, while it can be argued that all monuments can function 
as memorials in that they are reminders, sometimes embedded in 
commemoration that is proud and desired, at other times unwanted 
and injurious, it cannot be said that all memorials are monuments. 
Furthermore, for a monument to perform its memorial function, the 
memories it invokes/evokes would have to have some affirmative 
value, as, for example, in marking pride in those who fought for a ( just?) 
cause and died in the process. It could also be argued that memorials 
that are not monuments might be preferable to the monumental 
structures that litter our actual and cultural landscapes.
 The difference between a memorial and a monument can be clearly 
articulated by dissecting the adjectival form of the word monument, 
i.e. “monumental”. In its simplest application, something that serves 
as a monument may be termed “monumental”, but the more usual, 
metaphorical and colloquial use of the term, as in “monumental 
blunder”, meaning “massive and permanent, extremely great, 
stupendous” (Oxford English Dictionary 1964, 1278) is the one most 
commonly used in describing the things made to act as monuments. 
The fact that monuments are associated with size, grandeur and 
longevity or permanence, as memorials to persons and deeds deemed 
worthy of remembrance, suggests that the erection of monuments is 
always based in an intention to aim for immortality. It is also always 
based on assumptions that the values of those erecting the monuments 
will remain valid for succeeding generations, in spite of the fact that 
the destruction/removal of monuments – a form of iconoclasm 
(Gamboni 1997; Grant 2001; Freedberg 1989, 2012) – offers continuous 
evidence that they do not. 
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Monuments by design 
The Oxford English Dictionary definitions numbers 2-3 cited above 
suggest that monuments that are made as such, are designed as 
mnemonic devices, erected to last and commemorate persons and 
events. Such monuments are moreover generally associated with 
public spaces, and, although some may be privately funded, the 
majority are funded through the mechanisms of the state or the polity, 
as statements of history. A monument by design must be VISIBLE 
from time of production: it must be intended to uphold a particular 
construction of memory in the public eye. If, as Nora (1989) suggests, 
history is written in order to enable us to forget, because public history 
is the repository of memory, then, presumably monuments, as public 
memorials, enable the same kind of forgetting and remembering. Nora 
offers the following differentiation between memory and history, 
which gives this differentiation more eloquently:
Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains 
in permanent evolution, open to the dialectics of remembering and 
forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformation, vulnerable to 
manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being dormant and 
periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, 
always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. (Nora 1989, 7)
Yet it is questionable whether remembering events and persons 
depicted in figurative monuments is possible without verbal clues, 
or commemorative events and performances – in other words 
monuments as memorials are dependent on forms of history, and are 
therefore only as significant as the possible associations that can be 
made between them and known persons and/or events. It is possibly 
the enforced performance of obsequy demanded by larger than life-
size and imposing figures of hated characters such as the colonial 
master Cecil John Rhodes that make them so distasteful to those who 
have been oppressed. 
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Historically, monumental public civic sculptures and memorial 
architectural structures intended to last over centuries were only 
occasionally, and quite exceptionally, erected in indigenous African 
cultures South of the Sahara. In ‘the west’, however, they have a very 
long history going back to Ancient Greece. In Egypt, Nubia, Axum, India 
and Asia most monumental structures and sculptures were religious 
and tied to a theistic monarchic polity rather than a nominally civic 
one. Apart from the large multitude of massive sculptures to deities 
and Pharaohs that littered the ancient Egyptian and Nubian landscape, 
there were no other figurative large-scale (life-size or above) stone or 
bronze sculptures made by African artists that were equivalent in size 
or propagandistic function to the civic sculptures of Roman emperors, 
such as the Augustus of the Prima Porta the Colossus of Constantine, 
or the equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius (Brilliant, 1974), all of 
which are still used as models for monumental bronze sculptures, 
even those in Africa. The tradition of commemorative, naturalistic and 
identifiable individual portraits being used as memorials/monuments, 
can be traced back to the ancient Roman Republic, with a provincial 
offshoot in the Fayum portraits in Ptolemaic Egypt  and similar small 
forms dating much later in Ghana and possibly Nigeria. The portrait 
tradition continued through Europe among the aristocracy in tomb 
effigies, was revived in the Italian Renaissance in contexts that moved 
out of the burial context, and into the Enlightenment at which point, 
making monuments becomes part of the public sphere. 
Jurgen Habermas (1989) argues that the public sphere emerged in 
Europe specifically, from a space in which the power of royal elites was 
advanced and upheld to one constituted by families and their heads, the 
urban middle classes. The constitution of the public sphere lies in how 
these private families moved outside and beyond the domestic sphere, 
with private individuals becoming public citizens. Here work/labour 
moved from the family compounds into spaces more open to public 
access and egress and in which debate and reasoned criticism could 
occur among peers. It was in this open sphere that new monuments 
could have functioned as memory-markers for secular and non-
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royal events and persons. Yet, the tradition of monument making 
has remained elitist, driven by political agendas, and almost entirely 
patriarchal until quite late into the 20th century. Monuments depicting 
images of men standing high on plinths dominate in Europe and the 
USA, and, while allegorical group sculptures often include voluptuous 
female figures, many modelled on Greek originals such as the Nike of 
Samothrace, they seldom commemorated real-life women. Among the 
most vaunted memorial forms, equestrian statuary associated with 
status and power since Ancient Roman times – viz. the sculpture of 
Marcus Aurelius in Rome – has almost completely excluded women, 
being used to commemorate male leaders everywhere. It has been 
employed in similar ways in many (small scale) examples of African 
sculpture such as the Djenné terracotta horsemen (De Grunne 2014) 
and the horsemen of Yoruba house posts (Blier 1998). The power 
dynamics at play here are of course based in the fact that there have 
been few women in the past with sufficient power to hand to make 
such monuments either necessary or desirable.
The image of Cecil John Rhodes, in a prominent position on the 
campus of the University of Cape Town (UCT), belonged to a long line 
of images of seated male potentates, but possibly owed its closest 
debt to Auguste Rodin’s sculpture called The Thinker. Its naturalistic 
rendering of anatomy, idealised form, scale and material all sit firmly 
within the western tradition of monumentality, even though its 
emotive exaggerations of pose suggest a debt to early modernism. 
This, nevertheless entirely predictable and almost bankrupt tradition 
of naturalistic sculpture was exported across the world in the form 
of colonial monuments followed by independence monuments, the 
latter often in the very tired style of social realism favoured in the old 
‘communist bloc’, and now prevalent in the postcolonial industry of 
monument making by Chinese and Korean artists. 
That the many colonial and some postcolonial monuments, made and 
installed by design have suffered, and are still now suffering similar 
fates of dismantling and deposition as that meted out to the statue of 
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Rhodes, or complete demolition (which fate is best, depends on one’s 
point of view) bears out the idea that monuments by design are most 
likely temporary and most certainly not eternal. Such monuments’ 
attempted imposition of values is replaced by their evocation of 
shared histories of oppression and exploitation, as is abundantly clear 
from the furore that surrounded the #RhodesMustFall campaign. The 
triumphalist messages the old monuments were intended to convey 
to their original white audiences (as though the black people who 
encountered them did not see them) can no longer be tolerated in a 
changed cultural and political space. Some of this intolerance may be 
related to an argument mounted by Steven Knapp (1989) in which he 
posits that collective memory, whether it has any actual relationship 
to actual events or not, in some senses coerces individuals to 
acknowledge their culpability in the remembered events. Following 
this logic, such statues should be as discomforting for the descendants 
of white settlers (and new white settlers) as they are for the present 
generations of black citizens.
Monuments by survival: a matter of heritage
In the South African landscape there are innumerable monuments 
that have survived from the past. Many of these, like the Rhodes 
Memorial on Signal Hill above the UCT campus, are monuments 
that were built in the colonial and later apartheid eras. The Rhodes 
Memorial, because it is so far outside the normal passage of foot traffic 
of ordinary Cape Town residents or UCT students, has gone relatively 
unremarked. However, a monument such as the Kruger Monument in 
Church Square, in the centre of Pretoria/Tshwane city, while it still 
survives, has been moved, defended, defaced and restored many times 
and imprisoned in steel fences and rolls of razor wire when protest 
action is anticipated (Figure 2.1). It corresponds to a definition of a 
‘monument’ (again from the Oxford English Dictionary 1964): Anything 
that, by its survival, commemorates a person, action, period or event. 
The Kruger monument in Pretoria commemorates, and undoubtedly 
Chapter 2 | By design, survival and recognition:
41
celebrates, a whole history of various successive forms of resistance 
to oppression, and to the supremacy of white Afrikanerdom. 
Figure 2.1 Van Wouw, Anton. Monument to Paul Kruger. [Bronze sculpture]. 
Church Square, Pretoria. 1896. Photograph: Anitra Nettleton, 
January 2016.
Yet, because it forms part of an historical narrative, and is claimed as 
part of partisan heritage, functioning as what Kuhn (2010, 299) calls 
a “memory text”, it survives. Postulating that memory texts allow for 
social memory, and for an acceptance of memory as unfixed and open 
to interpretation, Kuhn places both narrative and performance at 
the centre of “memory work”. The Kruger monument has thus been 
a pivot on which numerous pro- and antagonistic performances 
have revolved and according to the Mayor of Tshwane, will remain 
at the centre of the square as it becomes a more inclusive heritage 
site. The Rhodes statue, however, went largely unremarked until it 
became a pivot in the antagonistic and agonistic political environment 
of the #RhodesMustFall movement in 2015. It formed a fulcrum for 
discussions about decolonialising universities, but not because of 
what it was (a statue in a western mode).
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Some survivals are accidental in the sense that they are not understood, 
as might be the case with the Miner’s Statue in Johannesburg. The 
statue represented three miners, one white, the overseer, fully dressed 
and with a lamp (to lead the way), two black rock drill operators, bare 
to the waist and doing most of the labour. The racist overtones of 
this composition appear to have gone unnoticed by all – students of 
mine interviewing passers-by about the monument in 2004-2006, 
were often told that it represented men manning an anti-aircraft gun 
rather than a rock drill. None of the interviewees appeared to have 
noticed the clearly delineated differences between black and white 
figures in the scene. Perhaps because these are nameless individuals, 
because nobody really knows what they represent, and because they 
are not at the centre of any performances they have been ignored, 
except by the metal thieves who regularly manage to remove parts of 
sculptures or their brass plaques around the South African landscape.  
Such sculptures are kept as heritage, restored and re-patinated, 
without a clear understanding of their origins, accepted as part of a 
wider history and a continuously shifting net of heritage
As ‘heritage’ is an idea that is pivotal in the cultural politics of 
remembrance and of identity, it is important to unpack its nuances to 
establish some parameters. The Oxford English Dictionary (1964, 894) 
defines heritage as: What is or may be inherited, inherited circumstances 
or benefits, (fig) portion allotted to anybody. Presumably, public heritage 
is commonly held, but is not governed by legal documents such as the 
will made out by an individual. It is on the assumption of the joint 
ownership of what is now defined as a cultural heritage that legal 
systems and acts of parliament attempt to outline what may or may 
not be done to with or around public monuments. 
Some of the issues that arise are summarised here. As against a private 
heritage, public heritage should be of value to all, and the value would 
have to be arrived at by consensus. Clearly there was consensus, in 
the case of the Rhodes statue at the University of Cape Town that the 
values that Rhodes represented were not acceptable to the majority 
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of students involved in the action demanding its removal. Yet there is 
an argument to be made that the value of a monument may inhere in 
aspects other than whom it represents. Schmahmann (2016) argues that 
the statue, as an artwork by a woman artist, should have been accorded 
some degree of recognition for its aesthetic worth and its historical 
importance as representative of a woman’s overcoming of gender biases. 
While this may have been extraordinary at the time of its installation 
in 1934, the fact of its female authorship does not render the figure 
any less patriarchal in its affect. It also does not exonerate those, who 
decided to erect the sculpture as a monument to Rhodes, from a kind 
of complicity in the commemoration of a now widely decried colonial 
master. Schmahmann’s argument also acknowledges the problematics 
of assuming a common understanding of aesthetic value, and a common 
recognition of the importance of women’s advancement. Neither was 
acknowledged in the rhetoric of the protests. 
The controversy highlights that the ways in which public heritage 
is allotted in contemporary society has not changed very much – in 
the contemporary, postcolonial, polyglot African nation state, public 
monuments are put in place by central governments, sometimes with 
a nod to ethnic minorities, but more often than not, with an eye to 
political consequence. In such societies where social structures 
of the past were not homogenous, and where contemporary social 
structures often harden along ethnic and religious boundaries, 
common cultural ancestries and futures can only be imagined, to use 
Benedict Anderson’s (1991) notion. Ultimately this political context 
calls into question whether there can be a “public” heritage without 
a centralised political control through which values and narratives 
are filtered. As in the past, peasants had very little say in the vested 
interests of the kings, so, today, the working classes have little say 
in the ways in which monuments are designed and constructed. The 
toppling of monuments of the former Soviet regime across Eastern 
Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s after the fall of the Iron Curtain 
bears ample testimony to the ways in which people enact their power 
against their former oppressors (Freedberg 2012; Grant 2001).
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Monuments by recognition, Art by appropriation
There is a final ontological status for monuments that encompasses 
both the dimension of design and survival. Many large-scale sculptures 
and architectural structures are in some sort monuments, being 
recognised as such in the present because of their size and aesthetic 
content (Riegl 1982). Often their size makes them inescapable, 
their materials make them venerable for their age, their aesthetic 
dimensions of design make them pleasing or impressive to behold. 
Consequently, they are recognised as monuments, even though they 
were not built as such. Two Southern African examples of this would be 
Great Zimbabwe in Zimbabwe and Mapungubwe in South Africa. Both 
of these ancient sites rank high in the heritage hierarchies of their 
respective contemporary nation-states, and both provide symbols 
for nation-building. They are both impressive for their scale and their 
African lineages that are impeccably pre-colonial. They are recognised 
as complex structures encompassing important iconographic 
elements and are thus subsumed into the realm of ‘art’ in its broadest 
definition. They offer precursors for new forms of memorial such as 
the experiential journeys mapped out at Freedom Park in Pretoria. But 
they were not built as monuments or as memorials. They have only 
become such in the context of debates about African heritage from 
colonial times onwards, and thus draw on theoretical paradigms such 
as that propounded by Riegl (1982). In this context, however, their 
significance has been made “African” by being extrapolated from their 
original ethnic connections to continental significance.
The particular problem of effigies
Number 4 of the Oxford English Dictionary definitions of “monument” 
cited above specifically mentions “effigies” as constituting a form 
of monument (Oxford English Dictionary 1964 1278). An effigy is 
essentially a figurative representation of a dead person (sometimes also 
a dog or a horse), which should be recognisable as a particular person 
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(or animal). Effigies were originally attached to tombs of deceased 
members of the European aristocracy. In this an effigy is different from 
a ‘portrait’, which is generally identified as a likeness of a person, the 
sitter, ‘taken’ by the artist during the sitter’s lifetime (Brillliant 1974). 
But while neither the effigy nor the portrait is considered as a monument 
unless so constituted in a public space, the representational image 
as a portrait is often central to the commemoration of the person, 
and sometimes of a specific event with which the actor is associated. 
Freedberg has argued that the power of images centres on “... the 
assumption of presence – what is represented becomes fully present 
– the sign becomes living embodiment of what it signifies.” (Freedberg 
1989, 28). It appears to have been this assumption of presence that 
underlay the reactions of students to the images of Rhodes and 
others at UCT during the #RhodesMustfFall campaign and protests 
of 2015/2016, but is barely discussed in any of the articles that have 
covered this specific debate, which is central to the discussion in some 
of the essays in this book.
It is interesting that it is precisely this power of attraction exercised 
by the likeness of the effigy or portrait (real or imaginary) of historical 
personages that has governed the kind of monuments that have been 
erected in post-apartheid South Africa and in many postcolonial 
African states. In the latter, one of the favoured modes is that of a stark 
socialist realism espoused by Chinese and North Korean monument 
makers who execute commissions for African states from Zimbabwe, 
and Senegal, through Republic of Benin, in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Namibia and Botswana (Arnold 1989; Kirkwood 2013). 
Furthermore, the monumental is often here completely aligned with the 
colossal, the size of the figure deliberately dwarfing the viewer, so that 
the obsequies paid and performed by those in the vicinity is physically 
inescapable and psychologically disturbing. While South Africa has 
descended to similarly aesthetically barren statements, in statues to 
Nelson Mandela at Sandton Square (Sandton) and the Union Buildings 
(Pretoria), these are homegrown variants, many of them made to 
‘match’ existing apartheid monuments. These stratagems seem to be 
46
Exchanging Symbols
adopted on the assumption that heritage divisions could be solved, 
simply by adding more effigies to an already overcrowded, almost 
entirely male-dominated space of public commemoration.
On a visit to Pretoria/Tshwane in late April 2015, to consider the 
present state of the Kruger Monument in Church Street, I spent 
some time in Pretorius Square in front of the Pretoria City Hall where 
another example of such accretion of monuments is visible. Here 
large-scale monuments to Andries Pretorius (an equestrian sculpture) 
(Figure 2.2) after whom Pretoria was named, and his son Marthinus 
Wessel Pretorius (a standing male figure with a book prominent in his 
hand) have stood as symbols of the ascendance of white nationalism 
since the 1940s (Figure 2.3). Both figures, made by Coert Steynberg 
and unveiled in 1945, are unmistakably ‘western’ because dressed in 
trousers and shirts and hats and shoes, with beards and ‘European’ 
facial features, in all probability having some authenticity as portraits of 
their subjects. A sculpture by the well-known contemporary sculptor, 
Angus Taylor, representing Chief Tshwane, after whom the greater 
metropole takes its new name, joined the older pair in 2006 (Figure 
2.4). This larger than life figure of a contested historical/mythological 
African indigene stands in the rear of a procession from the doors 
of the city hall towards the street. Tshwane is positioned therefore 
furthest away from those approaching from the street, and although 
on a higher base than the others, remains dwarfed by the equestrian 
figure and behind both white men. 
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Figure 2.2 Steynberg, Coert. Andries Pretorius. [Bronze sculpture]. Pretorius 
Square, Pretoria. 1945. Photograph: Anitra Nettleton, January 2016
Figure 2.3. Steynberg, Coert. Marthinus Wessels Pretorius. [Bronze sculpture]. 





Figures 2.4. & 2.5. Chief Tshwane. [Bronze sculpture]. Pretorius Square, 
Pretoria City, Tshwane. Photograph: Anitra Nettleton, 
January 2016
The figure of chief Tshwane is equal in size to the two Afrikaner Boer 
heroes – also made in bronze, but dressed in indigenous African at-
tire, comprised largely of skins covering the loins with long dreadlocks 
and other hair adornments. In all, the figure appears as a reconstruc-
tion based on anthropological accounts of indigenous customs and 
the artist’s idea of an heroic African indigene. In fact, it could have 
been copied out of a 19th century illustration of indigenous South Afri-
can warriors whom the colonists depicted as a form of ‘noble savage’ 
(Klopper 1992; Nettleton 2017). That there is some question as to the 
exact genealogical origins of this personage – most likely he was a 
descendent of a Zulu chief, Muzi, who had migrated to the area from 
Natal, and was thus a leader of a group identified as Manala Ndebele.1 
Given that the identification of this character remains speculative, the 
monument itself must be more than usually visually speculative.
When I asked, few of the local visitors to the space occupied by the 
figures (used by a local photographer as a backdrop for the portraits he 
1 See a history of Ndebele in this area by Peter Delius (1987) – although there is no mention 
of Tshwane per se, it is clear that Nguni-speakers, Ndebele, had lived in the area prior to 
white settlement.
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makes for paying customers) had any idea of whom any of the figures 
represented, their identifying brass plaques having been stolen. 
Most considered the African figure to be ‘Shaka’, because he was 
wearing what they thought were “Zulu”’ clothes. That there is little 
to differentiate this figure from another bronze sculpture, erected 
at Ondini Museum to commemorate King Cetshwayo Ka Mpande, 
clearly points to a form of iconological and visual mythologising 
that is elective, selective and thus flattens histories.2 The onlookers’ 
misidentification of Tshwane is possibly also a result of Shaka’s being 
the only great culture hero of South African history with whom they 
are familiar from school – and this in a city occupied largely by Sotho-
Tswana speakers. Only the resident park photographer knew that it 
was Chief Tshwane. The difference between the European and the 
African in these figures rests only on the style of dress of and possibly 
in their facial features, but is not visible not in their colour, because 
the tradition of uncoloured, naturally patinated, bronze (or marble) 
as a medium flattens out the racial marker of skin pigmentation. 
The reliance purely on renderings of detail to indicate differences 
of identity demonstrates the degree to which a realistic style of 
representation has become an apparently essential requirement for 
such sculptures. It may also explain the popularity of realism as a style 
of representation – often of varying degrees of competence – for use 
in contemporary monuments.
Although the Korean/Chinese social-realist style, used in the 
contemporary monuments made for many other African states, is both 
more dogmatic, more militaristic in its hard-edged-ness, it is, ironically, 
very similar in intention to the monumental sculptures erected within 
apartheid South Africa, by the apartheid regime (e.g. the now imploded 
Strijdom Head in Pretoria).3 And, of course, the style is part of the 
2 It is interesting that this mode is reserved only for leaders of the mythological past. The 
sculpture of Chief Albert Luthuli, Nobel Peace laureate, in KwaDukuza, shows him as a 
dapper man in western-style suit with hat and walking cane. He has no African 
accoutrements such as those he wore to the award ceremony for the Nobel Prize. Thanks 
to Juliette Leeb-du Toit for bringing this fact to my attention.
3 Examples include the Head of Strijdom which mysteriously “collapsed” on 31st May, 2001 
into a parking garage below Strijdom Square in Pretoria, to the large sculpture of 
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content, part of the meaning, as is the scale. To make a monument on a 
huge scale and in a realist style associated with fascist regimes such as 
Hitler’s and Mussolini’s, no less than Stalin’s, is not an innocent act. It is 
an act impregnated with ideological assumptions in which (purportedly 
western) realism is foregrounded as the most advanced, the most 
progressive stylistic choice. This ideology, which presents distortion and 
abstraction as “child-like” and “primitive”, is visible in the tracts written 
by western anthropologists on so-called “primitive” cultures and their 
arts, and in the attitudes of those who came to appreciate third-world 
arts precisely because they had not fallen prey to the allure of realism 
or mimesis. Most significantly, however, it is also evident in the kinds 
of sculptural monuments being erected to commemorate leaders of 
emergent African nations who are looking for a modern identity.4 
Probably the ideological arguments for Socialist-Realist monuments 
would follow this trajectory: Monuments are erected for the people 
and so they are commissioned by the peoples’ representatives in 
styles and forms that cater to the expectations, the tastes, the levels 
of understanding of the “people”.5 It is probably true that most people 
expect monuments to be representational/recognisable figurative 
sculptures that are seriously sombre.6 Those anti-monuments, or 
conceptual monuments which have slipped through the noose, 
especially in South Africa, have generally, like the Women’s Monument 
in the Union Buildings in Pretoria, met with mixed, if not lukewarm 
reactions from the public or the powers-that-be (Becker 2000). The 
extraordinary success of the poetic figuration achieved by Marco 
Verwoerd in Bloemfontein, removed from its plinth and placed in the Afrikaner stronghold 
of Orania. See Coombes (2003) for a discussion of some of these issues.
4 The idea that African art traditions were worthy of imitation and emulation by 
contemporary artists was particularly a theme in Senghor’s writing (Harney, 2004) and 
was echoed by others such as Enwonwu (Ogbechi, 2008). But it is not a proposition that 
has found much resonance with those who have the power to commission national 
monuments. See Maselela (2016) for a critique of Senghor and cultural assimilation in 
postcolonial African contexts.
5 See King (1998) for a discussion of such processes in relation to the erection of war 
memorials in Britain
6 See Swedberg (2005) for a discussion of the mismatch between the history/mythology 
of the Burghers of Calais and the actual historical records, and the lack of impact this has 
had on an understanding of Rodin’s famous Burghers of Calais of 1889.
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Cianfanelli in the monument to Nelson Mandela at the so-called 
‘capture site’ at Howick in KwaZulu-Natal, goes against this trend. It 
is testament to the fact that one does not have to indulge in the kind 
of neo-romantic realism of bronze figure sculpture that seems to be 
in vogue amongst political commissars such as Dali Tambo in dealing 
with the monumental commemoration of members of the liberation 
struggle and its deeper history. While such realism might give the 
impression of these being ‘portraits’ of real people, their historical 
status is based on an appeal to a collective memory possibly embedded 
within the sculptural portrayal.
This can be illustrated in the monument recently erected at the “capture 
site” of Jacob Zuma in Groot Marico, set up in apparent emulation of, if 
not in competition with that of Nelson Mandela. Originally conceived 
as a 6 meter tall bronze sculpture (portrait) of the former president 
of the Republic, this idea was scrapped to be replaced by a cut-out 
portrait bust against a light-containing sphere, supported on a stand 
of multiple stainless steel arcs, also standing 6 meters tall. Interestingly 
the portrait only becomes fully legible once it is lit up at night. In 
this, and in its scale and elevation, it certainly vies for attention with 
billboard advertising; similarly to these it lacks any of the sense of 
interaction with the landscape, of becoming and dissolving, features 
delicately handled in Cianfanelli’s Mandela monument in Howick. 
Its commercial qualities have seen it likened on social media to the 
trophy use for the Football World Cup. This is possibly explained by 
the fact that the artist, Chris van der Vyver, is a boilermaker by trade, 
and made the sculpture on winning the commission. Reaction to the 
sculpture/monument has been largely mixed: although the artist is 
reported to be very pleased with it7. and Jacob Zuma was all smiles at 
its unveiling, many commentators have been critical.8
7 see Tshehle, B. 2017 .“I’m proud of my Zuma statue” Pressreader/Sowetan 6th October, 
https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/sowetan/20171006/281479276624718 
accessed 2017 11 09.
8 See for example the twitter feed responses to Tshehle, B. “In Pictures: Residents divided 
over R1.8 million Jacob Zuma Monument.” Sunday Times: Times Live https://www.
timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-10-05-in-pictures--residents-divided-over-r18-million-
jacob-zuma-monument/ accessed 2017 11 09
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South Africa deserves better forms of commemoration. It has the 
artists, the conceptual capacity and the technical ability to make a 
more significant, thoughtful, and Africa-centred and Africa-inspired 
memorials, than tired remakes of colonial prototypes. Our narratives 
are varied and, when shared, our remembering is often fractured and 
fractious, but the tendency in making monuments seems to be to try to 
make a fairy tale past visible in a flattened notion of “Africa”, whether 
historical or contemporary, by using styles and genres of representation 
that are tired and tied to essentially non-democratic institutions.
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It takes a lot of work to silence silent objects. (Cole 2012)
Calls for the removal or demolition of colonial and apartheid statues and monuments across the South African landscape has been the subject of dissension. This chapter proceeds from the 
national discussion around statues and representation starting with the 
performative act that catalysed the current dialogue about colonial and 
apartheid statues, namely, the #RhodesMustFall campaign. Through 
discourses of pain, place, memory and history, this chapter probes 
what is commemorated and explores the tensions around where that 
commemoration takes place. To queer place is to really look closely at 
what the decolonisation of buildings and of public spaces could look like 
and how this might aid in democratising access. What we are sensing 
now is that it is not enough to build new sites of public history and 
memory without problematising the existing objects of cultural heritage 
that no longer represent the values of a democratic South Africa – the 
statues and monuments of imperialists. This chapter asks how people 
make sense of their interaction with place and so-called objects of 
cultural heritage and illustrates why, in a South African context, statues 
and monuments are not just inanimate, innocuous things. They are 
loaded with meaning, histories and the pain of a traumatic past. 
Background: from past to present
The year 2015 was a volatile and transformative year for South Africa’s 
higher education institutions, catalysed in part by student protester, 
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Chumani Maxwele who – in the second week of March 2015 -- hurled 
faeces at the statue of Cecil John Rhodes1 that stood at the University of 
Cape Town’s (UCT) main Rondebosch campus. This single act, motivated 
by persistent concerns around systemic violence and structural 
inequalities in higher education and society broadly, also sparked 
debates around the contentious place of colonial and apartheid statues 
and monuments in contemporary South Africa. Maxwele’s performative 
act supposedly set into motion the #RhodesMustFall (RMF) campaign 
which then galvanised a series of national student activist movements 
including Fees Must Fall, Disrupting Whiteness (University of Cape 
Town), Rhodes So White and the Black Students Movement (Rhodes 
University), Transform Wits (University of Witwatersrand), the Open 
Stellenbosch Collective (Stellenbosch University) and Black Thought at 
the University of Johannesburg. Other universities joined the protest 
simply under the overarching #FeesMustFall banner. The rage being 
expressed and the point being made by the students is that the existential 
struggles which shape South African life are no longer limited to the 
individual’s experience, but that a magnifying glass is now being held 
up to embedded structural inequalities in the university that reflect 
society broadly (Keet, Zinn & Porteus 2009, 114). 
The student movements also prompted conversation on the roles of 
intersecting identities (race, class, gender and language) in students’ 
perceptions, experiences and agency in creating opportunities or 
being ‘shut out’ while at university. The message to the institutions 
and the government is very clear: things can no longer carry on as they 
have, as the current modes of operation within the universities are 
perceived as being oppressive, stifling and unsupportive. Further, the 
traditions, values and practices that have been disguised or explained 
as ‘institutional culture’, are exclusionary in manners so pervasive 
that they permeate the students’ everyday reality in the institution 
(especially in historically white institutions). The issue of higher 
1 Imperialist Cecil John Rhodes (1853-1902), was a British business man who lived in South 
Africa. He is credited for establishing ‘The Native Bill’, a bill to force more Africans into the 
labour-wage market, a bill which became a precursor to apartheid policy and legislation.
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education’s oppressive financial schemes and lack of transformation 
in particular, were identified as catalysts fuelling the national student 
outcry. Other issues that prompted the protests included the lack of 
racial representation among faculty at historically white universities, 
the exclusion of African narratives and experiences in curriculum, the 
historical edifices and cultural heritage objects (statues, monuments, 
building names and artworks) whose meanings have changed in a 
democratic South Africa, and the outsourcing of student residence 
and low income university workers.
A week after Maxwele’s inciting act at UCT, students at the University 
of KwaZulu Natal (UKZN), in solidarity, defaced the statue of British 
King George V that stands at the university’s Howard College campus 
in Durban (Manda 2015). Suddenly statues were at the forefront 
of national discussion and, in a ripple effect, incidents of similar 
destruction were occurring throughout the country. The statue of a 
soldier on a plinth at the Uitenhage War Memorial was defaced and 
set on fire on 2 April 2015 (DeSwardt 2015). On 6 April (and again on the 
11th), a statue of former president of the South African Republic Paul 
Kruger that stands prominent in Church Square, Pretoria was defaced 
with green paint (Khoza 2015). A day later, the statue of a kneeling 
solider was pulled to the ground in Port Elizabeth (Spies 2015). On 
9 April the statue of first South African Prime Minister Louis Botha, 
was splattered with red paint in Cape Town (Capazorio 2015). The 
following day a statue of Queen Victoria was defaced with paint in Port 
Elizabeth (News24 2015). In Pretoria on 11 April, a statue of Marthinus 
Pretorius (the first president of the South African Republic) was 
vandalised in front of City Hall (Lindeque 2015). On 13 April, the statue 
of Andrew Murray (the son of a Dutch Reformed Church missionary) 
was vandalised in Wellington (Raborife 2015). Finally, on 20 April 
2015, the bust of Stephanus Schoeman (former state president of the 
South African Republic) was splattered with white paint in Polokwane 
(Mabeba 2015), the same day that the Anglo Boer War memorial was 
also defaced with white paint in East London (Linden, 2015).
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Before the Rhodes statue became a target at UCT in 2015, there were 
only a few reported incidents of the defacing or destruction of statues 
since 1994: for example the statue of Steve Biko was defaced twice 
shortly after it was unveiled by President Nelson Mandela in September 
1997 (allAfrica, 2015). The crash of apartheid leader J.G. Strijdom’s head 
in 2001, and the repeated vandalising of Paul Kruger’s statue, both 
in Pretoria, come to mind as well. The other incidents came in 2005 
and 2006 when, in September 2005 the statue of King Makhado in 
Limpopo was defaced and then later in July 2006, the statue of Chief 
Tshwane was vandalised in Pretoria and painted with the colours of the 
old South African flag used by the apartheid government (Hlatshwayo 
& samaYende 2005; Nthite 2006). What these three historical figures 
have in common is that they are black Africans and all three statues 
were defaced at least 10 years ago, probably by disaffected members 
of right-wing white supremacist movements. The Biko incident 
occurred three years after the democratic dispensation in 1994, when 
the country was still struggling with its rebirth, and the destruction 
of the King Makhado statue came soon after the renaming of a town 
in Limpopo Province from Louis Trichardt to Makhado. The statue of 
Chief Tshwane was defaced with the old apartheid flag after there were 
talks that the statue would replace the existing one of Paul Kruger on 
Church Square. Evidently there was a faction of the population that 
was not ready to accept the ushering in of a new inclusive democratic 
age that would mean letting go of some of the polarising relics of the 
past, which had come to stand for different things in the present. 
Although the colonial and apartheid figures listed above were 
memorialised as part of South Africa’s history – several of whom served 
as rulers or benefactors – they also represent colonial and apartheid 
histories, as symbols of racism and genocide and one could argue, that 
their continued presence reproduces coloniality as representations 
of “the ‘metaphysical empire’ that have outlived the ‘physical empire’” 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Zondi, 2016:4). One could also argue that the 
sites at which these deliberate acts of vandalism have taken place, 
have become “legitimate sites of decolonial struggle” (ibid.). From this 
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thought, I started to question the particularity of this contemporary 
moment. Is it that the presence of these statues always bothered us, 
but we have not yet been able to articulate the reasons why? Is it that 
we have arrived at a new place of conscientisation as a result of the 
slow pace of transformation in South Africa? Is it that we were focused 
on other issues at the start of democracy and can now turn our gaze to 
the statues and monuments we want because this is this generation’s 
predicament? What is significant about this present moment? Or is it 
simply that we have now called this particular issue up to importance? 
If we reconstruct the past according to our current views then the 
rewriting of individual biographies, the creating of new myths, or the 
reviving of old wounds and resentments is expected (Subrt 2012, 37). In 
every contemporary moment, our perceptions, understanding of and ideas 
about the past are constantly changing. New realisations, experiences, 
knowledge about the present can even influence the way we perceive the 
past, causing us to look at history and the past in different ways: this is the 
meditative decolonial state we currently find ourselves in.
Add to that already subconscious force the immediacy of history’s 
grip, when the past is publicly memorialised through oppressive 
historical figures, who continue to haunt the contemporary landscape 
in prominent urban spaces throughout the country.
Images of the past haunt the present
Who we choose to commemorate and how we choose to remember 
them is complex, particularly in the case of memorialised subjects 
made into symbolic objects of history (Grunebaum 2001, 198). I would 
add, to who and how we choose to commemorate, where we choose to 
commemorate them. Perhaps place has not been privileged as much as 
the ‘who’. For instance, when a cultural and political heritage site such 
as Robben Island becomes a project through which the government 
exercises its commemorative agenda, claiming to remember and 
celebrate the past through inclusive “multiculturalism”, we start to see 
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an attempt at creating “new public histories” (Grunebaum 2001, 199). 
Even this is problematic because most South Africans do not have the 
material means to visit a site like Robben Island. Nevertheless, Robben 
Island has had many uses prior to UNESCO declaring it a world heritage 
site in 1999. It is an example of a monument built from an existing place, 
history and structure whose meaning changed with its ‘rebranding’. 
This is different for example from the pre-1994 monuments that remain 
largely uncontested and unchanged, even in a democratic South Africa. 
Examples of these existing monuments are the Castle of Good Hope 
(the oldest surviving building in South Africa, built between 1606-
1679) in Cape Town (SAHO 2011), the Honoured Dead Memorial (1904) 
in Kimberly which remembers those who died defending the town 
during the 124 day Siege of Kimberley in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-
1902. Interestingly, the Honoured Dead Memorial was commissioned by 
Cecil John Rhodes. Scenically bordered by Table Mountain, the Rhodes 
Memorial (1912) in Cape Town was built in remembrance of Cecil John 
Rhodes who contributed a great deal to the development of the sub-
continent. The National Women’s Memorial (1913) in Bloemfontein was 
erected in memory of the women and children who died during the 
Anglo-Boer War, at the hands of the British, but excluded any mention of 
black victims. The Huguenot Monument (1948) in Franschhoek was built 
to celebrate the influence of the French in South Africa. The Voortrekker 
Monument (1949) in Pretoria commemorates the white Pioneer history 
of Southern Africa, especially the history of the Afrikaner. This was later 
followed by the Winburg Voortrekker Monument (1968) in the Free 
State, in honour of Winburg as the first Free State town established by 
the Voortrekkers. The 1820s Settlers Monument in Grahamstown was 
built to commemorate the contributions made by English-speaking 
settlers to South Africa – in particular – the introduction of the English 
language and the concept of democracy (SouthAfrica.com). Diggers’ 
Fountain in Kimberley (1960) was created in honour of past and present 
diamond miners and a bust of Sir Ernest Oppenheimer shares the same 
rose garden site as the fountain (SouthAfrica.info 2015). These are just a 
few examples of many. 
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These pre-1994 monuments are quite different from the monuments 
built specifically to commemorate people and events post-1994. For 
instance the Bisho Massacre Memorial (1997) in the Eastern Cape 
– a monument that commemorates slain anti-apartheid activists 
(SouthAfrica.info 2015.). Similarly, the Hector Pieterson Memorial 
(2002) in Johannesburg commemorates the role of the country’s 
students in the 1976 uprising against apartheid: The Freedom Charter 
Monument (2005) is a piece of land meant to memorialise the occasion 
on which some 3000 members of resistance organisations gathered 
to imagine the Freedom Charter (SouthAfrica.info 2015). Heroes’ Park 
(2001) in East London was built to honour South Africa’s struggle 
heroes and to celebrate the country’s freedom and cultural diversity. 
Interestingly, Heroes’ Park also incorporates the German Settlers 
Monument, which honours the German families who arrived in East 
London between 1856 and the 1870s (SouthAfrica.info, 2015). The 
Slavery Emancipation Monument (2004) in Elim was built in memory 
of emancipated slaves who were harboured at Elim in the Overberg, 
Western Cape (SouthAfrica.info 2015). The Gallows of the Pretoria 
Central Prison opened in December 2011 in memory of the political 
prisoners who were executed between 1967 and 1989 (SouthAfrica.
info 2015). All these monuments are billed as sites that ‘celebrate our 
freedom’ and ‘cultural diversity’ and honour those whose lives were 
lost trying to gain that freedom. 
Two things are curious about the pre-1994 and post-1994 monuments; 
the most obvious is that pre-1994 statues were of white men and 
women, while the post-1994 monuments are typically in celebration 
of black men and women. The post-1994 sites were built in the spirit 
of “creating new public histories” and claim to foster “inclusive 
multiculturalism”. Can the pre-1994 monuments also make claims to 
‘celebrate freedom and foster inclusive multiculturalism’ as the post-
1994 monuments do? The other curious thing is the geographical 
sites and spaces on which these different monuments are located. 
Many of the pre-1994 monuments are in scenic suburban landscapes 
surrounded by the natural beauty of South Africa. Is it important to 
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have these colonial and apartheid monuments still sitting alongside 
more contemporary ones – not only symbolically but geographically? 
What we are sensing now is that it is not enough to build new sites 
of public history without problematising the existing objects of 
cultural heritage that no longer represent the values of a democratic 
South Africa. It is not enough to focus on “new public histories” 
without addressing the remaining material public histories of old; the 
statues and monuments of imperialists. This is not an easy task, as the 
last three years have taught us. 
The students at UCT were victorious in their protest efforts as the 
statue of profiteer Cecil John Rhodes was ceremoniously removed on 9 
April 2015. At UKZN however, the statue of King George V still remains 
on the campus but it now stands damaged, splashed with white paint 
and bearing the words; “end white privilege”, “you do not represent 
us” and “symbols must fall” amongst other messages. There has been 
no news as to whether or not the other statues that were defaced, in 
other parts of the country, have been toppled. However, in a shocking 
move in February 2016, some RMF members removed and burned 
several historical artworks that hung in university residences at UCT. 
According to the activists, these artworks and photographs represent 
white colonial and apartheid oppressors and it should not matter that 
they were donors to the university: their presence on the walls of an 
African university is painful and traumatic. The drastic act of arson is 
said to have cost the university millions of rands in damages and in the 
melee, students also burned anti-apartheid works by prominent black 
artists. This came after the RMF members erected a makeshift shack 
on the main campus, aptly named, ‘Shackville’ in response to the lack of 
housing and student residences at UCT. Despite contention, the RMF 
campaign received widespread national and international support, 
but of course opinions about what should happen to colonial and 
apartheid statues in South Africa differ. Anecdotally, there are those 
who agree that the Rhodes statue (and other statues like it) should fall; 
those who argue that the statues should remain as evidence of the 
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country’s history; those who argue that they should all be removed 
and placed in national museums; those who feel as if the statues 
should remain if they are explained and those who are indifferent. All 
this background is to say, now, sites memorialising historical statues 
have become charged sites of contestation. 
On Decolonising Spaces
Teju Cole, writing on the 2012 destruction of the sacred tombs/
mausoleums of Timbuktu, maintained: “it takes a lot of work to silence 
[these] silent objects”, for the reason that statues are not just inanimate, 
innocuous things. Statues are loaded with meaning, histories and the 
pain of a traumatic past. Cole recognises this by asserting: “Images are 
powerful. They can bring people into such a pitch of discomfort that 
violence ensues, and iconoclasm carries within itself two paradoxical 
traits: thoroughness and fury” (Cole 2012). Analysing the complexity of 
iconoclastic aggression, Cole identifies “politics, struggles for power, 
the effort to humiliate an enemy” as common historical reasons for 
iconoclastic acts (2012). Cole is making the subtle argument that the 
creators of images and the iconoclasts share the same psychological drive 
– both are obsessed with the power of the icon. Cole’s words; ‘discomfort’, 
‘violence’ and ‘fury’ point to an anxiety around symbols and objects that 
cannot be denied and in South Africa, anxiety around statues points to 
the veracity of black pain. The pain is not always an immediate obvious 
pain happening in the ‘now’. Sometimes the pain is about the past, is 
buried in history, in memory, in lived experience and autobiography, 
and yet is felt in the present. The pain is not all now and it is not always 
painful, sometimes it is hidden by the beauty of scenic garden surrounds 
and towering city buildings, at times it is revealed through the fiery, ugly 
and grotesque, other times it subsides and sometimes it is not noticeably 
there at all but there is always an element of residue; the fragments of 
pain left in the South African consciousness and landscape. Achille 
Mbembe, acknowledges this pain when he warns that wanting to hang on 
to these statues can feel like “provincialism and nostalgia for a shameful 
and costly past” (Mbembe, Samuelson, Nuttall & Musila 2011). 
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Mbembe is clear in his assertion that Rhodes no longer belonged on the 
UCT campus, stating that the Rhodes Statue “and those of countless 
others who shared the same conviction – has nothing to do on a 
public university campus 20 years after freedom” (Mbembe 2015, 3). 
That taking the statue down should be not considered “erasing history” 
– despite the deeply problematic rhetoric that Rhodes “donated so 
much money” and “bequeathed his land” to the university – with little 
inquiry into how he amassed his wealth in the first place (Mbembe 
2015, 3). Instead Mbembe holds that bringing Rhodes’s statue down is 
one of the many legitimate ways in which we can, today in South Africa, 
“demythologize that history and put it to rest – which is precisely the 
work memory, when properly understood is supposed to accomplish” 
(Mbembe 2015, 3). There are many places in South Africa that are still 
palpably occupied by the lingering feeling of whiteness, that is, that 
black bodies do not belong in such spaces. Crucially Cape Town is 
often jokingly referred to as the ‘Europe of Africa’ that
obsessively clings to its anachronisms, its ossified forms of spatial 
segregation, its statues, even its street names, and today to the hard 
edges of its ‘soft apartheid’. (Mbembe et al. 2011)
Add to this already complex “scandal of beauty”,2 the statue of a colonial 
oppressor on an African university campus, then it is no wonder 
students feel as though they are being stifled by white ideals. Rhodes 
memorialised, becomes a mythologised figure that perpetuates the 
feeling that everything originates from him:
The demythologizing of certain versions of history must go hand 
in hand with the demythologizing of whiteness. This is not because 
whiteness is the same as history. Human history, by definition, 
is history beyond whiteness. Human history is about the future. 
Whiteness is about entrapment. Whiteness is at its best when it turns 
into a myth. It is the most corrosive and the most lethal when it makes 
us believe that it is everywhere; that everything originates from it and 
it has no outside. We are therefore calling for the demythologization 
of whiteness because democracy in South Africa will either be built 
2 From the Cape Times article of the same name. See Mbembe et al (2011). 
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on the ruins of those versions of whiteness that produced Rhodes or 
it will fail. (Mbembe 2015, 3) 
Mbembe proposes that the statue of Rhodes and the statues of other 
racist imperialists that are scattered across the South African landscape 
be placed in museums. At the same time he problematises the museum 
which he feels has not yet received the critique it requires as an 
institution, in other words, a good question is also, what is in South 
Africa’s museums and why? (Mbembe 2015, 4). This question challenges 
what is archived and who decides what is historicised and why. 
Really the decolonisation of African minds, places and institutions 
does not mean the dismissal of a troubled past, or a negation of history 
and its figures, but rather it is about “acknowledging, debating and 
encouraging critical scholarship on how exactly colonialism, settler 
colonialism and apartheid” have formed and continue to influence the 
thought, geography, languaging and customs of modern day South 
Africa (Pillay in Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2016, 3). The need for decolonisation 
is becoming more and more pressing in South Africa because the 
consequences of not recognising the damage colonisation has done 
to South African territory, the South African body and mind and South 
African epistemology, is part of the reason why youth in South Africa 
have unified to protest and quite literally, set the country on fire. It 
took young people to examine the symbols and images around them 
to say ‘these ideals and versions of history do not represent me and 
make me feel as though I do not belong here’.
On Decolonising Symbols
Symbolic interactionism as defined by Herbert Blumer (1969) is the 
fundamental idea that people act toward things based on the meanings 
they have for them, that these meanings are arrived at as a result of 
interpretive processes and social interaction with others (Blumer 1969, 2). 
Snow introduces four broader principles where he feels Blumer’s 
triad is too narrowly centred on meaning and interpretation: the 
principle of interactive determination, the principle of symbolisation, 
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the principle of emergence and the principle of human agency (Snow 
2001, 368). The principle of emergence is pertinent here because it 
focuses attention on the unfamiliar side of social life and its dynamic 
character which means ‘emergence’ looks at the potential for change 
(not only structural societal change but also change associated with 
meanings and feelings) (Snow 2001, 372). Emergence is about the
processes out of which new, novel, or revitalized social entities, or 
cognitive and emotional states, arise that constitute departures 
from, challenges to, and clarifications or transformations of everyday 
routines, practices, or perspectives. (Snow 2001, 372) 
Emergence is the idea of the altered ‘new’ and is a particularly useful 
concept in the context of social movements; this new generation 
organises with youthful vigour reviving the strength of past liberation 
strategies (for example crowd-pulling marches to parliament), assumes 
drastic tactics (for example throwing faeces), with new disputes (for 
example RMF) and new ways of taking collective action (for example 
erecting a shack on the university campus as a symbol of the displacement 
students face as a result of exorbitant residence accommodation fees). 
What emerges are not only institutional and legislative gains (typical 
results of social movements), but also cognitive and affective changes 
(socio-political conscientisation and identity politics). These changes 
affect not only how we view ourselves and the places we occupy, but 
our views of other groups and our relationships to/with them. 
In Contemporary Sociological Theory (2008), Johnson cites Mead, in 
explaining Symbolic Interactionism as the close relationship between 
the psychological processes “whereby people make sense of their 
environment and their interaction with one another” and the alliance 
between people as they try to develop collective understandings of 
the positions in which they find themselves (in Johnson 2008, 110). 
Contemporary symbolic interactionism also takes into account how 
one’s self-image develops through awareness of the perceptions of 
others, for example the works of W.E.B. Du Bois or Toni Morrison 
show how the self-images developed by African Americans
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(and no doubt other members of dis-privileged minority groups) reflect 
their ongoing struggles to resist the prejudice and discrimination 
they experience on a daily basis in interacting with majority group 
members. (Johnson 2008, 110)
In South Africa, self-image and perception emerges as a result of a 
majority dis-privileged group interacting with a minority privileged 
group. It is only when individual meanings and readings submit to 
extensive change that institutional transformation occurs, which then 
has the potential to change subsequent interactions at the micro level 
(Johnson 2008, 111).
All symbolic interactionists emphasize the micro level linkages 
between the subjective consciousness, interpersonal interaction, and 
identity formation, as well as the symbolic and socially constructed 
nature of the larger social world. (Johnson 2008, 111)
In this case the linkages occur between the individual student, the 
university space, the objects of cultural heritage and artworks (buildings, 
photographs, statues, plaques and paintings) and other people at 
the university (administration, faculty, support staff, other students). 
Therefore, decolonising the universities must start with reconstructing 
both these linkages and the public spaces they occupy. Transforming 
public spaces includes a change of those colonial names, statues, 
iconography and other symbols that continue to uphold white supremacy 
(Mbembe 2015:5). The act of de-imperialising public buildings and spaces 
becomes, in some manner, about democratising access:
But when we say access, we are also talking about the creation of those 
conditions that will allow black staff and students to say of the university: 
“This is my home. I am not an outsider here. I do not have to beg or to 
apologize to be here. I belong here” […] It has nothing to do with me 
having to assimilate into a culture that is not mine as a precondition of 
my participating in the public life of the institution. It has all to do with 
ownership of a space that is a public, common good.  (Mbembe 2015, 5)
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In decolonising and transforming the significance of place in South 
Africa – in spite of histories of racial oppression – we get to acknowledge, 
question and reimagine our history, and this is an affirming act of self-
determination.
Place and Memory
In Space and Place (1977), Tuan explains that ideas concerning place are 
multifaceted in adult human beings because they grow out of individual 
and shared experiences. He sees place as a pause in movement that 
makes it possible for us to endow place with value. Place, to a child 
for instance, is a great and to some extent, inert type of object. Place 
then begins to acquire profound significance for the child through 
the steady accrual of sentiment over the years. Every item in one’s 
bedroom or even a stain on the wall tells a story. Similarly, every piece 
of art, photograph, statue, monument at a university, tells a story, tells 
a particular history. For Tuan, captivating or painful images of the 
past are evoked not only by the intact edifice, which can only be seen, 
but equally by its workings, parts and fixtures, which can be touched, 
heard and smelled as well. Therefore, despite having to constantly 
defend their position, RMF insists that their movement is not solely 
about a statue falling or even the actual edifice. Memory entwines its 
charms in lesser, more recognisable things, as Kevin Quashie reminds 
us in Black Women, Identity and Cultural Theory (2004, 7) … 
… memory crystallizes and secretes itself at a particular historical 
moment, a turning point where consciousness of a break with the 
past is bound up with the sense that memory has been torn- but torn 
in such a way as to pose the problem of the embodiment of memory in 
certain sites where a sense of historical continuity persists.
Escobar recognises that place, body and environment integrate with 
each other, “that places gather things, thoughts and memories in 
particular configurations …” (2001, 143). Site and memory then, are 
inevitably intertwined; particular sites may supply an excess of possible 
meanings. At the same time it is the site’s very same assault on all ways 
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of perception (sight, sound, smell, touch and taste) that make it powerful 
as an underpinning of memory, as a thread where one strand ties in 
another (Creswell 2004, 86). A site can act as a container of experience 
that contributes effectively to its inherent memorability. An attentive 
memory connects impulsively with place, finding in it features that 
support and correspond with its own activities. So what happens – as 
in the case of historically white universities for instance – when you do 
not find these features that reinforce your sense of belonging? 
Sites of memory are themselves a process, a dynamic location of 
collective and individual knowledge constantly refiguring, emitting and 
tearing. Sites of memory are described as having corporeal qualities, 
for example, Verderey (1999) terms physical attacks on monuments 
as “calculated acts to despoil their sacred character in order to bring 
them into the human realm” (cited in Kros 2015, 154). This is reinforced 
by Chumani Maxwele,
“quoted by a fellow student as saying that he wanted the statue to feel 
‘ashamed, the same way he [Maxwele] feels ashamed that these faeces 
[sic] are in his living environment’”. (Boroughs cited in Kros 2015, 154) 
In this manner, Maxwele is almost converting the statue’s representation 
from “untouchable icon to sentient human being” (Boroughs 2015). Kros 
makes the argument that even the word ‘Fuck’, painted in white graffiti 
on the base of the Rhodes statue or the phrase ‘end white privilege’ 
emblazoned on King George the V’s chest for instance, give the statues 
a “human quality” adding that in the RMF context, it might be suggested 
that even the photography and social media activity also contributed to 
the students’ efforts to demystify the statue (Kros 2015, 154).
Demystifying the statue in this manner is, as UCT student Kealeboga 
Ramaru observed, another way to say “look this is our space too, and 
we deserve to be here”’ (cited in Kros 2015, 155). This act of demystifying 
articulates “a cry for belonging” (Shringapure 2015). Maxwele, on the 
RMF campaign echoes: “It is a black cry, a cry of the workers, the cry of 
the staff and a cry from the students” (Bashton 2015). The cry is about the 
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unending state of recovery we seem to be in, in post-apartheid South 
Africa. The symbolic appropriation of ‘the cry’ is powerful because it is a 
life-saving expression of pain. Addressing the statue of Rhodes directly 
embodies an attack against the continued exercise of power his legacy 
has over their environment and lives, a legacy that memorialises a 
history of specific power relations. The act of demystifying statues is an 
expression of the country’s collective and individual anger, of collective 
and individual grief. The same act creates a ‘living’ thing to assign pain 
to, to put anger outside of ourselves and onto something else and to 
assign culpability when we are no longer being heard.
But then again creating public memory spaces that are significant and 
all-encompassing in a traumatised South African landscape is a difficult 
task: “such spaces are affected by a multitude of forces: individuals, 
groups, institutions, history and culture among others” (Leibowitz 
2008, 5). How do we create spaces where the past is acknowledged but 
not at the expense of individuals’ senses of history and contemporary 
positionality? For this to happen, “there must be a deliberate shift away 
from colonial/Apartheid notions of what constitutes the past” (Leibowitz 
2008, 19). There must be recognition of the publicness of the space 
that these statues occupy and of collective memory (also understood 
as social or cultural memory), that is, widely shared perceptions of the 
past that can no longer be trivialized or ignored (Leibowitz 2008, 4). 
Leibowitz further posits that sites of memory can be material, symbolic 
and functional: 
“While memory exists on both a personal and national level, memory 
space is constructed and maintained in order to facilitate a particular 
ideology or to sustain a national narrative” (2008, 5). 
This is significant because in the past, the national narrative was 
constructed from a colonial and apartheid perspective and so it 
makes sense that now we are calling to see reflected in our statues 
and memorials “a contemporary form of memory practice born out 
of a more locally-generated aesthetic and meaningful to an [South] 
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African population” (Leibowitz 2008, 5). Perhaps we will, after many 
years, decide that the Western tradition of commemoration is neither 
relevant nor necessary in an African context and we will think of new 
ways to commemorate people and observe events in an anticipated 
non-patriarchal, robust and democratic society because, as Subrt 
reminded us earlier, in every contemporary moment, our ideas about 
the past are constantly changing. As a result, it is inevitable that in 
future moments our perception and understanding of what we want 
to see memorialised and how it should be memorialised will change. 
For now though, our longing to see worthy monuments is a moment 
we are resting in.
The new South Africa
After the dawn of the democratic dispensation, Nelson Mandela 
remarked:
During colonial and Apartheid times, our museums and monuments 
reflected the experiences and political ideals of a minority to the 
exclusion of others … having excluded and marginalised most of our 
people, is it surprising that our museums and national monuments 
are often seen as alien spaces? When our museums and monuments 
preserve the whole of our diverse heritage, when they are inviting to 
the public and interact with the changes all around them, then they 
will strengthen our attachment to human rights, mutual respect and 
democracy, and help prevent these ever again being violated (quoted 
in Corsane 2004, 6). 
Post-apartheid South Africa was branded ‘the new South Africa’ as a 
way to give a name to the huge political shifts occurring as well as to 
promote hope for the anticipated cultural and social change. Memory 
becomes critical in social theorising and critique during such transitions: 
it was critical for everyday South Africans to come to terms with what 
was done to them or in their name. But we also need new names and to 
appreciate the significance of the situatedness of history in the processes 
of transformation which characterise contemporary South Africa.
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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was perhaps the most 
visible public exhibition of engaging the human rights abuses caused by 
the apartheid government (McEachern 1998, 499). The TRC uncovered 
black pain in a way that had not been done before. It rendered black 
pain visible. How do we begin to think about other public ways we 
can work through pain, demystify place, interrogate iconography and 
express individual and collective memory in this country? An example 
of a project that attempted to both remember and give individuals 
agency over their own painful pasts was the Western Cape Action Tour 
Project (or WECAT). WECAT took people on walkabouts through the 
townships of the Cape Flats, while participants narrated the stories of 
their lives and their communities. In this way
… the project facilitated encounters that not only promote the 
remembrance of the social and political heritage of these communities 
and of the enduring effects of this heritage on people’s lives and lived 
environment, but also evoked both new forms of socioeconomic 
marginalization contoured by persisting systemic oppression as well 
as new possibilities for change. (Grunebaum 2001, 203) 
The tour facilitators (often former activists) then had the opportunity 
to fill the gaps missed by the TRC and include narratives that do not 
fit the “public version of Robben Island’s public historical narrative of 
transcendence, triumph, redemption, and reconciliation” (Grunebaum 
2001, 203). In this way, the past continues to live and the ephemeral 
nature of this contemporary moment and the sites we move through, 
become transformed and “imbued with multiple meanings as stories 
are told in, about and through them” (Grunebaum 2001, 203). In the 
same manner, statues like these contested sites are not in dead spaces 
but they are always in dialogue with history and the present. The 
statues need to be problematised and probed, and we need people to 
speak around and about them and the places that they occupy. 
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Afterthoughts
The removal of the Rhodes statue, while largely symbolic, has been 
an appropriate rallying cry by which to tangibly address the practical 
implications of transformation and decolonisation and to re-imagine 
what the role and function of an African University should be. The 
success of the removal of the statue will illustrate an important step 
in the ability for social movements under these rallying points, to 
effect change physically in their environment. This process of physical 
change in the university space will begin to provide material shape to 
the changes taking place in post-apartheid South Africa. Moreover, 
toppling Rhodes and the RMF campaign in general, were not intended 
(at least by its initiators) to deny a particular history, but the process 
of physical change prompted by the statue’s removal raises questions 
around the names we give to the spaces we occupy and helps us pay 
closer attention to the symbols and images that we are confronted 
with as we navigate these public spaces. So the issue becomes, not 
the statue itself, but how we as a society look at symbols of the past 
and understand the various ways in which those symbols interact with 
who we are now, and the places we traverse in our day-to-day lives. 
“Monumental symbols, like statues have a rhetoric. These rhetorical 
functions or meanings shift as society shifts and changes” (in Crowley 
2007, 56), and we are now in a time where these meanings have 
definitely shifted and demand clarification.
Many of the UCT students recognised that the historical narrative of 
which the statue was the most conspicuous feature in their immediate 
environment, continues to exercise power over the present. As 
Teju Cole reminds us in the opening of this paper: “It takes a lot of 
work to silence silent objects” (2012). The presence of these statues 
topographically shapes silence. If they are to remain then serious 
conversations around their place and meaning need to be had. This 




As Teju Cole so poignantly articulates: “That which doesn’t speak 
dumbfounds. After all, who can tell what such objects are thinking? 
Best to destroy the inscrutable, the ancient, if one is to truly usher 
in a pure new world” (Cole 2012). To decolonise space then, means to 
dismantle that which continues to reproduce and promote whiteness 
in favour for ushering in a new order that represents the values of a 
democratic South Africa for all.
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It has become common to ascribe the troubling1 of South Africa’s monumental landscape to the failures of post-apartheid administrations, the government’s structural and operational 
defects, slow transformation and the broader socio-economic issues 
that continue to scourge the country.2 While this approach is valid 
in many ways, it often neglects or superficially acknowledges the 
complicated networks of messy operations that produce heritage. The 
approach focuses much on external factors as enemies of heritage, 
and fails to see beyond the façade of authority and the impression of 
a structured, orderly practice that government officials and heritage 
practitioners often create. Although some policy reviews delve 
deeper to underscore gaps, contradictions, overlapping mandates and 
restraining bureaucracies, their recommendations tend to create or 
normalise simple dichotomies and categories. They tend to pinpoint 
dominance and authorised discourses,3 which they juxtapose with 
1 Troubling is here used to mean disturbed, stirred up or fraught with disorder, as used in 
the Holy Bible, John, chapter 5 verse 7, and a state of dilemma as used by Joseph Diesco 
in his novel Troubled Waters, 1993, which highlights the ‘troubles’ of black and white 
individuals as they helplessly strive to alter the apartheid system in which they find 
themselves.
2 See for example, Van Vuuren, Chisto J. “The intricacy of intangible cultural heritage: 
some perspectives on Ndebele earthen architecture”. South African Journal of Art History 
23, 2, 2008; King, Tony. & Flynn, M.K. “Heritage and the post-apartheid city: Constitution 
Hill, Johannesburg.” International Journal of Heritage Studies 18, 1, 2012; Nyamnjoh, 
Francis B. “Black Pain Matters: Down with Rhodes”. CODESRIA Bulletin, 3-4, 2015: 74-93; 
Mbembe, Achille. “Decolonizing knowledge and the question of the archive”. Presented at 
Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER), University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, 2015, Accessed 2 August 2016, http://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/
Achille%20Mbembe%20-%20Decolonizing%20Knowledge%20and%20the%20
Question%20of%20the%20Archive.pdf 
3 The notion of authorised heritage discourse was coined by Laurajane Smith to refer to a 
discourse of ‘experts’ and an instrument of political and cultural power, which produces 
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‘voices from below’, counter-memories and counter-narratives. Since 
these are generally imagined as distinct and determined, they easily 
settle with the simplest meanings of, for example, redress, unbundling, 
delineation, decolonisation and Africanisation. It is important to 
consider the complexity of the society under study, and the dynamics 
of its heritage economy. The best start is to acknowledge that taking 
socio-political struggles to sites of monumentalisation is not a new 
phenomenon in South Africa, and that the contexts of such occurrences 
have always been tricky. During apartheid monuments were from time 
to time rallying points for groups mobilised around particular social 
or political agendas. In many cases, as it is at present, the subjects of 
contention were neither directly connected, nor obviously related to 
the sites ‘under siege’. 
To demonstrate the complexity of monumentalisation, and how statues 
have come to contribute to the complexity of the post-apartheid 
heritage practice, this chapter begins by historicising the troubling 
of South Africa’s statues. The aim is to illuminate trends related to 
contestations of sites of public representation, and perhaps inform 
the heritage policy reviews currently underway. The chapter invites 
the reader to pay attention to heritage as an intricate assemblage of 
institutions, agencies, things and ideas, and to the ambiguities and 
contradictions in the various contributions and operations of these 
components within the heritage practice. 
Here I examine this complex network through three distinct but 
interlinking discussions. The first relates to complex transactions 
through which memories and narratives intersect to produce 
multifaceted and awkward heritage products (which attract 
contestations more for their awkwardness than for being one-sided). 
The second relates to an assemblage of legislations, institutions, and 
agencies which purport to represent different scopes and frameworks, 
and to produce different knowledges, experiences, memories, 
packages that undermine or constrain alternative views. See, Smith, Laurajane. Uses of 
Heritage. Oxon: Routledge, 2006.
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disciplines, practices, and approaches, although these overlap and 
intersect in complex ways. The third relates to the ambiguities and 
contradictions of a heritage practice that makes as it unmakes, and 
opens as it closes. The three discussions interlace with each other 
through the central argument of this chapter, which is that issues 
surrounding South Africa’s public statues are a symptom of a heritage 
practice made intricate – not necessarily by bureaucracies, hegemony, 
dominant ideologies, suppressed voices, counter-narratives and 
counter-representations, but by disordered intersections of 
knowledges, meanings, memories and identities. 
These troubles are not new
The weeks-long anti-apartheid marches that plagued the city of 
Pretoria in September 1989 could have come and gone without 
much drama, if the demonstrators had not climbed up the statue of 
Paul Kruger in Church Square. The act particularly irked members 
of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), such that on Sunday 
23 September 1989 they came out in retaliation and gathered around 
the statue for a rally addressed by their leader Eugene Terreblanche. 
Their cause was to protect the statue “against what the blacks did … 
because [it was] a sacred monument, not something for the apes to 
climb atop of”. 4 On that day, the immortalised Paul Kruger stood tall 
as ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ exchanged blows at his feet for about an hour 
before the security police ‘intervened’.
The bone of contention was not the statue or figure of Kruger, but 
what it represented. The statue and others in its category embodied 
racial exclusivity and white supremacy that fed into the very threads 
of the system of apartheid.5 Such symbols constituted a monumental 
4 Wren, Christopher S. “Pretoria Stops Anti-Apartheid March”. Special to The New York 
Times, September 24, 1989. Accessed 10 May 2016, http://www.nytimes.
com/1989/09/24/world/pretoria-stops-anti-apartheid-march.html




complex6 mobilised around the concept of erfenis,7 and produced 
monumental representations that fostered European identities 
and celebrated imperialist achievements. By 1989, about 97% of the 
monuments declared by the Historical Monuments Commission (HMC) 
and later National Monuments Council (NMC) represented people of 
European origin and their conquests.8 Only 3% represented the art, 
architecture and artefacts of Africans, who were about 84% of the 
country’s population.9 It was indeed a racialised monumental practice. 
Hence, climbing versus defending statues was for that 23 September 
1989 moment the defining factor between ‘blacks and whites’. 
But the politics of public representation transcended mere racial 
categories. Monuments had by the late 1980s become rallying sites of 
venting political rage across and among other groupings. Afrikanerdom, 
for instance, had by 1989 disintegrated into factions, which Annie 
Coombes summarised as a prosperous bourgeois sector versus right 
wing activism.10 The latter was conspicuous for taking its frustrations 
with the other faction to monuments. Sites like the Voortrekker 
Monument and Fort Schanskop were from time to time taken hold of 
by Afrikaner groups protesting certain views or actions. For example, 
in May 1990, the Conservative Party ‘took hold’ of the Voortrekker 
Monument to demonstrate their stance against political changes 
such as the beginning of the negotiations between the South African 
6 Derived from Tony Bennett’s concept of exhibitionary complex, which he uses to 
illustrate the bringing together different knowledges, disciplines, approaches, and 
practices into the museum institution resulting in a nexus of forms of knowledge and 
discursive structures within which power constitutes and manifests itself not in negative 
coercive force, but in various negotiable, adaptable and substitutable forms of agency. 
See, Bennett, Tony. “The Exhibitionary Complex.” New Formations, 4, 1988.
7 A Dutch or Afrikaans word for inheritance.
8 The National Monuments Council established in 1969, replaced the Historical Monuments 
Commission which was established in 1923, but could only begin its monumentalising 
work in 1934, due to its limiting earlier framework.
9 Frescura, Franco. “National of Nationalist? A Critique of the National Monuments 
Council, 1936-1989.” In Proceedings of the National Urban Conservation Symposium, 
University of Witwatersrand, 12-14 July 1991, edited by Derek Japha & Vivienne Japha. 
Cape Town: Oakville Press, 1991.
10 Coombes, Annie E. “Translating the past: apartheid monuments in post-apartheid South 
Africa.” In Hybridity and its discontents: Politics, Science and Culture, edited by Avtar Brah 
& Annie E. Coombes. London: Routledge, 2000.
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government and the African National Congress (ANC).11 This must have 
been sparked by a meeting between some government leaders and ANC 
leaders on 4 May 1990 at the Groote Schuur presidential residence. In 
December 1993, the Pretoria East Boere Commando mobilised around 
a similar stance invaded the Fort Schanskop. The statue of Paul Kruger 
was at some point a subject of heated debates regarding its value and 
suitable location. Although commissioned in 1896, the statue changed 
locations twice before it finally rested at Church Square in 1954.12
The troubling of statues associated with frustrations did not perish 
with apartheid, but gained even greater momentum with the roll-out 
of post-apartheid monumental projects. Sabine Marschall highlighted 
this momentum and what appears to be dominant ideologies and 
official heritage discourses versus vernacular discourses.13 In the 
current era dubbed post-apartheid, society still gets stratified by the 
climbing versus the defence of statues, although the associations 
and voices are ambiguous and at times contradictory. Between 1997 
and 2015, more than 20 colonial and post-apartheid monuments 
were contested and defaced. To cite a few examples, the statue of 
Steve Biko erected in the city of East London in October 1997, was 
spray-painted with ‘AWB’ initials less than 24 hours after its unveiling. 
On 16 December 1998, attendees of the unveiling of the Ncome and 
Blood River Monument were cautioned not to go near the makeshift 
bridge ‘of reconciliation’ that linked the new monument with the old 
Blood River Memorial on the west side of the Ncome River. There were 
rumours that ‘the Afrikaners’ holding their own celebrations on the 
west side of the river had threatened to blow the bridge up. 
In 2003 the City of Johannesburg proudly unveiled the statue of Mahatma 
Gandhi, and renamed the square of its location Gandhi Square, but the 
statue was vandalised with paint in April 2015. In September 2005, six 
11 Coombes, Annie E. “Translating the past: apartheid monuments in post-apartheid South 
Africa.” In Hybridity and its discontents: Politics, Science and Culture, edited by Avtar 
Brah & Annie E. Coombes. London: Routledge, 2000.
12 The statue was first erected at Prince’s Park, and then moved to Pretoria Station.
13 Marschall, Sabine. “Targeting Statues: Monument Vandalism as an Expression of 
Sociopolitical Protest in South Africa”. African Studies Review, 60, 3, 2017: 203-219.
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days after the unveiling of the statue of King Makhado in Makhado 
(formerly Louis Trichardt), the statue was defaced with paint in the 
colours of the former South African flag.14 Similarly, a monument 
erected in remembrance of the Duncan Village Massacre, which 
President Mbeki unveiled in the city of East London in March 2008, was 
contested and vandalised soon after its erection. A spear was removed 
from the hand of the African warrior-like sculpture. When the Buffalo 
City Municipality reacted and fenced the memorial, it was pelted 
with stones.15 In 2008, the South African Heritage Resources Agency 
(SAHRA) constructed a memorial at the grave site of Sara Baartman in 
Hankey, and then declared it a National Heritage Site.16 But the grave 
plaque was vandalised with white paint in April 2015. Before this, the 
grave in which Sara Baartman’s remains were buried on 9 August 2002 
had been vandalised several times. Battling to explain the cause Crais 
and Scully speculated that “the powerful symbolic site offered ritual 
specialists powerful muti (medicine) to cause harm, to ensure benefits 
or to ward off witchcraft”.17 It was unclear in their speculation why the 
‘harvesting’ of muti would involve vandalism. But the splashing of the 
plaque with paint some thirteen years later, resonated more with the 
2015 wave of the troubling of statues. 
Again, these violent contestations were not just about balancing lopsided 
representations or replacing sets of memories and narratives. Deeper 
investigations into each case could potentially unmasking more than 
just prominence of dominant or ‘official’ discourses over ‘vernacular’, 
local or popular expressions.18 Minkley and Mnyaka performed this 
unmasking in their critical analysis of the case of the Duncan Village 
14 Thotse, Mahunele. “Contesting Names and Statues: Battles over the Louis Trichardt and 
Makhado City-text in Limpopo Province, South Africa.” Kronos 36, 2010.
15 Minkley, Gary & Mnyaka, Phindezwa. “Seeing Beyond the Official and the Vernacular: The 
Duncan Village Massacre Memorial and the Politics of Heritage in South Africa”. In: 
Peterson, Derek R., Gavua, Kodzo & Rassool, Ciraj (eds.). The Politics of Heritage in Africa: 
Economies, Histories and Infrastructures. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
16 Government Gazette No. 30987, 2008.
17 Crais, Clifton & Pamela Scully. Sara Baartman and the Hottentot Venus: A Ghost Story and 
a Biography. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
18 Marschall, Sabine. “Commemorating the Trojan Horse Massacre in Cape Town: the 
Tensions between Vernacular and Official Expressions of Memory”. Visual Studies, 25, 2010.
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Massacre Memorial. Their reading of memories, imagery and meanings 
of the massacre transcended simple categories and dichotomies of 
good and bad, or hegemonic and counter-hegemonic heritage. The 
essence of their reading was that the contested warrior-like sculpture 
was “simultaneously national and particular, exclusive and ‘tribal’, and 
not simply universal or ‘African’ national.19 It is such simultaneity and 
intricate overlapping of interests of various contributors and role 
players that continues to render the heritage practice complex. In 
many cases involving constructions of monuments, consultations (and 
even lack of) can be considered as producing complex transactions, 
whereby local and popular memories rely on, borrow from, feed into, 
and sometimes translate into official, nationalising and universalising 
ideas, and vice versa. Thus, contestations do not necessarily confirm 
dominance or subjugation of one discrete and discernible discourse by 
another. Instead, they respond to medleys of meanings that make up 
convoluted and often ambiguous and contradictory heritage products. 
To explicate the complexity of the post-apartheid heritage 
practice further, it is necessary to scrutinise role players and their 
contributions, and to critically study the production processes and 
products at various stages, including the unintended consequences. 
However, for the scope of this chapter focus is limited to the 
complexity created by the overlapping structures and frameworks of 
heritage institutions and agencies and their intersecting mandates. 
It is to highlight the inevitable frustrations with a disorderly heritage 
practice and to demonstrate that there is indeed a correlation between 
the current climbing and defence of statues and their contexts. 
Unlike in the late 1980s, the current issues regarding statues are not 
limited to racial exclusivity and political inclinations. In fact, post-
apartheid monumentalisation simultaneously produces exclusivity 
and inclusivity, and contestations do not always arise along strict 
political lines. While the post-apartheid monumentalisation purports 
19 Minkley, Gary & Mnyaka, Phindezwa. “Seeing Beyond the Official and the Vernacular: The 
Duncan Village Massacre Memorial and the Politics of Heritage in South Africa”, 2015: 60.
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to construct and represent collective memories of a rainbow nation, 
its anti-colonial orientation juxtaposes blackness with whiteness. 
Furthermore, while monuments erected after 1994 can be seen as 
marking new memorial beginnings, they also symbolise convergences 
and conclusions of negotiated historical and heritage knowledges 
and meanings. Each monument immortalises particular streamlined 
memories and narratives, the custodians of which are heritage 
practitioners and government officials in charge of ‘the nations’ arts 
and culture. Certainly, this seems to render post-apartheid monuments 
merely official, rigid and subsequently unfulfilling to the ‘general public’. 
Yet, heritage practitioners and government officials often present the 
same monuments as open invitations to ‘the nation’ to utilise the spaces 
for ongoing creative engagements and production of new memories. 
And through such ‘opportunities’ interest groups invent themselves 
as heritage communities and advisers, beneficiaries and custodians of 
certain heritage processes and products. That too does not guarantee 
fulfilment. Besides, with heritage interests and groupings mutating 
every now and then, there is never certainty about who the climbers 
or attackers and defenders of monuments can be at any given moment. 
Complex negotiations and the blurring of official versus counter-
narratives, or those involved versus the side-lined, becomes even 
more prominent during events such as commemoration days, when 
these generally lifeless monuments get resuscitated to speak to and 
for ‘the nation’. On such occasions, speakers (representing government 
or communities) often seek relevance by carefully straddling between 
particularising the monuments to races, ethnicities and groupings, 
and generalising them to ‘the nation’ and the universe. Notably, the 
#RhodesMustFall movement launched another occasion whereby 
the statue climbers and defenders constructed and disseminated 
explicit meanings of race, ethnicity and gender, and amplified Rhodes 
into whiteness, Europeanness, and masculinity, at the same time as 
they sought to exterminate such generalisations. It is such endings 
and beginnings, closures and openings, and medleys of voices and 
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meanings that have come to characterise the post-apartheid heritage. 
And, it is for such complexity and disorder that the practice has 
landed itself in a web of socio-political struggles related to slow or 
lack of transformation and poor service delivery. The troubling of 
monuments therefore should be viewed through the lens of the kind 
of critical heritage studies that probes beyond simple binaries.
Theorising the post-apartheid heritage practice
For the scope of this work I consider three approaches to critical 
heritage studies that continue to write or talk past each other 
with regard to the troubles unsettling South African monuments. 
One approach is the dominant ideology thesis, which is concerned 
with issues of power and dominance in heritage productions and 
representations.20 It illuminates processes and outcomes that reflect 
top-down practices (usually by the government), subjugation and 
counter strategies. Another approach employs the notion of an 
authorised heritage discourse (AHD), and uses discourse in terms 
derived from linguistics.21 It explicates complex power dynamics in 
rhetoric, legislation, structures and operations, social and political 
contexts, the control of people’s worlds, and the organising of 
people into nations, classes and identities. It then approaches this 
control and ordering as an authorised discourse working against 
competing discourses. But there is another approach concerned with 
knowledge production and power relations in heritage. It is closer 
to the Foucauldian notion of discourse, and draws largely from Tony 
Bennett’s notion of exhibitionary complex.22 It approaches heritage as 
20 For example, Van Vuuren, Chisto J. “The intricacy of intangible cultural heritage: some 
perspectives on Ndebele earthen architecture”. South African Journal of Art History 23, 2, 
2008; Jethro, Duane. “An African story of creation: heritage formation at Freedom Park, 
South Africa.” Material Religion 9, 3, 2013; Marschall, Sabine. 2010a. Landscape of Memory: 
Commemorating Monuments, Memorials and Public Statuary in Post-apartheid South Africa, 
Leiden: Brill; Marschall, Sabine. “Targeting Statues: Monument Vandalism as an Expression 
of Sociopolitical Protest in South Africa”. African Studies Review, 60, 3, 2017, 203-219.
21 Smith, Laurajane. Uses of Heritage. Oxon: Routledge, 2006; King, Tony. & Flynn, M.K. 
“Heritage and the post-apartheid city: Constitution Hill, Johannesburg.” International 
Journal of Heritage Studies 18, 1, 2012.
22 Discourse according to Michel Foucault, and in simpler terms than he explains it, is not a 
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a nexus of negotiated meanings and knowledges.23 Discussions and 
argument in this chapter are aligned with this last approach.
It is important to note though that for all these approaches, the political 
transition of the 1990s was one opportunity for rethinking public 
representations through monuments and statues. The opportunity 
enabled an extensive body of literature devoted to comparing the 
‘before and after’. For example, Franco Frescura explored apartheid 
and post-apartheid monumentalisation through a persuasive critique 
of the work of the HMC and NHC, and of monumentalisation as a 
conservation strategy in general.24 Another critique of the HMC as 
an institution ‘charged with making a register of monuments which 
ought to be preserved’ versus the NMC as an institution charged 
with erecting monuments was offered by Hall and Lillie.25 These 
contributions were quite successful in highlighting the racial, ethnic 
and regional disproportions of conservation approaches over years, 
although Frescura’s contribution was mainly from an architectural 
point of view.
Subsequently, a number of contributions on the subject emerged, which 
appraised the post-apartheid memorial ambitions as they painstakingly 
documented the declarations and erection of monuments and statues 
manifestation of thoughts, knowledge and speeches of a particular subject, but a system, a 
way of organising or structuring, or a formation in which knowledge and meanings are 
produced or organised by means of power and its effects. In such system knowledge and 
meanings are produced to form what manifests as meaningful social relations, logics, 
collective understandings and a set of social facts. See, Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology 
of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language. Pantheon Books: New York, 1972: 55 and 117. 
See also, Bennett, Tony. “The Exhibitionary Complex.” New Formations, 4, 1988.
23 See, Minkley, Gary. “A fragile inheritor: The post-apartheid memorial complex, A.C. 
Jordan and the re-imagining of cultural heritage in the Eastern Cape.” Kronos 34, 2008; 
Witz, Leslie & Rassool, Ciraj. “Making Histories”. Kronos 34, 2008; Minkley, Gary & Mnyaka, 
Phindezwa. “Seeing Beyond the Official and the Vernacular: The Duncan Village Massacre 
Memorial and the Politics of Heritage in South Africa”, 2015.
24 Frescura, Franco. “National of Nationalist? A Critique of the National Monuments 
Council, 1936-1989.” In Proceedings of the National Urban Conservation Symposium, 
University of Witwatersrand, 12-14 July 1991, edited by Derek Japha & Vivienne Japha. 
Cape Town: Oakville Press, 1991; Frescura, Franco. “Who Needs Monuments?” Juta’s SA 
Journal of Property 5, 2, 1989.
25 Hall, Andrew & Ashley Lillie. “The National Monuments Council and a policy for providing 
protection for the cultural and environmental heritage”. Paper presented at Myths, 
Monuments, Museums: New Premises Conference. University of the Witwatersrand, 
history workshop, 16-18 July, 1992.
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around the country.26 Marschall and Grudlingh offered compelling 
critiques of the ‘new monumental premises’ and highlighted some 
myths and ambiguities embedded in the nationalising ideas and ideals 
of unity in diversity, reconciliation and social cohesion. Coombes 
offered a broader and more critical analysis, placing monuments and 
statues at the centre of intricate public history and memory-making 
projects fraught with ambiguities, contestations. 
Indeed, a few sources highlighted the numerous shortcomings 
characterising post-apartheid monumentalisation. Buchli and Lucas 
found monumentalising a heritage of recent political past generally 
a challenge, since it related to contemporary political issues that 
remained unresolved.27 Marschall evaluated the whole practice through 
a dominant ideology thesis. She perceived public monumentalisation in 
post-apartheid South Africa as manifesting dominant ideologies, and as 
produced through an official, hegemonic narrative, and as constituted 
within a discourse authorised, made official and endorsed by ‘agents of 
state’. Marschall criticised new monumental projects as embodiments 
of a triumphalist ‘meta-narrative’ of the struggle, and as representing 
a ‘dominant, authorised version of the past in visualised forms’.28 
Similarly, scholars like Duane Jethro singled out ‘legacy projects’ like 
the Freedom Park to diagnose anatomic issues from conception to the 
launch.29 Their overall focus was on highlighting successes and failures 
26 Marschall, Sabine. “Gestures of compensation: post-apartheid monuments and 
memorials”. Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, 55, 2004; Marschall, 
Sabine. “Reordering the Past: Monuments and Architectural Heritage in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa”. Repenser les limites: l’architecture à traves l’espace, le tempts et les disciplines, 
INHA Paris, 2005; Marschall, Sabine. ‘Struggle Heroes: Constructing a Genealogy for the 
New South Africa”. International Journal of Heritage Studies, 2006; Grundlingh, Albert M. 
“A cultural conundrum? Old monuments and new regimes: The Voortrekker monument 
as symbol of Afrikaner power in a postapartheid South Africa”. Radical History Review 81, 
2001; Coombes, Annie E. “Translating the past: apartheid monuments in post-apartheid 
South Africa.” In Hybridity and its discontents: Politics, Science and Culture, edited by 
Avtar Brah & Annie E. Coombes. London: Routledge, 2000; Coombes, Annie E. History 
after apartheid: visual culture and public memory in a democratic South Africa. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2003. 
27 Buchli, Victor & Gavin Lucas. Archaeologies of the Contemporary Past. London: Routledge, 
2001.
28 Marschall, Sabine. Landscape of Memory: Commemorating Monuments, Memorials and 
Public Statuary in Post-apartheid South Africa, Leiden: Brill, 2010.
29 Jethro, Duane. “An African story of creation: heritage formation at Freedom Park, South 
Africa.” Material Religion 9, 3, 2013.
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of the post-apartheid state. Jethro also revealed the contradictory 
nature of gigantic monuments like Freedom Park that have failed to 
attract visitors although conceived with the grandest ambitions to be 
the opposite. Some of the arguments made in this chapter about grand 
plans, chaotic operations, and unfulfilling and banal monumental 
products are grounded on Jethro’s observations. However, beyond 
centres and directions of power that Jethro has looked at, are some 
interesting disorderly spaces and processes between what appears as 
neatly constituted and organised institutions and lines of authority. 
In the light of the #RhodesMustFall movement, numerous 
contributions focused on issues of transformation and related socio-
economic conditions.30 Cynthia Kros offered a more detailed analysis 
exploring the rationale behind the recent call for removal of colonial 
and apartheid statues and monuments.31 However, none of these 
contributions probed the forms of knowledge informing the ideas 
and ideals driving the post-apartheid monumentalisation, and the 
structures within which heritage was produced. 
But this chapter is aligned with the deeper probing of these issues, 
which is prominent in the writings of Witz, Minkley, Rassool and 
Mnyaka. These scholars have for the past decade consistently analysed 
the post-apartheid heritage practice through critiques of disciplines 
and knowledge forms informing public representations. Most 
persuasive is Minkley and Mnyaka’s critical analysis of the memorial 
complex through a case study of a statue erected in Duncan Village, 
which highlights not just contestations but the intricacy of power/
knowledge relations in post-apartheid heritage.32 Another most 
30 Nyamnjoh, Francis B. “Black Pain Matters: Down with Rhodes”, CODESRIA Bulletin, 3-4, 
2015, 74-93; Mbembe, Achille. “Decolonizing knowledge and the question of the archive”. 
Presented at Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER), University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2015, Accessed 2 August 2016, http://wiser.wits.ac.za/
system/files/Achille%20Mbembe%20-%20Decolonizing%20Knowledge%20and%20
the%20Question%20of%20the%20Archive.pdf; Habib, Adam. “Race, Racism and 
Memorials”, Accessed on 2 August 2016, https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/
general-news/2015/2015-04/race-racism-and-memorials.html
31 Kros, Cynthia. “Rhodes Must Fall: archives and counter-archives”. Journal of Critical Arts: 
South-North Cultural and Media Studies, 29, 2015.
32 Minkley, Gary & Mnyaka, Phindezwa. “Seeing Beyond the Official and the Vernacular: The 
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recent contribution to this ‘advanced’ critical heritage scholarship 
is a collection of essays focused on understanding post-apartheid 
heritage as a complex.33 The essays on South Africa successfully steer 
away from settling with simple notions of heritage as authorised by 
the state and/or experts, but challenges one to think beyond coercive 
power. Yet so far, each of the studies of post-apartheid statues and 
monuments has been insulated and unrelated to the rest under an 
overarching yet close and critical reading. What remains absent in 
these studies is an overarching theorisation of the fundamental issues 
troubling the monumental landscape. 
My interpretation primarily draws from the critical heritage scholarship 
that approaches post-apartheid heritage practice as a complex in 
order to offer an account of the troubled monumental landscape as 
both complex (intricate) and a complex (network). It is an account that 
seeks to highlight fundamental issues not just in the regime, dominant 
ideologies and ambiguous ideals, or negotiated roles, but the ‘nature’ 
of the entire complex, the frameworks and scopes of operation. Hence, 
the troubled statues as subjects of this discussion are situated within 
what Gary Minkley identifies as ‘post-apartheid memorial complex’, 
a complex arena of ideas and meanings of ‘the symbolic’ represented 
discursively and materially.34 The historicising discussion featuring 
in the previous sections is therefore important in highlighting the 
genealogy, development and changes of the South African memorial 
landscape in relation to statues. 
Duncan Village Massacre Memorial and the Politics of Heritage in South Africa”, 2015.
33 Rassool, Ciraj. 2015. “Human Remains, the Disciplines of the Dead, and the South African 
Memorial Complex”. In The Politics of Heritage in Africa: Economies, Histories and 
Infrastructures, edited by Peterson, Derek R., Gavua, Kodzo and Rassool, Ciraj. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015.
34 Minkley, Gary. “A fragile inheritor: The post-apartheid memorial complex, A.C. Jordan 
and the re-imagining of cultural heritage in the Eastern Cape.” Kronos 34, 2008.
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The post-apartheid memorial complex
In his analysis of the work of culture, Tony Bennett considers the material 
processes through which culture is made as assemblages of networks 
of relations.35 The processes involve accumulation, classification, 
codification, and ordering of varied kinds of objects, knowledge, and 
practices to constitute culture. Bennett likens these processes to, for 
example, ‘the bringing together of various kinds of writing to form 
literature, or of painting to constitute art’. Similarly, an assemblage of 
buildings, sites, objects, cultures, traditions, and knowledge systems 
that are produced, stored, accumulated, codified, and disseminated 
by a network of institutions and agencies, constitute post-apartheid 
heritage. As Bennett demonstrates regarding culture, designating 
heritage involves setting in place ‘specific relations between objects 
and practices’, ‘institutionally produced zones of cultural action’, and 
‘institutional mechanisms and the forms of expertise’. 
Thus, analysing the work of post-apartheid heritage involves attending 
to the assemblage of legislations and policies that set the work into 
motion. It involves attending to the varied structures and frameworks 
of the institutions and agencies established to facilitate the making of 
heritage. And, it involves attending to the different knowledges and 
meanings giving rise to differentiated ensembles, such as tangible 
and intangible heritage. In the gestation of post-apartheid heritage 
legislation, a heritage definition carried through the arts and culture 
and heritage commissions, and bills was that of,
a sum-total of wildlife and scenic parks, sites of scientific and 
historical importance, national monuments, historic buildings, 
works of art, literature and music, oral traditions and museum 
collections and their documentation which provides the basis for a 
shared culture and creativity in the arts.36
35 Bennett, Tony. “The Exhibitionary Complex.” New Formations, 4, 1988.
36 This definition was adopted from the report by the Arts and Culture Task Group (ACTAG) 
and the White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage, 1996. In November 1994, following the 
National Museums Workshop in Pretoria where the Museums South Africa (MUSA) 
report was rejected, the Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology in the new 
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The NHRA in particular amalgamates all these into an assemblage 
called the national estate. It entrusts SAHRA, which replaced the 
National Monuments Council (NMC), with the mandate to safeguard, 
protect, preserve, and conserve the national estate. The Act explicates 
the national estate in sections, which SAHRA has adopted as its 
structure and operational framework, as follows:
Section 32 and 33: heritage objects; section 34: structures or built 
environment; section 35: archaeology, palaeontology and meteorites; 
section 35: maritime and underwater cultural heritage section, 
provided that the protection of any wreck in the territorial waters 
and the maritime cultural zone shall be the responsibility of SAHRA; 
section 36: burial grounds and graves; section 37: public monuments 
and memorials; section 39: national inventory; section 13: Centre for 
Training, Research and Education.37
A striking feature of the ensemble, particularly as assembled for SAHRA, 
is the missing category of national monuments, or replacement of the 
term ‘national monument’ with ‘heritage site’.38 In Section 34, ‘structures 
or built environment’ is assumed to accommodate monuments such 
as statues, which upon declaration acquire the term ‘national heritage 
site’. The development signifies a conceptual deconstruction of the 
existing marble, concrete, steel and bronze blocks and structures, 
so that they are thought of as sites. It invokes meanings of openness 
and versatile utility of an open memorial landscape. The development 
also signifies an inclination towards a memorial complex of symbolic 
rather than monumental commemorations. 
‘government of national unity’ appointed and commissioned the Arts and Culture Task 
Group (ACTAG). Its mandate was to review the heritage legislation existing at the time 
and recommend reforms. In its very first report, ACTAG noted in the National Monuments 
Act (NMC) and within the work of NMC a “bias” towards conservation of ‘heritage’ 
associated with European colonists. The group subsequently recommended among 
other things ‘inclusivity’ to include for example, “graves of all victims of conflict in South 
Africa, from land struggles to wars and the struggle against apartheid”. The White Paper 
on Arts, Culture and Heritage was a combination of ACTAG’s proposals, investigations by 
the Department of Arts and Culture, inputs from the writers of the Draft White Paper on 
Arts, Culture and Heritage and its Reference Group, and the Arts and Culture Ministry’s 
own views based on its understanding of the workings, possibilities and constraints 
facing the Government. See, the Arts and Culture Task Group (ACTAG), Second Draft 
Report, May 1995: 80-81, and the White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage.
37 National Heritage Resources Act No.25 of 1999.
38 National Heritage Resources Act, 1999, S 58 (11) (a).
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Besides, as was the case with the NMC, SAHRA is not mandated 
to declare and erect monuments, but to preserve, conserve, and 
protect the already declared monuments. Its role is to preserve 
the already declared monuments dotting the country, and identify, 
grade, and declare more undeclared monuments deemed of national, 
provincial, and local significance through a three-tier system.39 It 
is the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC), through the Legacy 
Projects40 under its heritage promotion and preservation programme, 
that erects new monuments. Some DAC monuments are even erected 
outside the borders of South Africa.41 The National Heritage Council 
(NHC) established by the National Heritage Council Act (NHCA) of 
1999, to develop, promote and protect the national heritage, and 
coordinate heritage management, has its contribution in this regard, 
through projects like the Liberation Heritage Project.42 Nonetheless, 
SAHRA contributes in the post-apartheid monumentalisation through 
its protection of burial grounds and grave sites, on which SAHRA 
erects monumental memorials. There is therefore a multiplicity and 
duplication of outlets at which monuments are conceived and realised. 
Moreover, SAHRA’s management scope overlaps into the mandate of the 
NHC in many respects. Just like SAHRA’s heritage impact assessments 
39 In terms of the National Heritage Resources Act the three-tier system is such that Grade 
I. II and III are sites of national, provincial and local significance respectively. It is the role 
of provincial heritage authorities to manage Grade II heritage resources, and the role of 
local heritage authorities to manage grade III heritage resources. Where a provincial or 
local authority is deemed incompetent, SAHRA must take the responsibility of managing 
the heritage resources within the ambit of the incompetent authority.
40 In 1996 the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST) planned 
Legacy Projects to ‘establish commemorative symbols of South Africa’s history and to 
celebrate its heritage’. In 1998 the Cabinet approved and budgeted some seven million 
rand for the initial eight projects. These were the Women’s Memorial, Ncome/Blood 
River Project, Samora Machel Monument, Albert Luthuli Museum, the Constitution Hill, 
the Freedom Park, Nelson Mandela Museum and the Khoisan Heritage Project.
41 These include the Matola Monument in Matola, Mozambique, and memorials on burial 
sites in Cuito Quanevale in Angola, the Vienna Camp in Angola, the Augustino Netto 
Memorial in Angola, the Liberation graves in Angola, the Nelson Mandela training 
Barracks in Ethiopia and Liberation Graves in Tanzania.
42 The NHC launched the Liberation Heritage Route Project as part of a bigger African 
Liberation Heritage Route project. The South African leg sought to the identify, recognise 
and develop people, communities, events, places, icons which had a significant impact 
on the South African struggle for liberation. See, Bialostocka, Olga. “Liberation Heritage 
Route: Reminiscent of the Painful Past or a Road to the Future?”, Policy Brief, Africa 
Institute of South Africa, November 2013: 100.
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overlap with the environmental impact assessment systems operated 
by different government departments, such as the Environmental 
Impact Assessments (EIAs) which is required in terms of the National 
Environmental Management Act, Act 107 of 1998, or of the Environment 
Conservation Act, Act 73 of 1989 and Environmental Management 
Plans (EMPs) required by the Department of Minerals and Energy. One 
notable result of the overlaps, duplication of roles, ambiguities and 
contradictions between the work of SAHRA, the NHC, DAC and other 
government departments, is frustrations and inefficiency among 
these agencies and institutions of heritage governance.43 
Nonetheless out of this paradox, effective collaborations have seen 
new post-apartheid monumental projects, implemented by DAC and 
declared by SAHRA, or implemented by SAHRA, endorsed by DAC and 
promoted by the NHC. Another example is the survey of monuments and 
memorials in public open spaces (squares and parks) in Bloemfontein, 
Cape Town and Pretoria, which SAHRA undertook, upon the request of 
DAC in 2003. This saw entry into the inventory of the national estate in 
the custodianship of SAHRA a few colonial monuments and towns. It is 
also through such collaborations that the NHC occasionally intervened 
in the protection of monuments subject to vandalism, as in the case 
of the Duncan Village Massacre Memorial erected by DAC. The NHC 
commissioned a study on the matter and held public hearings, albeit in 
the interest of promoting the liberation struggle.44
However, the post-apartheid monumentalising processes are generally 
protracted, intricate, and involve multi-layered bureaucratic consultative 
procedures. Where the processes are bottom-up, they involve, 
• expression of concerns or interests at the levels of individuals, 
families, concerned groups, local communities, and local authorities;
43 Manetsi, Thabo. Can Intangibles be Tangible? Safeguarding Intangible Heritage in the New 
South Africa: Towards Formulating Policy for the Conservation and Sustainable Management 
of Living Heritage. Masters’ Thesis. Cape Town: University of Cape Town, 2007.
44 Minkley, Gary. “A fragile inheritor: The post-apartheid memorial complex, A.C. Jordan 
and the re-imagining of cultural heritage in the Eastern Cape.” Kronos 34, 2008.
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• the processing of nominations, recommendations and 
applications by the institutions of heritage governance, including 
government Arts and Culture ministries, Provincial Heritage 
Resources Authorities (PHRAs), SAHRA, NHC and their multi-level 
professionals, experts and consultants;
• research and assessments of significance and state of conservation, 
consultation of various departments, stakeholders, experts and 
public participation of not less than 60 days, as required by multiple 
laws, policies and regulations; and
• multiple stages of planning, designing, procurement, tendering, 
and back and forth reporting, and implementation by professionals 
and service providers, followed by other multiple stages of 
reporting and accounting.45
Where the processes are largely top-down as in the case of the Legacy 
Projects, the same network of applications applies, not in direct reverse 
but intermittently. Such is the heritage assemblage, structures, and 
systems, part of which is the monumental work performed and deployed 
variously by local heritage authorities, PHRAs, SAHRA, NHC, and DAC. 
Apparently, post-apartheid monumentalising processes primarily 
empower structured forms of memory and knowledge production, 
and dismember unstructured creativity and in many instances, 
counter-hegemony. There is such hierarchisation and prioritisation 
of selected memories and knowledges that many processes have 
rendered themselves irrelevant to, for example, those pursuing new 
socio-economic struggles by means different from the anti-apartheid 
struggles. It is because of such that the hashtag movement masses 
were by 2015 increasingly distrustful of, for example, the ‘doctrines 
and talk of neo-liberal racial democracy’, while public institutions 
continued to exclude different epistemologies of thought.46 Indeed, 
45 This is a summary of processes outlined in NHRA, SAHRA Minimum Standards for 
Heritage Impact Assessments, 2007 and SAHRA Guidelines for Site Management Plans.
46 Kamanzi, Brian. “Rhodes Must Fall – Decolonisation Symbolism – What is happening at 
UCT, South Africa?”
The Postcolonialist, 29 March, 2015. Accessed 18 August 2016, http://postcolonialist.com/civil-
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graffiti messages accompanying the troubling of statues such as, ‘I stole 
your land so what?’, ‘End White Privilege’, ‘Fuck Rhodes’, and ‘a black 
woman raised me’ embodied counter-hegemonic discourses. Beyond 
this interpretation, however, is another interpretation transcending 
the simple dichotomies that slot these messages and the resisting 
voices into categories like black, white, poor, privileged, official, and 
vernacular. To interpret a heritage practice so complex, I prefer this 
approach as it irradiates those knowledge/power negotiations and 
dynamics. It acknowledges the agency of the statue-climbing and 
statue-defending masses as heritage makers and monumentalists 
in their own regard, rather than simple counter or anti-heritage 
revolutionists as a wide scholarship and commentary suggest. 
Analysing the troubling of statues 
The 2015 flurry of defacement of monuments had interesting surprises 
and unintended consequences for both heritage policy workers and the 
contenders. It seemed like heritage policy makers and bodies of heritage 
governance were caught by surprise by the sheer lack of public awareness 
of how to go about heritage-ising. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
of the NHC, Sonwabile Mancotywa admitted that there was a ‘policy 
vacuum’ and lack of public discourse and consultation. At the same time, 
he relentlessly insinuated his custodianship of some correct versions of 
pasts and histories, through utterances like ‘South Africans need to be 
taught their history because the history they were taught was distorted’.47 
But the arguments about ‘lack of discourse’, ‘lack of policy’, or ‘need for 
policy review’ were tenuous, since some of the contestations affecting 
monuments arose amidst an abundance of public policy and discourse. 
Consider, for example, public policy and discourse before and after 
the removal of the bust of Hendrik Verwoerd by Midvaal Municipality 
from the municipal offices in Meyerton. This occurred two weeks 
discourse/rhodes-must-fall-decolonisation-symbolism-happening-uct-south-africa/
47 Sosibo, Kwanele. “Heritage Council on back foot as Rhodes falls”. Mail & Guardian Online, 




before South Africa’s 2011 local government elections, in the spate 
of the ANC’s condemnations of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and its 
monumentalising tendencies. Two things particularly irritated Pieter 
Mulder from the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) about the ‘untimely’ removal 
of the bust. One was the kind of ‘selective removal’ that left the statues 
of Jan Van Riebeek and Queen Victoria in Cape Town untouched. 
Another was an attempt to ‘make history complete’ by removing old 
statues instead of erecting new ones.48 
According to media reports the bust was removed for safe-keep/ing 
by ‘its owner’, the Kultuurraad vir Klipriviervallei/Cultural Council for 
Klip River Valley allied to the Afrikaner heritage organisation named 
Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK)/Federation of 
Afrikaner Cultural Organisations.49 In that case the removal of the bust 
was an act of defence and protection from a potential defacement. 
Even so, the removal was in contravention of Section 27 of the National 
Heritage Resources Act (NHRA), Act No. 25 of 1999, which prevented 
damaging or unlawful removal of public monuments of any local, 
provincial or national significance. In terms of Section 8 of NHRA, a 
permit to remove the bust should have been obtained through due 
processes from a local or provincial heritage authority. If any of 
these authorities was incompetent or incapacitated, as assessed by 
an authority or agent at a higher level, the higher authority such as 
PRHA-Gauteng in this case or SAHRA, should have regulated the 
removal or followed through with a penalty, fine or conviction. The 
process would have lasted at least two months to accommodate the 
60-day minimum period required for public participation. 
Yet there was a contradiction. As a heritage object, the ‘owner’ had 
responsibility to conserve the bust in accordance with Section 32(15) of 
the same Act.50 What’s more, according to Section 55, ‘no person is liable 
48 Mulder, Pieter. Press statement. 5 May, 2011. Accessed 12 September 2016, http://www.
archivalplatform.org/news/entry/toppling_verwoerd/
49 Moeng, Katlego. “Verwoerd bust gone”. Sowetan Live, 6 May, 2011. Accessed 12 September 
2016, http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2011/05/06/verwoerd-bust-gone
50 According to NHRA, Section 32, a heritage object could be publicly or privately owned.
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in respect of anything done in terms of [NHRA] in good faith and without 
negligence’. Besides, SAHRA, PHRAs or the nameless local authorities 
generally exercised their powers as far as establishing principles, 
advising, assisting, and providing professional expertise, although NHRA 
empowers them to convict upon contravention. Thus, the removal of 
Verwoerd’s bust was not just subject to different interpretations of the 
law, it affirmed the complexity of the power/knowledge dynamics playing 
out in the post-apartheid monumental complex. 
In April 2015, in the spur of countrywide #RhodesMustFall protests, 
the bronze sentries at the feet of the statue of Paul Kruger in Church 
Square in Pretoria were splashed with green paint. In protest and 
defence of the statue, singer Sunnette Bridges and others in the 
Red October Movement and the Front Nasionaal party gathered in 
Church Square on the morning of 8 April 2015. Bridges chained herself 
to the statue until the protesters were prevented from ‘taking hold’ 
of the statue by a police barricade. As the Red October Movement 
gained momentum in the rest of the country, its supporters in Cape 
Town and other groups such as the Boere Krisis Aksie and the Western 
Cape Action Forum, also gathered in defence of the statue of Jan van 
Riebeeck. Like Bridges, Johan Willemse of the Western Cape Action 
Forum chained himself to the statue. 
Safeguarding one’s heritage in such a manner was also in contravention 
of NHRA, in the same way as defacing was. Hence, SAHRA responded 
by warning against contravention of Section 27 of NHRA, while 
contradictorily choosing to avoid meddling in ‘matters with political 
connotations’.51 In one of its official statements, SAHRA advised of 
the bureaucratic processes open to anyone wishing to see changes 
in the post-apartheid monumental landscape, including adding or 
removing monuments. The process, as outlined in various policy 
guidelines, involved submitting notices and applications to ‘relevant 
heritage authorities and stake holders’, together with heritage impact 
51 Bernado, Carla. “Heritage Agency Condemns Statue Vandals”. Independent Online, 




assessments and ensuring adequate public participation lasting at 
least 60 days. Heritage impact assessments necessitated attention 
to technical details, expertise, and time, the pleasure of which many 
individuals or groups disputing the monumental landscape had not. 
Even so, it was not the inhibitive bureaucratic processes, or a heritage 
constantly barricaded by police that concerned heritage bodies like 
SAHRA. Their preoccupation was ensuring adherence to rules and 
achieving change of public attitudes and regulation of behaviours. 
Much time and resources were spent on carefully crafting regulations, 
guidelines, codes and procedures, and on parading model post-
apartheid memorialisation through grand unveiling ceremonies, 
launches, commemorations, and award ceremonies. At the same 
time, the defacing episodes not only violated the rules but illuminated 
contradictions and ambiguities in the rules, the knowledges informing 
them, and the structures of their implementation. How then does one 
avert an easy reading of these events?
In the few examples cited in this chapter, ‘races’ sometimes exchanged 
places in the show of climbing and defending statues. The 2015 
occurrences were often so spontaneous that commentators had a 
wide range of guesses. The actions were slotted into racial, ethnic or 
class categories and then packaged as issues specific to a category. 
As ‘black issues’, they were linked with frustrations over poor service 
delivery52; a general failure of the government to see to the needs of 
‘the people’; a lack of, or insufficient consultation with ‘the people’; 
opportunism; criminal elements; and even illiteracy.53 As ‘white 
(specifically Afrikaner) issues’, the occurrences were associated with 
unwillingness to embrace change; the sore-loser syndrome; disruptive 
right-wing forces; and the add-on approach and its intrinsic flaws.54 
52 Kamanzi, Brian. “Rhodes Must Fall – Decolonisation Symbolism – What is happening at 
UCT, South Africa?” The Postcolonialist, 29 March, 2015. Accessed 18 August 2016, http://
postcolonialist.com/civil-discourse/rhodes-must-fall-decolonisation-symbolism-
happening-uct-south-africa/; Nyamnjoh, Francis B. “Black Pain Matters: Down with 
Rhodes”, CODESRIA Bulletin, 3-4, 2015: 74-93.
53 De Villiers, Ockert. “Steve Hofmeyr blames statue defacement on illiteracy”. Mail & 
Guardian, 8 April, 2015.
54 Baines, Gary. “The politics of public history in post-apartheid South Africa”. In History 
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So convenient were the simple explanations that even the agents of 
post-apartheid heritage governance took a ride and blamed vandalism 
of monuments and statues on the overdue heritage policy review 
and renewal of public participation.55 There was a huge banking on 
heritage policy review and renewing public participation as some holy 
grail for an impeccable post-apartheid heritage monumentalisation.
Yet, the existing heritage policy emerged out of vigorous processes 
involving and an overhaul of apartheid policies through public 
participation, which lasted at least four years from the appointment 
of the Arts and Culture Task Group by the Minister of Arts, Culture, 
Science and Technology in 1995 to the promulgation of NHRA in 
1999. The new legislation reflected an obvious departure from 
many colonial forms of representation. Monuments fell into a body 
of strategic resources that could be utilised for nation-building and 
social cohesion. Indeed, the legislation established a practice sustained 
by the 20 transformation imperatives,56 which effectively achieved 
the ‘othering’ of colonial statues, through its obvious inclination to 
anti-colonial pasts, histories and memories. Its new monumental 
projects were a taunting juxtaposition with colonial monuments, as it 
was the case with the gigantic Freedom Park versus the Voortrekker 
Monument. The possibilities that SAHRA would ‘identify’ and declare 
the undeclared colonial monuments as ‘national heritage sites’ were 
minimal, as the legislation transition had left many of them in the 
jurisdiction of largely incompetent local authorities, or as mere entries 
in the registries held by SAHRA.57 
Making and Present Day Politics: The meaning of Collective Memory in South Africa, 
edited by Hans Eric Stolten. Uppsala: Nordica Africa Institute, 2006; Baines, Gary. “Site 
of Struggle: the Freedom Park Fracas and the Divisive Legacy of South Africa’s Border 
War/Liberation Struggle.” Social Dynamics 35, 2: 2009: 330-344.
55 Mancotywa, Sonwabile. Critical Conversations About Heritage: Popularising Contemporary 
Heritage Issues, edited by Denver, Webb A. National Heritage Council, 2014.
56 The transformation imperatives were, human rights, freedom of expression, access, 
equity, redress, nation-building, multilingualism, diversity, autonomy, arms-length, 
participation, accountability, transparency, conservation, achievement, innovation, co-
operation, exchange, security, and sustainability. See, ACTAG Final Report, 1994, White 
Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage, 1996 and the National Heritage Resources Act, 1999.
57 Interestingly, the NMC had ‘forgotten’ to declare the Voortrekker Monument. It was only 
in 2011 that SAHRA declared the monument a national heritage site.
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Notwithstanding this, Minkley has observed that 22 years into 
‘democracy’ ‘the centrifugal heritage claims of diversity and 
multiculturalism seen reduced by the continuing presence of the 
real tangible signs of the existing visible built ‘South Africanism’ of 
the white settler ‘national estate”.58 Despite all claims and pageants of 
newness, there is a taunting presence of the ‘old’ in the monumental 
landscape. While this is largely due to a ‘strategic’ retention of colonial 
monuments, it is also because the ‘new’ is to a great degree similar to 
the settler heritage in form and approach. 
Reproducing the ‘old’
To a great extent, post-apartheid memorialisation manifests the ‘old’ 
ways of knowing and understanding pasts and histories. Firstly, the ‘new’ 
memorials primarily fail to deconstruct persistent hierarchical binary 
oppositions based on ideas of racial difference and timeless African 
cultures and traditions. Persistent utilisation of colonial categories like 
tribe in the constructions of, for example, monuments to Shaka, Chief 
Makhado, the Battle of Ncome/Blood River, Duncan Village Massacre 
Memorial, draws from forms of romance that fed into the settler notions 
of imperial conquests and erfenis. Also, the post-apartheid repatriation of 
human remains, identification of missing dead bodies, the rehabilitation 
of heroes’ graves, and the symbolic and physical memorialisations that 
goes with, are often not critical of knowledge generated by disciplines 
like forensic anthropology and archaeology. The remains of Sara 
Baartman and Klaas and Troy Pienaar for instance, although repatriated, 
reburied, and memorialised through grand ceremonies, were returned to 
the same categories that in the past rendered them subjects and objects 
of degrading scrutiny in the name of science.59 They were returned as 
Bushmen and memorialised as such. 
58 Minkley, Gary. “A fragile inheritor: The post-apartheid memorial complex, A.C. Jordan 
and the re-imagining of cultural heritage in the Eastern Cape.” Kronos 34, 2008: 24.
59 Rassool, Ciraj. 2015. “Human Remains, the Disciplines of the Dead, and the South African 
Memorial Complex”. In The Politics of Heritage in Africa: Economies, Histories and 
Infrastructures, edited by Peterson, Derek R., Gavua, Kodzo and Rassool, Ciraj. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015: 145.
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Secondly, the practice is ambivalent in the sense that on the one hand, 
it privileges the so-called living heritage through the superior powers 
and financial resources vested on the NHC, which include making 
policy and advising the Minister of Arts and Culture. On the other 
hand, it strives to catch-up or even supersede the apartheid regime 
in erecting monuments. As it was for the NMC, ‘opportunity for far 
more creative and productive approach to memorialising cultural 
significance’ is lost to ‘costly large impenetrable blocks of black marble, 
massive concrete or steel structures’.60 As seen in the examples cited 
in this chapter, even the newest and grandest of these could not deter 
the masses from contesting the monumental landscape. 
Thirdly, the practice is more contradictory and productive of 
contestations than the harmonising unity in diversity it purports. While 
the post-apartheid heritage practice appears progressive and steering 
to new directions, its ambivalence in many areas apprehends the 
functionality of its apparatuses. Baines for example, notes that framing a 
master-narrative by selecting usable pasts for something called national 
identity and collective memory, while ignoring sub-national, ethnic, 
local and even family identities is ambivalent.61 Another ambivalence 
to note stems from the permissive nature and outlook of the practice. 
It is in the ‘strategy’ of not obscuring, relegating or destroying many 
features of the ‘old’ monumental landscape, which effectively renders 
the modern post-apartheid state and its preferred features visible to its 
citizenry. Indeed, the features of the ‘old’ left untouched are – for the 
benefit of the state – rallying points for a collectivised public to celebrate 
the defeat of an ugly past. But this also works contrariwise, in that the 
same symbols become rallying points for expressing discontentment 
with the state, regarding what some perceived as incomplete or botched 
transformation, and selective historicisation and heritagisation by the 
state departments institutions and agents. 
60 Buchli, Victor & Gavin Lucas. Archaeologies of the Contemporary Past. London: Routledge, 
2001: 90.
61 Baines, Gary. “The politics of public history in post-apartheid South Africa.” In History 
Making and Present Day Politics: The meaning of Collective Memory in South Africa, 
edited by Hans Eric Stolten. Uppsala: Nordica Africa Institute, 2006: 173-176.
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It is this progressive, yet regressive approach that artists like Beezy 
Bailey and Sithembile Msezane have drawn attention to. Bailey’s daring 
refiguring of colonial statues, including dressing and making-up the 
statue of Louis Botha outside the parliament in Cape Town as a Xhosa 
male initiate, earned him death threats from ‘passing Afrikaners’.62 The 
installation came across as unacceptably progressive for blurring the 
venerated fixed racial and cultural boundaries, but also unacceptably 
regressive for invigorating ostracized symbols of colonial domination.63 
The question of who was regressive between Bailey and the defenders 
of Louis Botha’s statue is valid, and it highlights the complexity of the 
statue as a heritage piece. The heated reaction to Bailey’s installation 
is comparable with Maximo Caminero’s smashing of a vase displayed 
by Miami Art Museum, as a protest against ‘the museum’s failure to 
display works of local artists’. The act raised valid questions about who 
the vandal was between Caminero and Ai Weiwei, the artist who had 
appropriated the Han Dynasty urn and painted on it.64
More than 10 years later, another artist Sithembile Msezane attracted 
both praise, humiliation and for her art performances, which involved 
dressing up provocatively and standing still for hours on plinths 
next to some of the highly contested monuments. Msezane turned 
herself into a living juxtaposition with the contested memorials, as an 
invitation for people to think about why such monuments had to ‘fall’.65 
While Bailey and Msezane’s statue-troubling was of a different kind, 
their works irradiated a memorial landscape that seemingly opened 
62 Mbita, Tarzan. “Artist Beezy threatened over Xhosa Louis Botha”. Beezy Bailey Press, 
2015. Accessed 19 April 2015, http://home.intekom.com/beezybailey/new/press/
abakw/abakw.htm
63 Tshabalala, Sibusiso and Botha Nadine. “8 things to do with unwanted statues and 
monuments”. Cape Town Partnership, 31 March, 2015. Accessed 19 April 2015, http://
www.capetownpartnership.co.za/2015/03/7-things-to-do-with-unwanted-statues/
64 See Jones, Jonathan. “Who’s the vandal: Ai Weiwei or the man who smashed his Han urn?” 
The Guardian, 18 February 2014. Accessed 23 August 2018, https://www.theguardian.
com/artanddesign/jonathanjonesblog/2014/feb/18/ai-weiwei-han-urn-smash-
miami-art.
65 Sethembile, Msezane. Interview with Buist, Erica. “Sethembile Msezane performs at 
the fall of the Cecil Rhodes statue”. The Guardian Online, 19 April, 2015. Accessed 
10 August 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/may/15/
sethembile-msezane-cecil-rhodes-statue-cape-town-south-africa
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itself to open and ongoing construal, and yet offered an impression of 
decisiveness to the satisfaction of some. 
Lastly, there are striking similarities between apartheid heritage 
designed to achieve governmentality of citizenry by means of 
suppressing, taming and othering, which resulted in ‘blacks’ climbing 
the statue of Kruger and ‘whites’ defending it in 1989, and the post-
apartheid memorial practices. This is because the latter, corresponds 
with the former as it contradictorily straddles heritage between on the 
one hand, democratisation, an exhibitionary kind of open access, and 
unlimited creativity, and on the other hand, governmentality through 
regulation. The practice occasionally leans more to the former than the 
latter, and on other occasions, more of the latter than the former. The 
product of such ambiguity is therefore no less than another ambiguity 
such as the masses’ occasional outbursts, which at one stage trouble 
statues to draw attention to the present, and at another stage uphold 
statues in advancement of selected pasts. 
It also suffices to point out that such struggles have such agency as to 
transcend ordinary classifications as counter, alternative, vernacular, 
unofficial, or unauthorised. To make heritage is to choose whether 
or not to preserve, and what and how to preserve. It is in that light 
that climbing, defending or removing statues can be considered an 
act of memorialising, similar to constructing or erecting statues. Such 
acts contribute layers of complexity to the post-apartheid memorial 
complex. It is these surprises and unintended consequences that 
constantly prompt institutions of heritage governance and policy 
makers to want to review heritage legislation and re-design avenues 
of public consultation and participation. 
In conclusion
The post-apartheid heritage practice is complex. Its sphere 
encompasses a wide range of sites, objects and places, as well as bodies, 
institutions, processes, practices, disciplines, and approaches. It is 
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complex in terms of size and gridded structure, and is complex in terms 
of the sophistication of its processes. With regards to monuments, 
the broad sphere ostensibly permits and even encourages massive 
memorialisation, while the bureaucratic structures through which the 
practice is governed can be considered inhibiting. The purpose of this 
chapter has been to evaluate the recent troubling of South Africa’s 
statues in relation to the nature of this post-apartheid memorial 
complex. I have argued that while the monumentalising practice might 
seem simply hegemonic and driven by dominant ideologies, it is far 
more complex than a simple matter of hegemony versus alternative 
discourses, categories and binaries. I have shown that the practice 
seems well ordered, structured and well managed, yet excessive, 
contradictory, disorderly and unfulfilling. Heritage products like 
monuments are visual manifestations of layers of interspersed ideas 
and meanings. Therefore, their ever so often troubling should draw 
our attention to these layers and intersections than some imagined 
entities of absolute power. 
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Heritage denunciation and heritage enunciation?
A postcolonial discourse on state prioritisation of 




Struggles around culture and difference in South Africa have 
historically constituted a powerful domain of political resistance, 
whereby culture or ethnicity was a shorthand for political, social 
and economic claims…these claims are increasingly being enacted 
in the sphere of heritage and are themselves underpinned by the 
state failure over equity, access to resources, and recognition.1
This article takes its lead from PhD research on ‘State Prioritisation of Heritage: Issues of Governmentality, Heritage Management and the Liberation Heritage Project in the Post-Colonial 
South Africa’. State Prioritisation of Heritage entails processes of 
governmentality were certain pasts (heritage) are selected, legitimised 
and authorised as official heritage of the nation/state in the present.2 
Similarly the notion of ‘Denunciation and Enunciation of Heritage’, in 
relation to State Prioritisation of Heritage draws on the discourse of 
governmentality were select past/s are privileged over others and 
proclaimed official heritage in the post-colonial South Africa. 
Building on Foucault’s thesis on governmentality, in the recent 
postcolonial writings on the subject matter, Laurajane Smith introduces 
the term “Authorised Heritage Discourse” to expand the analysis of the 
various regimes involved in heritage governance. She argues that heritage 
involves a cultural process of meaning making, mediation, selective 
amnesia (the politics of forgetting and remembering), expert influence 
and codification, and a naturalising effect. She elaborates further: 
1 See Harry Garuba & Sam Raditlhalo, “Culture”, 37. 
2 See Michel Foucault, “On Governmentality”, 5-26; Geoff Danaher, Tony Schirato & Jenn 
Webb, Understanding Foucault, 12 (xii); Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge.
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[H]eritage places … create, legitimize and disseminate their own 
particular cultural and social meanings, and are thus themselves 
part of, and not separate from, the ‘heritage process’ of meaning 
making. As heritage sites are managed, the performance of what is 
chosen to be remembered and forgotten about the past is enacted, 
and its conservation and presentation to the public will affect “sense 
of place” and other experiences. However, this process is obscured 
and redefined as external to the process of heritage because of the 
way value is assumed as immutable and innate – management and 
conservation become things that are done to sites and places, but 
are not seen as organically part of the meaning-making process of 
heritage itself.3 
Both notions, ‘governmentality’ and ‘Authorised Heritage Discourse’, 
provide lenses to probe the extent of state influence and dominance 
in the formalisation of heritage through policy and institutions 
to determine the enunciation of ‘official’ heritage but conversely 
denunciation of heritage in the present. 
The Liberation Heritage Project prioritised heritage in the postcolonial 
South Africa serves as a reference point to issues of heritage 
denunciation and enunciation in relation to state intervention in 
heritage management. In this essay, I will illustrate and interrogate 
the question of political instrumentality informing the denunciation 
and enunciation of heritage resources in relation to political uses of 
heritage as part of the postcolonial discourse on heritage management. 
Ashworth & Tunbridge have raised some critical questions on the 
issues of the ‘Intrinsic value: the social and political uses of heritage’, 
such as why a particular interpretation of heritage is promoted, 
whose interests are advanced or retarded, and in what kind of milieu 
was it conceived and communicated?4 It is precisely the purpose of 
this essay, to further interrogate the rationality and implications of 
the deployment and mobilisation of political and policy instruments 
3 See Laurajane Smith, Uses of Heritage, 88.
4 See Gregory John Ashworth & John E. Tunbridge, Pluralising Pasts: Heritage, Identity and 
Place in Multicultural Societies, 41.
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informing the current approach to heritage management, such as the 
colonial and apartheid influences on the postcolonial experience of 
the governance of heritage resources.
Framing political instrumentality: The 
denunciation and enunciation of heritage 
resources in postcolonial South Africa
In March-April 2015, the much publicised controversy over the violent 
destruction and removal of colonial monuments and apartheid statues 
at various locations in South Africa, sparked by the University of 
Cape Town’s (UCT) #RhodesMustFall campaign, clearly demonstrated 
public dissent and denunciation of the colonial past and heritage. 
This happened in a context of prolonged frustrations about lack 
of transformation in post-apartheid South Africa. This is not to 
be confused with media reports about the desecration of colonial 
monuments linked to elements of criminal and political opportunism 
by certain factions of society. These violent acts tend to set a 
precedent of permanent obliteration of history and past for future 
reference, yet simultaneously underpin the construction of history 
and heritage in the present. The current state of denunciation of 
colonial heritage epitomises public dissonance with colonial symbols 
and what they represent. The kind of reception that a monument and 
memorial in the public domain receives from its targeted audience is 
largely dependent upon that audience‘s historical and socio-cultural 
background. A historical and socio-cultural background encompasses 
lived experiences and behaviours of a people, in this case the unequal 
distribution of power along the basis of race, gender, class, ethnicity, 
age and even sexual orientation under apartheid.5
5 See Pepi Leistyna, Arlie Woodrum & Stephen A. Sherblom. Breaking Free: The 
Transformative Power of Critical Pedagogy, 3. 
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Coombes asserts that 
… many of the buildings or other structures that have been proclaimed 
national monuments by the National Monuments Council have more 
negative than positive connotations for the majority culture …what 
does it mean, for example, to preserve the Cape Dutch architecture 
and slave quarters of Groot Constantia, built on slave labour and 
thriving as a profitable vineyard to this day.6 
She further argues, that 
… the Voortrekker monument is the Afrikaner nationalist symbol 
most closely identified with the apartheid regime and remains highly 
contested in the democratic South Africa… the monument attest to its 
historical value as a vestige of a separatist system and others argue for 
its removal…this monument, which represents the former apartheid 
state and the myth that South Africa belongs to the Voortrekkers and 
their descendants.7
Following the violent destruction of colonial heritage in 2015 in 
South Africa, the then Minister of Arts and Culture, Mr Nathi Mthethwa, 
held nationwide consultative meetings and public hearings with 
politicians and civil society organisations on the contestations in the 
heritage landscape. As an outcome of the consultative meetings, about 
20 resolutions were adopted and a 10-member task team was set up to 
examine the recommendations of the meetings further. The task team 
has since presented a report of its findings to the Minister but it is still 
to be made public. However, Minister Mthethwa commented that the 
majority of respondents were against the vandalism and destruction 
of statues during the public hearings. Also, there were some examples 
given of erection and installation of new monuments juxtaposed to 
‘old and offensive statues’.8 
6 See Annie E. Coombes, Symbolic Restitution, 34. 
7 Annie E. Coombes, Translating the past: apartheid monuments in post-apartheid South 
Africa, 173-197. 
8 Department of Arts and Culture, Report on Stakeholder Engagement on reflections by 
the Minister Nathi Mthethwa, 11. 
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Public denunciation of colonial heritage elicits deep-seated questions: 
What would the ideal heritage symbols that resonate with the 
aspirations of the present generation look like? A simple response, to a 
much more complex situation, could be that the popular dissent against 
colonial and apartheid history inversely justifies the enunciation of 
the much-celebrated Liberation Heritage Project currently being 
prioritised in postcolonial South Africa. Heritage denunciation of the 
colonial and apartheid past further accentuates the politicisation of 
heritage through ‘heritage erasures’, aptly described by Pikirayi as: 
… choices and decisions we make with regards to our own 
environmental contexts…this includes heritage erasures … [ie] … what 
we choose to save may be what we value, but it does not necessarily 
follow that what we destroy or choose not to keep, is valueless … the 
current situation in the Middle East is an example … sustainable 
heritage is about meeting the needs of the present and the future, not 
just preserving the past.9
Heritage symbols of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle 
(Legacy Projects such Freedom Park, Robben Island Museum, 
Mandela Museum and others) are inscribed on the cultural landscape 
juxtaposed to the colonial and apartheid heritage (Victorian and Dutch 
Architecture and monuments including the Voortrekker Monument 
amongst others). The idea of heritage enunciation and denunciation 
draws heavily on oppositional discourse where the juxta positioning of 
old (colonial and apartheid heritage) and new (postcolonial heritage) 
symbols counteract and stand in stark contrast to each other. Also 
the juxta positioning of old and new symbols along the idea of past-
present alignment to achieve diverse cultural representation (social 
cohesion, national identity and ‘common heritage’) as an integral 
part of the postcolonial narrative tend to accentuate the notion of 
co-presence, where old and new symbols appear simultaneously 
almost in a complementary or oppositional manner within the same 
context (time and space). The unparalleled co-presence and binary 
9 See Innocent Pikirayi, The Heritage We Want: Development, Sustainability and the 
Future of Africa by 2063. 
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opposition of both the enunciation of the anti-colonial heritage 
(liberation heritage) and denunciation of colonial heritage mirrors the 
current political milieu of postcolonial thinking in relation to heritage 
management in South Africa. 
The politics of transforming the heritage landscape in post-1994 
South Africa witnessed the emergence of the idea of state prioritisation 
and enunciation of the liberation heritage as a site of memory, 
responding to, and confronting the legacy of the former repressive 
regimes for restorative justice particularly to honour and recognise the 
legacy of the political struggles for freedom against colonialism and 
apartheid. It is arguable that the framing of the ‘National Liberation 
Heritage Route’ project as state prioritised heritage in postcolonial South 
Africa serves as a counter-narrative to colonial and apartheid heritage. 
The most prominent and popular signifiers of the liberation heritage in 
the democratic South Africa are a plethora of memorials and monuments 
such as Freedom Park, Robben Island Museum, Luthuli Museum, 
Nelson Mandela Museum, Ncome, Hector Petersen Memorial, and many 
others including statues, graves and places named after struggle icons.10 
The introduction of Legacy Projects (post-1994), like some of the 
aforementioned state projects, are iconic fixtures of the evolving 
cultural landscape which serve to redress past inequities. The Liberation 
Heritage Project has also manifested through a spate of media frenzy 
commemorative national events, festivities and celebrations. In the 
year 2012 South Africans witnessed the prioritisation of liberation 
heritage which occurred prominently juxtaposed to the much-
profiled centenary celebrations of the formation of the African 
National Congress (ANC) 100 years ago in 1912 as the oldest liberation 
movement in Africa. In the celebration of 20 years of democracy in 
2014 since the attainment of freedom in 1994, new places and sites of 
liberation history have been unveiled. Of paramount importance is the 
passing of former President Nelson Mandela in December 2013 which 
spurred the abrupt and subsequent unveiling of his towering statue 
10 South African Tourism, Tourism Satellite Report for the Financial year 2014/2015, 5-10.
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at the Union Buildings in Pretoria and his portrait at Parliament in 
Cape Town as symbols of honour to the iconic freedom fighter. 
All these forms of state prioritisation of the liberation heritage have 
far reaching implications on the question of state-centric approaches 
to heritage management at political, policy and administrative levels 
in South Africa. This relates specifically to the mobilisation and 
deployment of state resources to advance the consolidation of the 
National Liberation Heritage Route project, as a flagship project of the 
post-apartheid and post-liberation South Africa.
The theme, liberation heritage, is a bold political statement which 
resonates with postcolonial thinking of how the state imagines the 
memorialisation and commemoration of the anti-colonial struggle in 
the present. In particular, the National Liberation Heritage Route project 
is perceived as a befitting memorial and commemorative project, which 
resonates with the hopes and aspirations of the majority South Africans 
who suffered under the repressive colonial and apartheid regimes.11 In 
this regard the National Liberation Heritage Route project is located 
within the discourse of transformation of the cultural landscape in the 
new South Africa and attempts to present the alternative history of 
untold narratives and historically suppressed experiences of the masses 
of South Africans who suffered under the siege colonial and apartheid 
regimes. On this point Marschall argues that
… new monuments and statues are necessary to ‘tell the other side 
of the story’; to expose suppressed histories and preserve narratives 
of the past previously written out of the official historical record; to 
counter biased interpretations disseminated through the existing 
symbolic landscape; to celebrate the identity and achievements of 
societal groups previously marginalized; and lastly to acknowledge 
suffering and pay tribute to individuals or groups who lost their lives 
through acts of resistance.12 
11 Department of Arts and Culture, Progress Report on the National Liberation Heritage 
Route Project, 3-5.
12 Sabine Marschall, Landscape of Memory: Commemorative Monuments, Memorials and 
Public Statuary in Post-Apartheid South, 16. 
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For many who have traversed the cultural landscape of South Africa, 
it is still glaring to note the recurring dominant representations of 
colonial and apartheid conquest in the public domain which do not 
reflect the demography and diversity of South Africa. According to 
the draft National Heritage Transformation Charter “… the disparities 
amongst the various heritage institutions persist in the distribution 
and management heritage resources only highlights the perpetuation 
of the pre-1994 norms and practices privileging certain institutions 
at the expense of the previously disadvantaged institutions (PDIs) …”13 
Similarly, the non-profit organisation (NPO), the ‘Direct Action Centre 
for Peace and Memory’ pointed out:
… in Cape Town, where there are marks of victory against the native 
dotting the cultural landscape, there are no marks of victory against 
colonialism and apartheid…there is a gap in recognising those who 
fought apartheid in the city’s cultural landscape.14 
The rationalisation of both the ideological text and physical signifiers 
of liberation heritage in the public domain does not only reflect 
systematic curation and mediation of history and past by the state, 
but also underpins the deliberate inscription and positioning of an 
anti- colonial legacy in public consciousness and popular culture 
through the construction of heritage in the present for consumption 
by the current generation. 
In the context of regime change and the politics of transforming the 
heritage landscape in the postcolonial South Africa, the promotion 
of liberation heritage is morphed and woven into grand, national 
narratives such as ‘reconciliation’, ‘social cohesion’, ‘national pride’, 
‘national identity’, and ‘nationhood’ of an emerging ‘democratic’ state. 
For the state, heritage is arguably an opportunistic means to fulfil 
the social needs of the electorate, while simultaneously fostering the 
political goals of nation-building, reconciliation and unity, as well as 
13 National Heritage Council, Draft National Transformation Heritage Charter, 4.
14 Direct Action Centre for Peace and Memory, Policy Dialogue: The Role of the Ex-
Combatants in Memorialisation Processes in South Africa, 5-6.
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promoting the economic imperatives of development, employment 
creation and income generation, mostly through tourism.15 Thus, the 
impression created is that the National Liberation Heritage Route 
project serves as a political construction at the service of addressing 
broad political aspirations and objectives of post-apartheid South 
Africa. As Negri observed,
 … when culture is closely linked to politics, cultural heritage becomes 
a vehicle for transformation of society…the political objectives for 
which the cultural heritage is used differ from one nation to another 
…the cultural dimension may thus be used to legitimise political 
orientations.16 
In this context, the National Liberation Heritage Route project has 
become a deliberate attempt to legitimise the recognition of anti-colonial 
history not only as ‘official’ heritage of the nation state but to serve as an 
instrument to entrench political ideals in a transforming state.
Documenting and legitimising liberation 
heritage in South Africa and Africa
The theme of liberation heritage has often been a site of profound interest 
and preoccupation in the geo-political space in postcolonial Africa 
and post-apartheid South Africa in particular. The notion of liberation 
heritage draws on the history and historiography of postcolonial thinking 
and writing about the political history of the struggle for emancipation 
against colonialism in Africa and apartheid in South Africa. Several 
renowned scholars and intellectuals, especially of African descent, 
have written extensively on the effects of the political instrumentality 
of colonial domination, in particular white domination and black 
subjugation, decolonisation, Pan-Africanism, post-colony, democracy, 
neoliberalism, social justice, political consciousness, transformation, and 
15 Sabine Marschall, Landscape of Memory: Commemorative Monuments, Memorials and 
Public Statuary in Post-Apartheid South, 14.
16 Vinvent Negri, “Introduction to Heritage Law in Africa”, 8.
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identity politics.17 These grand themes underpin the struggle discourse of 
several liberation movements and ambitious attempts aimed to restore 
and affirm ‘African identity’ in the global context.18 
A substantial part of these postcolonial and post-apartheid 
writings and studies has been preoccupied with the important task 
of documentation and analysis of liberation history and theory, 
especially the interpretation and systematic recording of the memory 
and narratives of the struggle against the repressive colonial and 
apartheid orders. The volumes of the publication, The Roads to 
Democracy in South Africa by South African Democratic Education 
Trust (SADET), under the leadership of Ben Magubane, marks a first 
series of post-1994 scholarship writing on various topics and epochs 
of the liberation struggle in South Africa. Similarly, the publication by 
Ndlovu, the current Director of SADET project entitled, Heritage routes 
for the liberated South Africans: using oral history to reconstruct 
unsung heroes and heroines’ routes into exile in the 1960s, presents 
alternative histories of the liberation struggle which have been largely 
undocumented.19 The research report entitled The Liberation Struggle 
and Liberation Heritage Sites in South Africa, commissioned by the 
NHC to the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC – 15 November 
2013) in South Africa, follows on from the previous works of SADET 
and also serves the same purpose of documentation of the liberation 
history in South Africa. 
In the SADC region, the Hashim Mbita project regarding the 
documentation of the liberation history in Southern Africa was 
approved by the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Summit of Heads of States and Governments in Botswana in 
17 W.E.B Du Bois (1903), Cheikh Anta Diop (1946), Franz Fanon (1968), Amilcar Cabral (1969), 
Chinua Achebe (1958), Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986), Wole Soyinka (1975), Steve Biko (1977) 
Mahmood Mamdani (1992), Achille Mbembe (2001) and many others.
18 See Senghor’s Negritude (1930), Nkrumah’s idea of the Organisation of African Unity 
(1961), Nyerere’s Ujamaa (1962), and most recently Mbeki’s popularisation of African 
Renaissance (1998). 
19 Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu, “Heritage routes for the liberated South Africans: Using Oral 
History to Reconstruct Unsung Heroes and Heroines’ Route into Exile in the 1960s”, 3. 
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August 2005.20 The result was the recent publication (2014) entitled 
Southern African National Liberation Struggles by Hashim Mbita, a 
former Brigadier-General and Executive – Secretary (1974-1992) of the 
Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The 
publication attempts to document the history of the liberation struggle 
of the Southern African Region through collection, cataloguing and 
compiling of oral texts in SADC Member States and outside the region.21 
The National Liberation Heritage Route Project in South Africa is part 
of the SADC joint initiative.
In contrast, Saunders has cautioned that, in more recent writings, 
especially of the more popular kind, one often finds ‘romanticisation 
and triumphalism’ on the part of those whose movements emerged 
victorious. He further argues that 
… triumphalist history either ignored or minimised difficult issues in 
the past, such as the imprisonment and torture of activists in exile…it 
tends to be uncritical, assuming that criticism would somehow bring 
the struggle itself into disrepute.22 
In post-apartheid South Africa, the work by cultural institutions23 who 
have taken the task of documenting and safeguarding the history and 
heritage of the liberation struggles in South Africa, demonstrate the 
importance of the Liberation Heritage Project as a priority project for the 
nation state. These institutions have been preoccupied with the theme 
of the liberation heritage in a bid to transform the heritage landscape 
by presenting alternative narratives of the resistance struggle to the 
20 Report of the African Union, SADC Summit of Heads of States and Governments in 
Botswana in August 2005, resolved to support and approve the Hashim Mbita project 
regarding the documentation of the liberation history in Southern Africa.
21 The Hashim Mbita Research Project, Southern African National Liberation Struggles, 2.
22 Nordic African Institute, Workshop report on “Documenting the History and Legacy of 
the Liberation Struggle in South Africa”, 2, 11.
23 South African History Archive, Center for Popular Memory, National Oral History Project, 
Department of Arts and Culture, Department of Military Veterans, National Heritage 
Council, South African Heritage Resources Agency, the Nordic Africa Institute (Sweden), 
National Archives, National Library, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 
Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory, Nelson Mandela Museum. Freedom Park, Chief Albert 
Luthuli Museum, Mayibuye Archives, District Six Museum, Universities and many others
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dominant narrative of the colonial and apartheid orders.24 However, 
what has been sadly lacking, is state prioritisation of the digitisation 
and ownership of the digital archive of the liberation heritage archive. 
It is shocking to note that ownership rights of the digitised material 
of South Africa’s liberation history, especially anti-apartheid records, 
are not in the custodianship of the state. It appears that the state has 
not yet prioritised enough resources towards the digitisation of the 
liberation heritage archive as part of heritage management. Lalu argues 
that there has been an increase in the digitisation of the liberation 
history in South Africa by multinational organisations and this has far 
reaching implications on ownership rights and claims by multinational 
organisations on South Africa’s digital archive.25 
In postcolonial states, in Africa and southern Africa in particular, there 
seems to be a concerted effort and political commitment by the former 
liberation movements, as the ruling party in government, to legitimize 
the legacy of the liberation struggle against colonialism as ‘official’ 
history and heritage of the nation state. This recurring pattern has 
been prevalent in several post-colonial states especially in the SADC 
region and elsewhere. Critics have observed that: 
… former liberation movements, including the Popular Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola in Angola, the Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique in Mozambique, the African National Congress in South 
Africa, the South West Africa People’s Organisation in Namibia and 
the Chama Cha Mapinduzi in Tanzania at the helm of government 
in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa and 
Tanzania, have maintained close ties rooted in common liberation 
histories and personal connections, and during times of crisis they 
draw on these linkages and solidarities.26 
24 National Heritage Council, Draft National Transformation Heritage Charter, 4-5. 
25 Premesh Lalu, The virtual stampede for Africa: Digitisation, Postcoloniality and Archives 
of the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, 4.
26 Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Reconstructing the Implication of Liberation Struggle History 
on SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe”, 5.
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Strategic political alliances have been established amongst the former 
dominant liberation movements, which have influence in the SADC 
region. In each regime and political system it is evident that heritage 
is used as a rallying point to mobilise society, consolidate political 
power to advance political interests.
An important summit of the heads of political parties of former liberation 
movements was held in August 2011, in Namibia, which stressed 
… the importance of identification, restoration and preservation of 
historical sites which are relevant to the liberation struggles’ need for 
promoting the spirit of solidarity and cooperation amongst Africans 
in the context of the former liberation movements.27
Undoubtedly, the political position and commitment to safeguard 
the history of the liberation struggle is top on the agenda of former 
liberation movements in government in the SADC region. However, 
recurring dissonance and unavoidable disputes occur as a result of 
the tendency to impose certain histories with a bias towards the 
dominant narrative of former liberation movements at the helm of 
Government. Sometimes this dominance and bias of promoting and 
legitimising certain narratives over others tends to exclude and 
displace alternative histories, especially narratives of other former 
liberation movement who are not in the ruling governing party. 
Consistent with the notion of the politicisation of heritage through 
technologies of governance and governmentality, Melber argues that:
 … governments formed by the anti-colonial liberation movements, took 
control of the state machinery and reorganized themselves as political 
parties…their legitimacy to rule stemmed from their emergence from 
the decolonization process as representatives acting on behalf of the 
majority of the people…since then they have been able to strengthen 
their political dominance and maintain control over the state.28 
27 An African National Congress (ANC) communiqué about the meeting of heads of political 
parties of the former liberation movements, 02.




In other words, the critical questions of hegemonic politics of 
domination and the politicisation of heritage, lying behind the 
ideological construction of the Liberation Heritage Project through 
state prioritisation of the struggle history, are inevitable. This is 
especially the case in the context of the ‘dominant ideology thesis’ in 
political uses of heritage. In particular, which dominant narrative will 
be privileged and for what purpose, in the context of governmentality 
and the current political milieu in South Africa? 
Governmentality and political enunciation of the 
liberation heritage 
The Liberation Heritage Project has emerged from remnants of the 
past into the present. A new trajectory has emerged in post-apartheid 
South Africa, where sharp focus and emphasis is on memorialisation 
and celebration of the struggle for freedom. Due consideration and 
attention must be given to Harrison’s claim that
 … heritage can both stimulate and act as a symbol of political struggle, 
and how ownership of heritage objects, places and practices might be 
considered to give their possessors political power.29 
As a politically endorsed and state resourced ‘official’ heritage, the 
National Liberation Heritage Route project has found meaning and 
expression through elaborate official enunciations by the state at 
expedient political moments. Most notably, on four occasions in the 
successive years, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, former President of the 
Republic of South Africa, Mr Jacob Zuma, underlined the Liberation 
Heritage Project and the development of graves and monuments of 
struggle heroes as priority projects for the nation in his State of the 
Nation Address (SONA).30 On the occasion of the State of the Nation 
Address in February 2011, President Jacob Zuma pronounced that
29 Rodney Harrison, Understanding the Politics of Heritage, 154. 
30 State of the Nation Address by His Excellency Jacob G Zuma, President of the Republic of 
South Africa, at the Joint Sitting of Parliament, Cape Town – on the 10 February 2011 and 
09 February 2012. 
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 … we [Government] will launch a programme celebrating National 
Icons and promote a National Liberation Heritage Route, to honour 
individuals who have made an enormous contribution to the 
liberation of our country.31 
In the subsequent year, in 2012, in his State of the Nation Address, the 
President reiterated that
 … as part of the promotion of social cohesion, this year we will 
undertake and continue many heritage projects … museums and 
centers to be unveiled will include the 1980 Matola Raid museum 
in Maputo, the Ncome museum in Kwa Zulu-Natal, phase 2 of 
the Freedom Park museum and the Steve Biko heritage centre in 
Ginsberg in King Williamstown…we have also prioritized the homes 
and graves of former ANC Presidents and other national heroes 
including Thomas Maphikela, Lilian Ngoyi, Walter and Albertina 
Sisulu, Griffiths and Victoria Mxenge, Robert Sobukwe and others.32 
Once again in the State of the Nation Address on 14 February 2013, 
President Zuma pronounced that
 … this year marks the 50th anniversary of the raid on Lilliesleaf Farm, 
the escape from Marshall Square as well as the start of the Rivonia 
Trail…A series of events are being planned throughout the year to 
mark the three events, culminating in a national commemoration on 
the 11th of July 2013.33 
The authoritarian power of political instrumentality behind 
such fundamental enunciations by the head of state cannot be 
underestimated. Critics have observed that such pronouncements 
by the state about public representations through monuments and 
the accompanying unparalleled media coverage of these symbols are 
implicitly informed by the emancipatory postmodern and postcolonial 
31 State of the Nation Address by His Excellency Jacob G Zuma, President of the Republic of 
South Africa, at the Joint Sitting of Parliament, Cape Town – on the 10 February 2011. 
32 State of the Nation Address by His Excellency Jacob G Zuma, President of the Republic of 
South Africa, at the Joint Sitting of Parliament, Cape Town – on the 09 February 2012. 
33 State of the Nation Address by His Excellency Jacob G Zuma, President of the Republic of 
South Africa, at the Joint Sitting of Parliament, Cape Town – on the 14 February 2013. 
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discourses of the previously oppressed margin as it comes to the fore 
and expresses its identity.34 It is therefore the mandate and objective 
of the ANC-led government to deliberately foreground the liberation 
heritage in the public domain, as this aspect of heritage has been 
subject to marginalisation during colonialism and apartheid. 
Amongst the aforementioned projects, state resources have been 
allocated towards the implementation and completion of the following 
projects, namely, the 2nd phase of the Freedom Park Museum, Steve 
Biko Heritage Centre, Ncome Museum and the 1980 Matola Raid 
Museum in Mozambique.35 However, the latter project has since been 
reported to lack governance systems and inadequate management 
structure to support administrative operations due to insufficient 
funding.36 Tracking the status and progress of the implementation of 
these projects is important, as the state has made a pronouncement 
and pledged resources to support these prioritised projects. 
Nonetheless, the political rhetoric by President Zuma not only profiles 
and positions the Liberation Heritage Project as a tangible construct 
of political imagination, but demonstrates the extent of political will 
and power to select and support an aspect of the past in a supposedly 
politically correct context. It is worth recalling that both the colonial 
and apartheid states once selected heritage resources that favoured 
and advanced their political interests in the past.
Another important point to consider is that political enunciations by 
the President mirror the inherent social compact and relationship 
involving the mobilisation of power from party politics into state 
administration (executive authority). This alignment is evident in the 
conformity of the President’s pronouncement (the state) to the ANC’s 
(party politics) position on issues of arts, culture, and heritage that “… 
34 Sabine Marschall, Landscape of Memory, 16.
35 Department of Arts and Culture Presentation of Progress Report, Legacy Project of State 
of Nation Address and Liberation Heritage Route, at the Parliamentary Arts and Culture 
Portfolio Committee meeting, 25 April 2012.
36 Department of Arts and Culture Presentation of Progress Report, Legacy Project of State 
of Nation Address and Liberation Heritage Route, at the Parliamentary Arts and Culture 
Portfolio Committee meeting, 25 April 2012.
Chapter 5 | Heritage denunciation and heritage enunciation?
139
a national memorial commemorating the liberation struggle will be 
erected, as it has outlined in the ANC Draft National Cultural Policy 
…”37 Even the revised White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage draws 
heavily on the ANC’s Draft National Cultural Policy (1994), stating that 
“… colonialism and apartheid neglected, distorted and suppressed the 
culture of the majority of South Africans …”38
This kind of political alignment has attracted criticism amongst other 
former liberation movement and opposition political formations, 
such as the sentiment vehemently expressed by Prince Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi (Leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party – IFP and Member of 
Parliament) that
… on the surface it would seem that we both have the same interests 
at heart. He [President Zuma] is a Zulu, I am a Zulu…and he is proud 
of his cultural heritage…but President Zuma is also the President of 
the ANC, and he leads a party whose intention has always been to 
gain political hegemony and total dominance.39 
The issue of political domination and the inherent selective amnesia 
through privileging certain signifiers of the historic past constitutes 
an integral aspect of postcolonial discourse around constraints and 
opportunities of addressing diverse representations. On this point 
Bhabha argues that
 … postcolonial criticism bears witness to the unequal and uneven 
forces of cultural representation involved in the contest for political 
and social authority within the modern world order.40 
This ties in well with Fanon’s reference, ‘The Pitfalls of National 
Consciousness’, in what he has described as the 
… national consciousness, instead of being the all-embracing 
crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead 
37 ANC, Draft National Cultural Policy 1994, 2-10.
38 ANC, Draft National Cultural Policy 1994, 2-10.
39 Address by Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi (MP), Inkosi of the Buthelezi Clan and 
Traditional Prime Minister of the Zulu Monarch and Nation, April 2, 2013.
40 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 171.
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of being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilization 
of the people, will be in any case be only an empty shell, a crude and 
fragile travesty of what it might have been.41 
In other words, the idea of inclusion and exclusion of others’ heritage or 
culture within the framework of cultural diversity tends to undermine 
the state’s efforts for national unity, where the intention in a typical 
postcolonial and democratic context such as in post-apartheid 
South Africa, is to establish signifiers for social cohesion, national 
identity, national unity and patriotism. To achieve multiculturalism in 
a political system through state prioritisation of the liberation heritage 
will require a substantial measure of appreciation and acceptance of 
political and cultural differences as well as tolerance which tends to 
be difficult to achieve. 
The extent of the influence of politics in shaping the liberation 
heritage is re-hashed and re-articulated in various public platforms 
and social contexts. Most notably, the persistent politicisation of 
heritage and uses of heritage to achieve political goals, which tend 
to be unavoidable. In one of a series of speeches recorded verbatim 
in the Limpopo Province Legislature in September 2014, a member of 
the ANC highlighted:
… I want to emphasise to myself and all of us here and the public out 
there that we must start to argue that the African National Congress 
itself as the political party is the heritage of the South African people 
and the African struggle [APPLAUSE]…I want to state that the Freedom 
Charter states that this land belongs to all of us – black and white – 
and further that the colour of a man‟s skin is no more significant than 
the colour of his eyes…we want to argue that apartheid is a legacy, 
but it is a legacy which we want to forget…we want it to be put in 
the archives of history and never be re-loaned or introduced to our 
people except to remind them of the evils of apartheid…the African 
National Congress’ main policy, as the liberation movement and body 
committed to nation-building, is to redress the imbalances of the past.42 
41 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 148.
42 Recorded verbatim speeches of the Limpopo Legislature Lebowakgomo Legislative 
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These political sentiments and policy positions are prevalent 
especially in ANC-led provinces and municipalities, where a set of 
expectations is created and certain ideas entrenched – that the 
ANC-led government is a home for all regardless of varying political 
ideologies and cultural differences. This notion links well with the 
findings in a publication entitled, The Patronage Politics Divides 
Us: A Study of Poverty, Patronage and Inequality in South Africa by 
Ncebisi Ndletyana. In this publication Ndletyana shares insights into 
the unscrupulous extent of hegemonic politics in certain ANC-led 
municipalities plagued by patronage ties of blind loyalty, nepotism and 
prejudice, self-enrichment and reciprocal beneficiation. He argues 
that there is a tendency to pledge political support and allegiance to 
politicians, regardless of their morals and ethics, in positions of power 
who are likely to reciprocate the favour by allocating certain privileges 
and benefits only to those in society who pledged support initially.43 
Most importantly, the mobilisation of political instrumentality that 
underpin the state prioritisation of the National Liberation Heritage 
Route illustrates the extent to which the power of politics tends to 
assume a governance position to inform heritage management, far 
beyond the limitations of structured state policy frameworks.
The notion of state prioritisation of the Liberation Heritage Project, as 
‘official’ heritage of the nation state, is not immune from the discourse 
of contemporary uses of heritage by the state in the political process 
of nation building and forging a new national identity in South Africa. 
Political use of heritage is a common fixture of many political systems 
in nation states, clearly illustrated in the works of Benedict Anderson 
(1991), Stuart Hall (1998), and many others. 
Chamber, Tuesday, 28th September 2010, meeting of the House (14:15). 
43 Mcebisi Ndletyana, Patronage Politics Divide Us: A Study of Patronage, Poverty and 
Inequality in South Africa, 7. 
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Uses of the liberation heritage at expedient 
political moments
As part of postcolonial discourse of policy reforms for new heritage 
regimes, the National Heritage Resources Act (1999) has created 
enabling environment for implementing certain aspects of the liberation 
heritage. In particular Section 4 (g)(iii) and (g)(iv) of the National Heritage 
Resources Act (1999) makes specific reference to the declaration of 
sites “… graves of victims of conflicts and those associated with the 
liberation struggle … graves of individuals designated by the Minister by 
notice in the Gazette.”44 Through this piece of legislation the Ministry of 
Arts and Culture gazetted the declaration of several graves, as national 
heritage sites, of struggle icons such as Charlotte Maxeke, Helen 
Joseph and Lillian Ngoyi in 2010 and subsequently, in 2013, the graves 
of Rev Sefako Makgatho, Mr Josiah Gumede, Dr Pixley ka Isaka Seme, 
Dr Robert Sobukwe, Mr Stephen Biko and Dr Christiaan Beyers-Naude, 
were declared national heritage sites.45 The convenient use of policy 
to legitimise a select few national monuments and memorials has had 
far reaching consequences in privileging certain pasts over others. The 
inherent bias in the declaration of the select legacies of a few struggle 
icons and the exclusion of others, has attracted criticism broadly 
especially from opposition political formations such as the Democratic 
Alliance (DA), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Pan African Congress (PAC) 
and United Democratic Movement (UDM), against the ruling party – the 
ANC. This also includes resentment and dissonance expressed by some 
alliance parties in the ANC, concerning the dominance of the ANC-led 
Liberation Heritage Project, such as the critique by members of NEUM:
 … Well, we need to call a spade a spade: the ruling party looks after 
its own. Today liberation heritage is by and large a story about ANC 
icons from the past, with a nod towards Black Consciousness leader, 
Steve Biko, PAC icon, Robert Sobukwe, and one or two indigenes, such 
44 National Heritage Resources Act no 25 of 1999. 
45 South African Government News Agency, Graves of Struggle Heroines Declared 
Heritage Sites.
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as Klaas and Trooi Pienaar, whose remains were recently repatriated 
from Austria and reburied at Kuruman in the Northern Cape … and 
more of the same is on the way…now, according to Paul Mashatile, the 
Minister of Arts and Culture, the graves of Charlotte Maxeke, Lillian 
Ngoyi, Helen Joseph, O. R. Tambo, Alfred Xuma, Pixley Ka Isaka Seme 
and Albert Luthuli, among others, are to be upgraded and declared 
national heritage sites … in privileging its own, the ruling party has 
effectively erased that past in which the ANC is not inscribed, and 
that past in which it was challenged by a rival political tendency, 
as represented by the NEUM and associated organisations … but 
that today’s heritage landscape is a biased and exclusionary master-
narrative focusing on ANC national heroes shouldn’t surprise us, of 
course, as history, heritage and memory are always controlled and 
shaped by those in power … what we have in South Africa is an official 
national heritage landscape that has been edited by the state through 
engineered silences and gaps in the liberation story – a deliberate 
distortion of history by omission.46 
Similarly Michele Pickover, curator in the Department of Historical 
Papers at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), writes:
 … the state and the ruling party lays claim, ownership and 
stewardship to South Africa’s past and the ‘liberation struggle’ not 
under the guise of inclusiveness discourse… It is not about creating 
a common, inclusive identity but about creating a monolithic lens 
through which a certain kind of struggle history is given superiority 
and fostered.47 
Inevitably the Liberation Heritage Project which is state funded 
through the ANC-led government will tend to project and profile 
the political interests of the ruling party in government, much to 
the dismay and exclusion of the narratives of other former liberation 
movements and political parties who serve in the government of 
national unity in South Africa. 
46 NEUM report, Disinherited: Distorting Heritage by Omission, 11.
47 Pickover, “Disinherited: Distorting heritage by omission,” in NEUM report, 12. 
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The political and policy context that has shaped the emergence of 
the Liberation Heritage Project, as a flagship project of the nation 
state, draws its inception from a series of political and official state 
declarations. In 2012, the Department of Arts and Culture announced 
a set of key objectives during the staging of Heritage Day celebrations 
in the Northern Cape Province, under the theme “Celebrating the 
Heroes and Heroines of the Liberation Struggle in South Africa”,48 
which aimed to:
1. reaffirm and promote the significance of Liberation Heritage as 
part of the Cultural Heritage of South Africa;
2. use the Liberation Heritage as a vehicle to foster social cohesion, 
nation building, economic development, inclusive citizenship and 
an end to xenophobia and homophobia;
3. promote national identity that is self-conscious of its liberation 
heritage; and
4. promote unity in diversity among all sectors of the South African 
society.
These official statements of intent clearly not only define the 
extent of the uses of heritage at the service of contemporary South 
African politics, but epitomise the fundamental consequences of the 
expectations of the new political order for heritage management to 
fulfill certain national priorities of a developing nation. In this regard, 
the National Heritage Council concedes that “… expectations are 
high that the Liberation Heritage Route project will promote social 
and economic progress and that it will provide impetus for the 
development of cultural industries and cultural tourism.”49 According 
to Ashworth et al (1996) 
48 Department of Arts and Culture publication on Heritage Month, Celebrating the Heroes 
and Heroines of the Liberation Struggle in South Africa, 2-3. 
49 National Heritage Council, Presentation of National Liberation Heritage Route project at 
a Summit in the North West Province, 6.
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Heritage is used as a political resource in the creation or support of 
state at various spatial jurisdictional scales and the legitimation of 
their governments and governing ideologies.50
In this context, the political discourse on contemporary uses of heritage 
transcends the notion of heritage uses for the sake of conservation 
purposes only, but also advances the debate on the tendency of state 
to appropriate heritage for other uses in contemporary politics. 
This phenomenon is prevalent in many other political systems and 
countries. Some African states affirm the pre-eminence of the cultural 
dimension to establish national identity. Negri observed that
… the acknowledgement of cultural values can thus be effected at 
the highest level of the legal standards which underpin the creation 
of the state thus the incorporation of the cultural priorities in the 
Constitution may correspond to different objectives…it may be from 
the need to use these foundations to build a national identity common 
to the different ethnic groups or the need to promote a dominant 
national culture that will compel recognition among the various 
communities of the state.51 
The notion of nation building and national identity in democratic South 
Africa further accentuates heritage uses as a rallying point to mobilise 
society, consolidate political power and advance political interests. 
For instance, the uses of heritage to engender a culture of national 
unity, reconciliation, social cohesion and, most recently, economic 
and infrastructure development in line with national priorities of a 
democratic South Africa, are prevalent. According to the proposed 
amendments in the White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage: 
Developing an inclusive, cohesive, caring and proud society is pivotal 
to social transformation … it requires eradicating all inequalities, 
exclusions and divisions of the past; and replacing it with a shared 
South African identity which incorporates diversity in a democratic 
50 Gregory John Ashworth and John E. Tunbridge, Dissonance and the Uses of Heritage, 34. 
51 Vinvent Negri, “Introduction to Heritage Law in Africa”, 8 
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dispensation; by directly translating the rights and responsibilities of 
both the state and its citizens into social reality.52 
The notion of reconciliation and unity, which follow on from a negotiated 
settlement during the transition phase in 1994, has been systematically 
enacted in various state supported high profile events. During a 
symbolic ceremony in 2013 the former Minister of Arts and Culture, Mr 
Paul Mashatile unveiled a road linking the Voortrekker Monument and 
Freedom Park as a gesture of unity and bridging the past (apartheid state) 
and the present (democratic state).53 Subsequently, in 2014 the Minister 
of Arts and Culture, Mr Nathi Mthethwa, officiated the unveiling of a 
bridge linking the Ncome Memorial to the Voortrekker Monument, on 
Reconciliation Day (16th December 2014) as part of the state socialisation 
for unity and social cohesion.54 In this context, the idea of heritage use 
to forge and foster a new national identity and unity is consistent with 
the perceived conditions of a democratic dispensation amid the deeply 
entrenched and glaring reality of racism, homophobia, and xenophobia 
in South Africa. 
The uses of heritage at national events which are state funded, also play 
to public consciousness and serve as a political instrument to mobilise 
support and legitimise the Liberation Heritage Project. Such political 
instrumentality has been partly realised through established platforms, 
including the much profiled year-long 2012 centennial celebrations 
of the formation of the ANC 100 years prior. In 2012, the Liberation 
Heritage Project featured prominently in the centenary celebrations 
marking the 100 year anniversary of the ANC as the oldest liberation 
movement in Africa. The prominent theme of the liberation heritage, 
which constituted an integral part of the centenary celebration, was 
carefully orchestrated through a systematic assemblage of public 
lectures, symbolic torch bearing processions and a myriad of festivities 
52 Revised Draft White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage, 22.
53 Department of Arts and Culture 2013/2014 Budget vote speech by the Minister Paul 
Mashatile at the National Assembly,16th May 2013, http://www.dac.gov.za 
54 Department of Arts and Culture, A Speech delivered by the Minister of Arts and Culture 
Mr Nathi Mthethwa at the occasion of the ‘National Recociliati on Day’,16th December 
2014, Ncome Museum (KwaZulu Natal), www.dac.gov.za 
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across South Africa, in celebration of the oldest liberation movement 
in Africa and its founding leaders. According to the ANC, the centenary 
celebrations seeks to 
celebrate our [ANC] proud traditions, values and principles that 
earned our movement an indelible place in the hearts, psyche and 
soul of our people…it should reflect the ANC in all its facets and 
dimensions, for example, mass mobilization, the underground, armed 
struggle and international solidarity.55
In 2012, the African Union also endorsed the centenary celebrations of 
the ANC through a ‘Decision on the Centenary of the African National 
Congress’ at the General Assembly.56 For the past 20 years since the 
dawn of democracy, the ANC has reinvented itself as a political party 
rather than a liberation movement. However, the former liberation-
movement-turned-ruling-party largely draws on the legacy of the 
anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle for credentials in order to 
socially mobilise the masses in contemporary South African politics. 
The struggle credentials of the ANC have earned the political party 
immense support amongst the masses in South Africa, and thus the 
liberation heritage is a popular choice for many South Africans. 
In certain untimely events, such as the passing on of the world iconic 
leader Nelson Mandela in 2013, the notion of the liberation heritage 
once again received a substantial measure of prominence and media 
mileage. This also spurred the proliferation of heritage initiatives 
associated with Nelson Mandela, such as the unveiling of a towering 
bronze statue of Madiba (2014) at the Union Building by the Department 
of Arts and Culture, the grading and declaration of the ‘Nelson Mandela 
Sites of Reconciliation and Memory’ (2014) by the National Heritage 
Council, and most recently the launch of the ‘Madiba Journey’ mobile 
application in 2015 by the South African Tourism. 
55 ANC, African National Congress:100 Years of Selfless Struggle, 06, http:// www.anc.org.
za/centenary/show 




Back in the Eastern Cape Province, the birth and burial place of Nelson 
Mandela, a special Cabinet resolution was taken to honour prominent 
leaders of the struggle as part of marking the 20 years of democracy 
and the branding of the province under the banner – ‘Home of the 
Legends’.57 Most notably, the Cabinet resolved to honour Nelson 
Mandela, Chris Hani and O.R. Tambo amongst great leaders whose 
birth place is the Eastern Cape Province, as part of the commemorative 
programme of the liberation heritage and the ‘Home of the Legends’ 
campaign.58 Similar events occurred in various provinces across South 
Africa. Crucial to note here is not only the scaling up of an important 
memorial project such as liberation heritage, but the mounting of 
prominent personalities and icons of the liberation struggle as an 
embodiment of the political struggle, and thus as being an integral 
part of the composition of the Liberation Heritage Project.
The framing of the liberation heritage at expedient political moments 
has also occurred in various other ideological texts and inscriptions 
on the physical fabric of the cultural landscape. Post-apartheid South 
Africa has witnessed the politicisation and manifestation of heritage 
in the naming and renaming of places after struggle icons of the 
liberation struggle. Several towns, streets, buildings, city-scapes, and 
municipalities which constitute the cultural landscape attest to an 
abrupt upsurge of new place names aligned to struggle heroes and 
heroines. For example the Sol Plaatjie Municipality (Northern Cape 
province), the Nelson Mandela Museum (Eastern Cape province), 
Luthuli House (Gauteng province), O.R. Tambo International Airport 
(Gauteng province), Thabo Mbeki Drive (Limpopo province), Moses 
Mabhida Stadium (KZN province), Ngaka Modiri Molema Municipality 
(North West province), Fezile Dabi Municipality (Free State province) 
– the list is exhaustive. 
57 Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature adopted a Cabinet resolution to honour prominent 
leaders of the struggle as part of marking the 20 years of democracy and the branding of 
the Province under the banner of the ‘Home of the Legends’ (2014). 
58 Cabinet Memorandum presented at the Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature for adoption. 
The Cabinet Memorandum made specific resolutions and recommendations to honour 
prominent leaders of the struggle as part of marking the 20 years of democracy and the 
branding of the Province under the banner of the ‘Home of the Legends’ (2014). 
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These commemorative initiatives of national stature exemplify the 
political context and conditions in which the Liberation Heritage 
Project finds profound meaning and prolific expression. Inversely, the 
legacy of the liberation struggle sets the terms and conditions which 
inform a particular political context for the celebration of the liberation 
heritage in the postcolonial and post-apartheid South Africa. 
Conclusion
Heritage enunciation and denunciation has become a political 
currency for social mobilisation in postcolonial South Africa. Both 
the denunciation of colonial and apartheid heritage, as well as 
the enunciation of liberation heritage shows how heritage has 
been deployed in ways that challenge common or essentialised 
understandings of the notion and practice of heritage. As illustrated 
before, the Liberation Heritage Project is a deliberate attempt to 
legitimise anti-colonial history as ‘official heritage’ and a state 
sanctioned memorial project juxtaposed an assemblage of colonial and 
apartheid heritage formations in the democratic complex. In essence, 
the ideological construction of the Liberation Heritage Project places 
sharp focus on broad questions of political uses of heritage which 
tend to serve multiple purposes such as reclaiming and unearthing 
the suppressed histories of the anti-colonial struggle. Simultaneously, 
political uses of the legacy of the anti-colonial struggle are morphed 
into formations of a new nation state and national identity. 
The far-reaching impact of state prioritisation of the Liberation 
Heritage Project rests in the state’s acceding to the challenge of 
mastering the representation of diverse pasts and experiences of the 
struggle(s) against colonialism and apartheid. The consequences of 
‘selective amnesia’ often have far reaching implications on in skewed 
or biased representations of certain narratives which may diminish 
the strides by the state – government of national unity – to achieve 
‘social cohesion’ through recognition of diverse representation of 
broad narratives of the liberation struggle. Therefore, it is inevitable 
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that in the scheme of power relations and imposition of authority by 
the state, certain heritages will be privileged over others and/or to 
the exclusion of still others. The question remains whether liberation 
heritage in South Africa will transcend traditional racial, ethnic, and 
economic boundaries, or simply reinforce these categories. Analysing 
these processes and the differing investments of social groups will 
allow for a fuller appreciation of the historical consciousness and 
geographic agency of these groups, including their vested interests in 
the Liberation Heritage Project.
Bibliography
Abercrombie, et al.
The Dominant Ideology Thesis. London: Allen and Unwin Hyman, 1980.
African National Congress (ANC). Draft National Cultural Policy, 1994.
Anderson, Benedict.
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
London: Verso Editions, 1980.
Appadurai, Arjun.
The Globalization of Archaeology and Heritage. Journal of Social Archaeology. 
United States of America, 2001.
Ashworth et al.
Dissonant heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict. 
London: Wiley and Sons, 1996.
Ashworth, Gregory John & Brian J. Graham & John E. Tunbridge.
“The uses and abuses of Heritage.” In Heritage Museums and Galleries: 
An Introductory Reader, edited by Gerard Corsane. London: Routledge, 2005.
Ashworth, Gregory John & John E. Tunbridge.
Dissonance and the Uses of Heritage. London: Wiley and Sons, 1996.
Ashworth, Gregory John & John E. Tunbridge.
Pluralising Pasts: Heritage, Identity and Place in Multicultural Societies. London: 
Pluto Press, 2007
Chapter 5 | Heritage denunciation and heritage enunciation?
151
Baines, Gary.
“The Politics of Public History in Post-Apartheid South Africa.” In History Making 
and Present Day Politics: The Meaning of Collective Memory in South Africa, 
edited by Hans Erik Stolten. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikaininstitutet, 2007.
Baines, Gary.
“The Freedom Park Fracas and the Divisive Legacy of South Africa’s Border War/
Liberation Struggle.” Social Dynamics 35, no. 2 (2009): 330-344.
Bhabha, Homi K.
“Introduction: Narrating the Nation.” In Nation and Narration, edited by Homi K. 
Bhabha. London: Routledge, 1990.
Bhabha, Homi K.
The Location of Culture. London: Routledge, 1994.
Cabinet Memorandum of the National Liberation Heritage Route Project, 
Department of Arts and Culture, and the National Heritage Council, 2013, http://
www.dac.gov.za and http://www.nhc.org.za 
Chris Hani District Municipality. Liberation Heritage Route: Icon Site Guide, 
Rhodes University Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2008.
Comaroff, Jean & John L. Comaroff.
Millennia! Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism, Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 2001.
Coombes. Annie E.
“Translating the past: apartheid monuments in post-apartheid South Africa. 
London: Routledge.” In History after Apartheid: Visual Culture and Public 
Memory in Democratic South Africa, edited by Annie E. Coombes, 173-197. NC: 
Duke University Press, 2000.
Coombes, Annie E.
History after Apartheid: Visual Culture and Public Memory in Democratic South 
Africa. NC: Duke University Press, 2003a.
Coombes, Annie E.
Symbolic Restitution. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2003b.
Danaher, Geoff, Tony Schirato & Jenn Webb.
Understanding Foucault. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2002.
152
Exchanging Symbols
Deacon, Harriet, Sephai Mngqolo & Sandra Prosalendis.
Protecting our Cultural Capital. Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2003.
Department of Arts and Culture (South Africa). Celebrating the Heroes and 
Heroines of the Liberation Struggle in South Africa, 2012a.
Department of Arts and Culture (South Africa). Presentation of Progress Report, 
Legacy Project of State of Nation Address and Liberation Heritage Route, at the 
Parliamentary Arts and Culture Portfolio Committee meeting, 25 April, 2012b.
Department of Arts and Culture (South Africa). Revised Draft White Paper on 
Arts, Culture and Heritage, p. 22, 2013.
Department of Arts and Culture (South Africa). Report on Stakeholder 
Engagement on reflections by the Minister Nathi Mthethwa, 2016. 
Direct Action Centre for Peace and Memory. Policy Dialogue: The Role of the 
Ex-Combatants in Memorialisation Processes in South Africa, The Centre for 
the Study of Violence and Reconciliation – Transitional Justice Programme, 
Workshop Report, pp. 5-6, 2007. 
Fanon, Frantz.
The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press, 1963.
Foucault, Michel.
Truth and Power. Selected Interviews & Other Writings by Michel Foucault, 1972-
1977, 1972.
“On Governmentality.” Ideology and Consciousness 5 (1979): 5-26.
Power and Strategy in Power/Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.
The Archaeology of Knowledge. Routledge: New York, 1987.
“Governmentality.” In The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, edited 
by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991.
Garuba, Harry & Sam Raditlhalo.
“Culture.” In New South African Key Words, edited by Nick Shepherd & Steven L. 
Robins.
Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008.
Hall, Martin.
“Identity, Memory and Counter-Memory: The Archaeology of an Urban 
Landscape.” Journal of Material Culture 11, no. 1-2 (2006):11. 
Chapter 5 | Heritage denunciation and heritage enunciation?
153
Hall, Martin.
Desire Lines: Space, Memory and Identity in the Post-Apartheid City, London: 
Routledge, 2007a.
Hall, Martin.
Tourism and Post-Colonialism: Contested Discourses, Identities and 
Representations. London: Routledge, 2007b.
Harrison, Rodney.
Understanding the Politics of Heritage. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2010.
Melber, Henning.
Liberation Movements as Government: The Unfinished Business of 
Decolonisation. In Outside the Ballot Box: Preconditions for Elections in 
Southern Africa 2004/5, edited by Jeanette Minnie. Windhoek: Media Institute 
for Southern Africa (MISA), 2006.
Melber, Henning.
The Legacy of Anti-colonial Struggles in Southern Africa: Liberation Movements 
as Governments. International Journal of Social Renewal, 2006.
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Documenting the Legacy of the 
South African Liberation Struggle: The National Liberation Heritage Route, 
Research Report on the Liberation Heritage Route in South Africa, Democracy, 
Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD), 2013, http://www.hsrc.org.za or http://
www.nhc.org.za
Lalu, Premesh.
“The Virtual Stampede for Africa: Digitization, Post-Coloniality and Archives of 
the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa.” Innovation: Journal of Appropriate 
Librarianship and Information Work in Southern Africa 34 (2007): 28-44.
Leistyna, Pepi, Arlie Woodrum & Stephen A. Sherblom. 
Breaking Free: The Transformative Power of Critical Pedagogy. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Educational Review, 1999.
Lowenthal, David.
The Past is a Foreign Country. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Lowenthal, David.
“The Timeless Past: Some Anglo-American Historical Preconceptions.” Journal 




The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998.
MacDonald, Sharon & Roger Silverstone.
“Rewriting the Museums Fictions: Taxonomies, Stories and Readers.” Cultural 
Studies 4, no. 2 (2006):176-191.
The Hashim Mbita Research Project. Southern African National Liberation 
Struggles. Tanzania: Mkuki Na Nyota Publishers, 2014.
Manetsi, Thabo.
Safeguarding Intangible Heritage in South Africa: A Critique of the Draft National 
Policy on Living Heritage. International Journal on Intangible Cultural Heritage 6, 
no. 57 (2011).
Manetsi, Thabo.
State Prioritised Heritage: Issues of Governmentality, Institutionalisation and 
Monumentalisation of Heritage, A Seminar Presentation at Archaeology Centre, 
Stanford University, USA, 21 November, 2013.
Marschall, Sabine.
“Commemorating Struggle Heroes: Constructing a Genealogy for the New South 
Africa.” International Journal of Heritage Studies 12, no.2 (2006a).
Marschall, Sabine.
Landscape of Memory: Commemorative Monuments, Memorials and Public 
Statuary in Post-Apartheid South. Leiden: Brill, 2006b.
National Heritage Council. Draft National Transformation Heritage Charter. p. 4, 
2006.
National Heritage Council. Presentation of National Liberation Heritage Route 
project at a Summit in the North West Province. p. 6, 2011.
National Heritage Council. The National Liberation Heritage Route Report and 
Power Point Presentation, 2015, www.nhc.org.za
National Heritage Council. The National Liberation Heritage Route, Report and 
Power Point Presentation, 2016, www.nhc.org.za
Ndletyana, Mcebisi.
Patronage Politics Divide Us: A Study of Patronage, Poverty and Inequality in 
South Africa, Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA). Research 
Report, 2013, www.mistra.org.za 
Chapter 5 | Heritage denunciation and heritage enunciation?
155
Ndlovu, Sifiso Mxolisi.
“Heritage routes for the liberated South Africans : Using Oral History to 
Reconstruct Unsung Heroes and Heroines’ Route into Exile in the 1960s.” Historia 
47, no. 2 (2002): 479-510.
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J.
Heritage routes for the liberated South Africans: Using Oral History to 
Reconstruct Unsung Heroes and Heroines’ Route into Exile in the 1960s. SADET, 
2002.
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. & Wendy Willems.
Making Sense of Cultural Nationalism and the Politics of Commemoration under 
the Third Chimurenga in Zimbabwe, Journal of Southern African Studies, 2009.
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J.
The Ndebele Nation: Reflections on Hegemony, Memory and Historiography. 
Amsterdam & Pretoria: Rozenberg Publishers & UNISA Press, 2009.
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J.
The Zimbabwean Nation-State Project: A Historical Diagnosis of Identity- and 
Power-Based Conflicts in a Postcolonial State. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 
2010.
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J.
Hostage to Nationalist Monologue, Recycled Histories and Sanitised Memories: 
The Case of Zimbabwe. Paper presented at the ECAS 2011 – 4th European 
Conference on African Studies, Uppsala, 2011a.
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J.
Reconstructing the Implication of Liberation Struggle History on SADC 
Mediation in Zimbabwe. African Perspectives: Global Insights 92. Wits: South 
African Institute of International Affairs, 2011b.
Ndoro, Webber & Gilbert Pwiti.
Heritage Management in Southern Africa. In Heritage, Museums and Galleries: 




Introduction to Heritage Law in Africa. In Cultural Heritage and the Law 
Protecting Immovable Heritage in English-Speaking Countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, edited by Webber Ndoro, Albert Mumma & George Abungu. ICCROM 
Conservation Studies, 2008.
Nelson Mandela Monuments of Liberation and Reconciliation consultative visit, 
National Heritage Council, 24 January 2014. 
NEUM. Disinherited: Distorting heritage by Omission, NEUM report: Posted on 
18th September 2012.
Pikirayi, Innocent.
The Heritage We Want: Development, Sustainability and the Future of Africa by 
2063. A Presentation at the Seminar on Harmonising Heritage with the African 
Union Agenda 2063 organized by the Africa World Heritage Fund. Development 
Bank of Southern Africa, Midrand, South Africa, 6-8 May 2015. 
Pickover, Alison M.
2012. Disinherited: Distorting heritage by omission by NEUM report: Posted on 
18 September 2012.
The Draft National Transformation Heritage Charter, 2009, www.nhc.org.za
The South African Heritage Resources Agency. Report on Arts, Culture and 
Heritage White Paper Policy Review Workshop, 11 June 2015.
Regional Workshop on the African Liberation Heritage. 2011. Roodevallei 
Conference and Meetings Hotel organised jointly by the Africa World Heritage 
Fund, Department of Arts and Culture and the National Heritage Council, 
16-18 August 2011.
Report of Consultative Workshop on Liberation Heritage Route: Tourism Route 
Development, National Department of Tourism, Ditsong Museum, Pretoria, 
22 October 2014.
Nelson Mandela Memorials of Liberation and Reconciliation Project Proposed 
World Heritage Nomination (NHC/04/2013/14), WHS Nomination Dossier Options 
Analysis Report, www.nhc.org.za 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Arts and Culture: Minister’s Budget Vote Speech, 
A presentation of the Budget Speech at the National Assembly by Minister of Arts 
and Culture, Mr Paul Mashatile, 3 May 2012, www.pmg.org.za/print/31872
Tentative List Submission Liberation Heritage Route by the Republic of South Africa, 
Submitting State Party Agency, National Heritage Council, 2008, www.nhc.org.za 
Chapter 5 | Heritage denunciation and heritage enunciation?
157
Smith, Laurajane.
Uses of Heritage. New York, Routledge, 2006.
State of the Nation Address By His Excellency Jacob G Zuma, President of the 
Republic of South Africa on the occasion of the Joint Sitting of Parliament, Cape 
Town, 10 February 2011. [Online]. Available: www.info.gov.za/speech / 
State of the Nation Address By His Excellency Jacob G. Zuma, President of the 
Republic of South Africa on the occasion of the Joint Sitting of Parliament, Cape 
Town, 9 February 2012, www.info.gov.za/speech/
State of the Nation Address By His Excellency Jacob G, Zuma, President of the 
Republic of South Africa on the occasion of the Joint Sitting of Parliament, Cape 
Town, February 2013, www.info.gov.za/speech /
State of the Nation Address By His Excellency Jacob G Zuma, President of the 
Republic of South Africa on the occasion of the Joint Sitting of Parliament, Cape 
Town, February 2014, www.info.gov.za/speech/
State of the Nation Address By His Excellency Jacob G. Zuma, President of the 
Republic of South Africa on the occasion of the Joint Sitting of Parliament, Cape 
Town, February 2015, www.info.gov.za/speech/
State of the Province Address by Eastern Cape Premier Noxolo Kiviet, delivered 
on the Occasion of the Opening of the Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature, 
17 February 2012, www.anc.org.za/eclcaucus/ 
State of the Province Address by Eastern Cape Premier Noxolo Kiviet, deliverd 
on the Occasion of the Opening of the Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature, 
25 February 2013, www.anc.org.za/eclcaucus/ 
South African News Agency. Graves of Struggle Heroines Declared Heritage 
Sites, 2010, https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/graves-struggle-
heroines-declared-heritage-sites 







Chapter 6 | Present absence
161
137. Vredesmonument (Peace Monument), Vereeniging
12. J. G. Strijdom-Bolfybeeld (J. G. Strijdom’s Bust), Krugersdorp
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16. Jameson-Gedenkteken (Jameson Memorial), Roodepoort
18. Ossewatrekmonument (Ox-Wagon Trek Monument), Paardekraal School, 
Krugersdorp
19. Magersfontein-Monument (Magersfontein Monument), Orange Free State
8. Churchill-Gedenkteken (Churchill Memorial), Natal
27. Republiekmonument (Republic Monument), Nooitgedacht School
Chapter 6 | Present absence
163
9. President Paul Kruger Standbeeld (President Paul Kruger Statue), Pretoria
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14. Verpleegster Henrietta Stockdale-Beeld (Nurse Henrietta Stockdale Statue), 
Kimberley
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32. Plaasskool-Monument (Farm School Monument), Panfontein School, Vereeniging
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6. Republiekmonument (Republic Monument), Drie Riviere Primary School, 
Vereeniging
5. Ossewatrekmonument (Ox-Wagon Trek Monument), Cottesloe, Johannesburg
19. Republiekmonument (Republic Monument), Jan de Klerk High School, 
Krugersdorp
29. 1838-Gedenkteken (1838 Memorial), Nooitgedacht
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81. Bloedriviermonument (Blood River Monument)
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25. Langenhoven-Beeld (Langenhoven Statue), Langenhoven High School, 
Pretoria
21. Die Saaier-Beeld (The Sower Statue), Lichtenburg
37. Piet Retief-Monument (Piet Retief Monument), Port Elizabeth
Chapter 6 | Present absence
169
30. Piet Retief-Monument (Piet Retief Monument), Dingaanstat
49. Ossewatrekmonument (Ox-Wagon Trek Monument), Queenstown
16. Voortrekker-Monument (Pioneers Monument), Graaff-Reinet
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95. Paardekraalmonument (Paardekraal Monument), Krugersdorp
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55. Voortrekkerleier Karel Landman-Monument (Pioneer Leader Karel Landman 
Monument), Alexandria, Cape Province
32. Ossewatrekmonument (Ox-Wagon Trek Monument), Nelspruit
25. Voortrekkerweg (Pioneers Road), Krugersdorp
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The work on this visual essay began during an artist residency in 
Johannesburg in 2016. Hoping to learn about other commemoration 
practices than the ones I was familiar with from my home country 
Israel and my place of residence in Western Europe, I embarked 
southwards, crossed the equator for the first time in my life, and moon 
landed in South Africa. 
The calls and demands of the #RhodesMustFall movement were still 
echoing in Johannesburg’s campuses, and I found myself searching for 
photographs of monuments in old books at the libraries of the same 
universities. The original images used here were all scanned from two 
publications in Afrikaans, edited and published by J.J. Tonder: Fotobeeld 
van 300 monumente, standbeelde en gedenktekens langs die pad van 
Suid-Afrika (Pictures of 300 monuments, statues and memorials along 
the path of South Africa) from 1975, and Veertien Gedenktekens van 
Suid-Afrika (Fourteen Memorials of South Africa) from 1961. 
The selection contains photographs that depict “human figures” 
alongside the “sculptural subject”, and thus brings into focus the 
relationship between man and (absent) object. The sequence begins 
with the only image I found, in which Black persons are present. It 
documents the mounting of the Peace Monument by sculptor Coert 
Steynberg in Vereeniging in 1961. From here onwards the series of 
retouched and tinted photographs exhibits an imagined narrative: 
The erection of the monument is followed by a festive inauguration, 
and later by ceremonies and yearly gatherings as well as school visits. 
Now the monument is established as a place and may occasionally 
be emancipated from its original memorial function and transformed 
into a stage for non-related public events. From a stage it easily shifts 
into a mere background. But the personal relation to the (absent) 
object and the memory it comes to eternalise (or silence) persists, 
and we witness different forms of identification with the two. Here 
a closer look reveals: the body is initially very close, even touching 
and imitating, but slowly distances itself. The gaze transforms from 
sympathy to awe and turns eventually to an inner inquiry. 
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Not much from my initial motivation to grasp something about the 
local landscape and culture came about during my three months stay 
in South Africa. Nonetheless, what I have possibly learned here was 
actually to feel that I may not grasp. The right to relevance, which 
has accompanied me hitherto in all my (more or less righteous) 
undertakings, was cropped off my self-assured way of being; and I 
have never guessed that this resultant void could possibly involve 
liberating qualities, next to its terrifying hollowness. 




Verfremdung as a strategy of memorial in the work of 




How soon people become bored with the making and unmaking of 
history, Grekov thought, remembering the hundreds of thousands 
who had taken to the streets to watch the first monuments fall. 
(Vladislavic 1996)
In their climatic, widely cited visual essay Statues Also Die, partly censored until 1968 (Fraiture 2016, 47), auteurs Chris Marker (director and writer), Alain Resnais, (co-director), Ghislain Cloquet 
(cameraman), and Guy Bernard (composer) juxtapose a striking 
and haunting array of displaced artifacts in European gardens and 
museums, developing a shared anti-colonial argument. To them, 
African art (was) at death’s door and its artifacts, arrested in colonial 
mausoleums, demanded removal from the asphyxiating and deadening 
site of the colonial museum. Still visually impressive to us today, this 
stark black-and-white visual essay, composed of jarring still and 
moving images, begins with a pronouncement written by Marker and 
delivered by Jean Négroni in his matter-of-fact, staccato radio voice, 
intonated to command attention and extend authority and finality, 
veracity and gravitas to the documentary’s initial assertion: “when 
men die, they enter into history. When statues die, they enter art. This 
botany of death is what we call culture” (Marker & Ashby 2013, 431). It 
is not this essay’s intention to provide a comprehensive reading and 
analysis of Les Statues, but rather to propose this 1953 documentary as 
an overture to thinking and envisaging how cultural objects can gain 
a new charge, one of unsettling and upending systems, particularly 
the systems of colonialism that arguably persist to this day. To those 
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of us who study museums and curating, Les Statues usefully brings 
the camera into the (ethnographic) museum to analyse how objects 
are regarded, providing a window of opportunity to discuss how 
these cultural institutions domesticate time and place at a distance, 
providing, as Matthias de Groof has written, a “categorization of 
otherness in order to define the self” (2010, 31).
In Les Statues, Marker deplores the manner ‘negro’ artifacts that 
have been cannibalised by the west to become ‘inauthentic’ objects, 
constrained “to perform an act they were not meant to be performing” 
(Fraiture 2016, 48). Although current and acute in advocating the need 
for repatriation, Marker’s argument is intolerably flawed to us today 
in its ideal of return to a ‘pure’ signifier called ‘Africa’ – an overly 
romanticised “country where every form had its signification, where 
the gracefulness of a curve was a declaration on love to the world” 
(De Groof 2010, 32) and to a(n) (imaginary) space where people exist 
in timeless bliss. In so doing, Marker forecloses the possibility of any 
exchange or dialogue with this place he considers lost to us, and 
which I would add as a corrective, has historically never been cut- off, 
isolated or without history. In effect Marker, like his antagonist, the 
ethnographic museum, does little to restore, but rather seems to 
emphasise impossibility, muteness, loss and death. Graver yet, he 
denies multivocality and the capacity of discourse to the continent 
and its production, still speaking with white patriarchal authority, 
through Négroni, for a mute people, in a mode that is not entirely 
dissimilar to the one adopted by the Musée de l´Homme, the Museum 
of the Belgian Congo in Tervuren, the British Museum and the Pitt 
River Museum and their conservators. 
I propound instead that we consider Les Statues, and by extension, the 
displacement of cultural artifacts by way of critical intervention, as 
productive moments of verfremdung, that is, moments where artifacts 
that seem severed, neutered, resolved, categorised, and “known” become 
unsettled and highly charged once again. Ernst Bloch tells us that the 
word verfremden (“to estrange”) is not old, but difficult to translate. 
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Using Grimm as his source, he tentatively states that its first use in 
literature was in the 1842 novel Neues Leben by Bertold Auerbach:
In the novel, the parents feel verfremdet – that is, deeply wounded 
– because their children speak French, which the parents do not 
understand, in their presence. Presumably, the parents are being 
discussed; they feel estranged, treated as if they were not present. 
(Bloch 1970, 121)
To this, Bloch adds the concept of Verfremdungseffect, which he 
provides as the displacement or removal of a character or action (or 
object) out of its usual context, so that the character or action (or 
object) can no longer be perceived as wholly self-evident. 
Through this, the scales fall from one’s eyes, unveiling an instance of 
“exempla docent, although only by means of indirection” (ibid., 121). 
Displacement leads to revelation. To paraphrase Bloch further, the 
distant, the out-of-way, the displaced into heights reflects back and 
leads to an understanding of present reality.
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Figure 7.1. Still from Statues Also Die. [Black and White 35 mm film]. Chris Marker 
& Alain Resnais. dir. France: Tadié Cinéma. 1953
Art arguably affords us ways of seeing what lies embedded and 
hidden, of perceiving differently and across time. Through the artist’s 
dysphoric gaze, the previously invisible becomes visible, the absent 
becomes present, and the normalised, the homogenised, the classified 
within an existing dominant or hegemonic cultural system becomes 
displaced, estranged and haunted. This is no alchemy but rather the 
work of the politicised, cognisant, archaeological, decolonial and 
arguably depatriarchal approach of some artists. Through their work, 
and how they engage with “hot” monuments (Bellentani & Panico, 
2016), relations of visibility and invisibility, and the voluntary and many 
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times willed blindspots of history are teased out.1 In this chapter, I will 
be looking at how a small number of artists, both contemporary and 
modern, engage with monuments, employing strategies of verfremdung 
within the built environment, seen by them as personifications or 
embodiments of the forces that condition and shape our times. 
These artists, culled from different generations and geographies, are 
Lungiswa Gqunta, Sikhumbuzo Makandula, Haroon Gunn-Salie and 
Leonard Tshela Mohapi Matsoso. They work with histories of trauma, 
albeit from different angles and with different approaches, in specific 
mediums which help to inform their, and by extension, our thoughts 
and perceptions of the cultural and lived landscapes we inhabit. The 
list of artists I have provided is not extensive but illustrative and 
indicative, in other words, incomplete and speculative. I would like to 
maintain and honour this open-endedness as it respects the present 
tide of revision and revulsion, which has not passed, and to which may 
other artists are likely to contribute. The text that follows is informed 
by Benjaminian fragmentation, and as such, prioritises and values 
plurality and rupture. It takes shape as a collection of fragments – a 
mosaic – and presents itself to readers through a series of interruptions 
and cinematic jump cuts. 
I suggest that we commence with the eldest artist of all, the late Leonard 
Tshela Mohapi Matsoso, an underexposed champion of South African 
modernism, celebrated at the Bienal de São Paulo in 1973 with a Ciccillo 
Matarazzo Award.2 Despite this significant recognition, imparted 
to him at the surprising age of twenty-four by an international jury 
1 Federico Bellentani and Mario Panico (2016, 34-35) distinguish between hot and cold 
monuments. The terms are somewhat self-explanatory. As they write, “in general terms, 
‘hot’ monuments can elicit in users uncomfortable or even traumatic emotions. They can 
stimulate fierce political debates that may result in forms of conflict and resistance at a 
social level (...). Conversely ‘cold’ monuments convey meanings that have become widely 
shared by a large part of users (...) Cold monuments are peacefully integrated into the 
everyday practices of users that perceive them as ordinary built forms. This is the case 
with monuments that have turned into neutral landmark or mere meeting points.” 
Originally monuments are not erected as hot or cold: “accepted monuments can turn 
into sites of resistance as well as controversial monuments can increasingly become 
accepted and mindlessly experienced during the routine of everyday life.” 





comprised of five international critics and museum directors (António 
Bento, Robert Delavoie, Lu Ke King, Jiri Kotalik, and Donald Baum), 
Matsoso’s career never catapulted as one would expect from such 
an accolade, stifled by the muting context of apartheid South Africa 
and its all-too-compliant emissaries, together with the reinforcing 
perversions of modernism itself which placed ‘African’, or worse yet, 
‘Bantu’ art at the service of its mostly white, mostly male exponents. 
Matsoso, an artist who diligently trained from a schooling age at 
Polly Street Art Centre (Miles, 2004:73), spent a significant part of his 
production envisioning the sculptural and monumental form. His work 
was displayed in groundbreaking exhibitions that have fallen deaf to the 
ears of history, perhaps due to the fact that they were arranged by the 
apartheid dispositif, being the rather spooky sounding “Cultural Section 
of the Department of Information” which had no intention of exalting 
or exhorting Black South African artists, but rather one of boxing, 
diminishing and thus effectively segregating and belittling their work. 
A case in point is the group exhibition, held from March 25 to May 16 
of 1976 at the Brooklyn Museum and adjoining Brooklyn Public Library, 
“the first group exhibition in the United States of Black South African 
artists” (Potgieter 1976, 17). It included Matsoso’s work under the broad 
category “graphic art.” According to Stefanie Potgieter, in an article 
published in the June edition of Bantu, a journal expressly meant for a 
white readership, the “almost eight-week long exhibition of 16 tapestries 
and 90 graphic works of 10 artists was seen by nearly 250 000 people”.3 
The article, in true apartheid style, as with all totalitarian memory-
controlling regimes, fails to mention the names of these artists, thus 
excising them from their due place in history.
Possibly owing to the influence of his peers and instructors, particularly 
Ezrom Legae who succeeded Sydney Kumalo at Polly Street in 1965, a 
young and one would imagine curious and impressionable Matsoso was 
3 According to the editorial of October 1978: “BANTU [which had changed title to 
Progressus] continued as a publication mainly for White (sic) readers, in both English and 
Afrikaans.” According to this same editorial, as overseas demand for the publication 
increased, in February of 1962, the two languages were separated and Bantu appeared in 
English and Afrikaans respectively.
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taken by the production happening around him, creating a body of work 
which would also gravitate to the sculptural and often monumental form, 
emulating his peers and their interest in three-dimensional work. Although 
portraiture was a component of the study programme at the Centre as 
much as life drawing (Miles 2004, 88), the sculptural prevailed amongst 
its learners (and instructors) and was thus to become a constant in the 
drawings of Matsoso. “Polly Street Art Centre cultivated an awareness 
that art was not only mimesis but a tool for expression”, Elza Miles (2004, 
10) writes, and in Matsoso’s case, or so I posit, his output of drawings 
were a resistive response to the oppression he was subject to – one need 
only look at his titles to get a sense of the hardship he and his fellows 
faced4 –but more significantly to us, and within our chosen framework, 
his work discreetly countered the normalisation of an absence: the denial 
of the Black monument and Black cultural history in the South African 
landscape, providing us today with a window to number of blueprints for 
potential monuments, rendering his production arguably contemporary 
in its political and conceptual acuity.
Six years after having received an award for his drawings in São Paulo, 
Matsoso was recruited yet again by the city of São Paulo for an edition 
of the biennial that is commonly known as the ‘bienal dos prémios’ 
or biennial of accolades. The idea of the biennial was to provide an 
overview of the first fourteen editions and showcase work that had 
been awarded over these successive years. Although Matsoso is listed 
in the catalogue as a recipient in 1973, and even though he specifically 
produced a suite of drawings for the biennial in 1979 at the behest of 
his gallery, in conjunction with the South African government, his work 
was not exhibited (together with a tapestry by Marguerite Weavind, 
with visual artist Larry Scully as commissioner), as had originally been 
planned. “South Africa’s participation in the 1979 Sao Paulo Biennale 
was cancelled due to political reasons shortly before the exhibition was 
held” according to the Director General of the Information Service of 
South Africa, in several letters written to consuls in the United States 
4 Titles like Helpless, Helpless, a drawing from 1972, located in the Constitutional Court art 
collection, or Agony, one of the drawings presented at the Bienal de São Paulo in 1973.
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at the request of the National Executive Council of the South African 
Association of the Arts (heretoforth SAAA) to find alternative venues 
for the work produced by Matsoso and his fellow exhibitors. Despite 
the country’s repeated attempts at rapprochement, namely in 1982 
and 1984, Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations, otherwise known as 
Itamaraty, together with certain countries, in particular India, vetoed 
all attempts at South African participation and the country would not 
participate again until 1994.
It is conceivable that the government “acquired” the Matsoso suite 
of drawings, together with the Marguerite Weavind tapestry5 for the 
Pretoria State Theatre to console the artists, or perhaps itself for this 
embarrassing diplomatic rebuttal. I am reluctant to state that Matsoso’s 
work was purchased. It was in effect sponsored by the South African 
Information Service at most. According to the SAAA’s expense report, 
Matsoso received R300 for materials whereas Marguerite Weavind 
received ten times the amount for the production of her tapestry, paid 
over to the artist via a state grant managed by the SAAA. 
Before finding a permanent home in what is today known as the 
South African State Theatre, Matsoso and Weavind’s work travelled 
to the United States as a result of much diplomatic maneuvering.6 
The suite of five drawings he produced for São Paulo, later exhibited 
in Houston and at the ‘Festival of Two Worlds’ or Spoletto Festival in 
South Carolina in 1980, were fierce and magisterial.7 Reproduction in 
5 This was a 3-metre-high and 7 metre long mohair tapestry, designed by Judith Mason, 
consisting of five different sections depicting the Garden of Eden with two large angels 
whose wings, according to the official description, ended in five angel faces. Allegoric 
forms such as snakes, trees and flowers were included. The work I imagine and admittedly 
conjecture, by way of its sheer size, would have intentionally been included to overshadow 
and outshine Matsoso’s drawings, indirectly enacting a symbolic battle of faiths and 
races, between Christian and traditional, colonial and autochthonous, European and 
African beliefs.
6 Until recently, Matsoso’s suite was to be found in the lift foyer. The suite was removed in 
a general rehang of the collection and is currently in held in the theatre vault.
7 According to Michael Brown (2000), the Spoletto Festival was born in 1958 on the impetus 
of composer Gian Carlo Menotti and his vision: to unite two cultures and two art worlds, 
that is, the European and the American. The festival is mostly known for opera and 
theatre performances. According to correspondence between James T. Kerney, the 
festival manager in 1979, and the Ambassador of South Africa, Donald B. Sole, artists who 
participated in past festivals included Alberto Burri, Jean Cocteau, Willem deKooning, 
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book form betrays their scale and impact. Measuring approximately 
166 x 85 cm each, the figures they depict are strikingly monumental. Of 
the five drawings, three relate directly to the legend of Nongqawuse. 
For apartheid South Africa, the story of Nongqawuse was dismissed 
as mere ‘foolish folk tale’, but for many today, and I would speculate 
Matsoso too, this real-life event bespeaks of the resoluteness, faith 
and selfless lengths and sacrifices that the Xhosa people committed to 
in order to save themselves from colonial expansion.8
It was in 1856, three years after bovine pleuropneumonia arrived in 
the Cape aboard a ship carrying Friesian bulls at Mossel Bay (Peires, 
1987:45) with the additional aggravation of a severe drought that 
Nongqawuse, a young Xhosa girl, had a vision that the ancestors were 
preparing themselves to return to life, salvaging her ailing population 
with the offering of new cattle and a revived land (Ashforth 1991, 581). 
In order to prepare for their coming, this young seer was told all the 
Xhosa must burn their crops and slaughter their cattle. When the 
ancestors failed to arrive by the predicted date, despite reluctance 
in some quarters, most of Nongqawuse’s people had decided to 
destroy their livelihoods to appease the ancestors. An estimated 
40 000 people starved to death as a consequence (Peires 1987, 43). The 
survivors, forced to seek assistance in the British Cape Colony, were 
driven into the service of the colonialists. Unsurprisingly, under the 
leadership of Governor Sir George Grey, the colonial administration 
brutally exploited and capitalised on the situation and vulnerability of 
the Xhosa people, who saw the power of the chiefs broken and their 
lands seized for European settlement (Ashforth 1991, 581).
Helen Frakenthaler, David Hockney, Robert Indiana, Robert Motherwell and Andy Warhol.
8 It should be noted that Nongqawuse’s prophecy was preceded by that of Nxele, who lived 
from about 1780 to 1820, at a time when Xhosa society was coming under increasing 
pressure from within as well as without. According to Jane Hodgson, sometime between 
1816 and 1818, Nxele, an igogo credited with second sight, offered his people a course of 
action that was grounded in traditional worldview, yet charged with a new source of 
power, claiming that he had seen a vision. “Dalidiphu appeared to me and spoke to me 
saying, ‘Tell my people to prepare themselves for action. They must kill all dun-coloured 
cattle.’ He will cause all the dead to rise from their graves. They will come out of the sea, 
ready and armed to the teeth” (Hodgson 1985, 25).
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Although there is much to be said of this complex event which has served 
different agendas over time, I would argue that Nongqawuse’s vision is 
not located in the past, but in the future-present, creating a compelling 
haunting and stirring amongst her followers – an intertwined dream 
of becoming, return and regeneration – a decolonial and anti-colonial 
desire – which Matsoso, with his Brazil suite, wished to tap into and 
possibly share with his Portuguese-speaking counterparts.
Figure 7.2. Matsoso, Leonard Tshela Mohapi. Nongqawuse (sic) I, II, III. [Oil pastel 
on paper]. 166 x 85 cm each. 1979
Each of Matsoso’s panels portrays a monumental Nongqawuse, a seer, 
liminal being and niece of Mhlakaza, associated with the Xhosa cattle 
killing in different scenes. In his novel, The Heart of Redness, Zakes Mda 
envisions Nongqawuse as unkempt and with the appearance of a waif. 
He further adds to his description, “in the manner of all great prophets 
she seemed confused and disoriented” (2000, 59). Unlike Mda, Matsoso 
portrays Nongqawuse in the first panel as a grandiose figure, addressing 
a group of four crouched, grimacing subjects, who like her, are smeared 
in traditional red ochre. They appear to attentively draw on her words 
under a crimson, apocalyptic African sun. A long cloud of grey stretches 
across the sky, possibly caused by the burning fields, which she has 
called her people to ignite. Nongqawuse’s right arm is raised; her fist 
clenched in colonial-cum-apartheid defiance and leadership as she 
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addresses her hungry, broken kin. Like others included in the scene, 
the exposure of the lines of her thoracic cage are exacerbated, alluding 
not only to the drought of the summer of 1855-1856 (Peires 1987, 45) 
but also, and more importantly, to the diseased cattle and loss of land 
brought about by English colonisers. The scene encapsulates the 
emotion and despair of people whose entire wellbeing rested with its 
cattle, and who, as Peirce writes, “loved each beast individually”. Thanks 
to colonial settlers, who bought with them this invisible deadly disease, 
cattle owners and shepherds were forced to watch their animals putrefy 
from the inside out (Peires 1987, 47). Moving on to the second scene, 
Nongqawuse stands erect with another figure, their conjoined bodies 
indissociable. At their feet lies the carcass of a dead animal. There would 
have been many more corpses, but Matsoso, I would argue, chose to 
represent the familial unit and its individual connection to each animal. 
Nongqawuse touches and is connected to both earth and sky. In this 
scene, she holds the sun in her hand; a possible representation of the 
popular expression “ulihambe lingashoni” – to catch or hold the sun in 
an act of defiance, resilience and glory. In the third and last panel of 
the triptych, Nongqawuse rests atop of a living Nguni bull. Her back is 
bent from exhaustion. The skies have cleared, and she is again one with 
animal. Her partner however is represented divorced from her in the 
background, pleading to an absent, possibly Christian God. Still within 
reach, not all has been lost. 
In addition to the above triptych, two other works around the veiled 
theme of colonial-cum-apartheid resistance were included. In the 
vertical, almost life-size work Man and Beast, an amaXhosa man 
wrestles a giant, toothed monster with a poised, diminutive spear. One 
might argue that the giant crocodile depicted in the battle alludes to Die 
Groot Krokodil (Afrikaans for The Big Crocodile), a nickname used for 
P.W. Botha, the then prime minister of South Africa and first executive 
state president from 1984-1989. In the other horizontal panel, titled 
Mabalele, the crocodile has almost dominated its human prey. Although 
pinned down and trapped by the reptile’s heavy grey body, this warrior 
looks death – read the apartheid oppressor – squarely in the face.
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It should be noted that Matsoso’s technique was eximious for an artist 
working under dire conditions shared by most Black artists under 
apartheid. Living and working mostly from Soweto, he did not have 
access to electricity or a conventional and expansive studio space. 
This would understandably have conditioned the scale of work he was 
able to produce. Nevertheless, his workmanship demonstrates the 
supersession and overcoming of these otherwise impossible working 
conditions. His drawings deliver exceptionally striking tones and a 
palette that renders the human form as perennial, colossal and rock-
like. If South Africa was void of monuments to the Black individual, 
Matsoso was defiantly erecting primordial and perennial figures on 
two-dimensional surfaces, which looked as though, and suggested 
that they had been designed, and here lies the crux of my argument, to 
be carved and commemorated in stone. Rather than engage with these 
works as drawings on paper, I suggest we look at them as blueprints 
for monuments and imagine ourselves walking and engaging with 
their presence. I believe this is what Matsoso desired to impress upon 
his viewers, both then and now, and that this is what renders them 
fearsome and unsettling, ultimately leading to their removal from the 
State Theatre walls where they were once hung.
If Matsoso was responding to a void, a wave of young Black artists 
today are engaging and struggling in various ways with a landscape 
still populated and dominated by apartheid’s wreckage, be this its 
institutions or monuments; questioning, troubling and estranging 
their untouched presence, their embedded ideologies and divisive 
legacy in present-day South Africa. Katharyne Mitchell argues that 
“traces of memory left in the landscape point to the political, cultural 
and economic forces which cohered at that moment to produce a 
vision of the way a (dominant) society perceived itself and represented 
itself to itself” (2003, 448). She further writes, “during moments of 
major political disjunctures, when national and individual identity 
is challenged in fundamental ways”, such as in ‘post-apartheid’ 
South Africa, “the politics of memory rises to the fore, and (settled) 
monuments, in particular, become sites of great conflict” (ibid., 448). 
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The artists I will be looking at from this point on, or so I argue, plant 
“seeds of difference” (ibid., 451) in these lieux de mémoire or sites of 
memory, underlying the continuities and discontinuities they embody. 
Pierre Nora (1989, 19) tells us that lieux de mémoire are created by a play 
of memory and history. As I see it, today’s generation, in this fragile 
present, are productively calling attention and staging the difference 
and opposition between (Black) memory and (settler) history, in a 
battle with white settler monuments and their meaning. Memory and 
history, as Nora (1089, 8) writes, are far from synonymous: 
Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains 
in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and 
forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to 
manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and 
periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, 
always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. Memory is a 
perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present; 
history is the representation of the past. Memory, insofar as affective 
and magical, only accommodates those facts that suit it; it nourishes 
recollections that may be out of focus or telescopic.
This generation of emerging artists has taken it upon itself to wrestle 
with the memories of these places and their genius loci, in other 
words, “the geniuses we locate there” (Mayerfeld Bell 1997, 813). Theirs 
is a bitter struggle, one that is part and parcel of an informal project of 
resistance to normative memory production. By way of their counter-
practice, these artists refuse to accede to the scripting of history in 
the format of a once-dominant minority power, creating works which 
speak to a different interpretation of historical events.
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Figure 7.3. Gqunta, Lungiswa. Horse Memorial I. [Paper, wheat paste and water]. 2017
Horse Memorial I by Lungiswa Gqunta is a rather inconspicuous 
intervention considering the artist’s remaining expansive production. 
Somewhat reminiscent of the décollages of Wolf Vostell and Jacques 
Villegle, Gqunta presents a lacerated and gnashed colour print of the 
contested Horse Memorial, seen in profile from its location in Port 
Elizabeth. Looking at this modest work of a torn poster-sized image, 
the indices on the wall are not of careful peeling, but rather represent 
the desire to rip, peel and tear apart, signalling the determination, 
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anger and scorn which have fuelled the artist’s desire to see this 
image removed from the wall, and metonymically, from public space 
and our shared cultural landscape. This life size, 3-ton bronze statue, 
which is still to be found erect in Port Elizabeth, is dedicated to the 
thousands of horses that died on active duty in the Second Anglo-Boer 
War between 1899 and 1902, and depicts a soldier kneeling before his 
horse, holding a drinking bucket under its muzzle. According to Major 
Tylden, cited by G.R. Duxbury, the British Army supplied 520 000 
horses and 150 000 mules of which 350 000 horses and 50 000 mules 
perished. The losses of the ‘Burgher Forces’ were not given, but the 
total probably exceeded 150 000 (Duxbury 1968, n.p.). In a description 
dating back to 1964, Richard Buncher states that the statue “has a 
touchingly tender, dramatic quality” (1967, 139). Sculpted by Joseph 
Whitehead, Buncher (1967, 139) further adds that its author “worked 
with inspiration while the citizens of Port Elizabeth, led by Harriet 
Meyer, contributed considerable concern and much money”. 
Originally erected in 1905, exactly 110 later, this kneeling soldier was 
toppled by a group of 30 men dressed in red (Marias & Wilson 2015). 
Gqunta, I posit, like these unidentified men, wishes to underscore and 
give voice to the history elided by the monument and its promulgators, 
affording us a different, decolonial reading of the symbol. In her 
thesis, she reminds us that with the horses came the Bubonic plague, 
a disease hitherto unknown to the land, and with it, death and a 
reason to dislocate and uproot countless Black families.9 According 
to architect Franco Frescura, British military authorities imported 
large numbers of horses from Argentina to fight the Anglo-Boer 
9 In her highly commendable text on the absent history of the ubiquitous horse, social 
historian Sandra Swart reminds us that the horse (Equus caballus) was not indigenous to 
South Africa, but was introduced by white settlers. Swart traces this long history to Jan 
Van Riebeeck and his desire to reshape the landscape and change the native ecosystem. 
In order to remove bushes, plough the soil, cut down shrubs and trees, transport lumber, 
sand, clay and firewood, horses were much needed for the ‘landscaping’ that was 
required. After much arguing with the VOC, they were eventually brought from Java, 
much to the dissatifaction of Riebeeck who found the breed (known as the ‘South East 
Asia Pony’) to be light and insubstantial (2007, 127). Swart further writes: “The horses – 
together with a pack of hunting dogs – were imported, to a certain extent to inspire 
terror in the Khoisan, who were beginning to initiate raids upon the settlements. Van 
Riebeeck argued that a watch of twenty riders would prove a suficiente deterrent. On 
7 June 1660, the settler authorities udes horses to display settler ascendancy.”
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War. With their fodder came infested vermin which carried Bubonic 
plague (Spinage 2012, 1352). Between 1901 and 1903, most of South 
Africa’s major towns, Port Elizabeth included, recorded outbreaks of 
the disease. As Frescura in an undated entry on South African postal 
history writes:
… although its spread affected all sectors of the population, it was the 
black community who bore the brunt of the Plague Health Regulations. 
In 1902, most of Port Elizabeth’s black suburbs were demolished, the 
personal belongings of their residents were arbitrarily destroyed, and 
restrictions were imposed upon inter-town travel.
It was at this time that the racially segregated suburb of New Brighton 
(Gqunta’s hometown) was established, some 8 km from the city 
centre, to house families that had been displaced during the outbreak. 
According to John Iliffe (1987, 115), others were forced to settle on 
other peri-urban freehold land such as Korsten, a suburb named after 
Frederick Korsten, one of the first traders to settle in Algoa Bay.
To date, little to no interest has been shown by the media in 
understanding the public contestation or even the possibility that 
this monument could actually repress a history of hurt and loss, 
depicting the toppling somewhat blindly as disgraceful and shameful. 
Dr Beverley Roos Muller, in an online article titled Horse memorial 
attack makes no sense, surprisingly fails to evoke or acknowledge 
this history, possibly unaware of the connection between the horse, 
Bubonic plague and the forced and racialised displacement of local 
populations, which Gqunta seeks to obliquely evoke through her 
work.10 As such, rather unsurprisingly, a year after it was dismantled, 
10 Professor Myron Echenberg in his treaty Plague Ports: The Global Impact of Bubonic 
Plague 1894-1901, provides an account of the arrival of the plague in Cape Town and 
posits that it was this epidemic in particular that acted as the catalyst, setting in motion 
the phenomenon of urban racial segregation which has characterized and defined South 
Africa to this day. Echenberg points the emergence of these policies to William Simpson, 
professor of hygiene at Kings College, London, who accompanied the pandemic around 
the British Empire. Simpson, considered an expert at the time on the disease, happened 
to be in Cape Town in 1901. Although his purpose was to study typhoid fever among 
troops fighting in the Transvaal, he availed himself to the Plague Advisory Board. 
According to Echenberg, “Simpson’s so-called expertise in plague matters stemmed 
essentially from his limited clinical observations and selective reading rather than 
Chapter 7 | This fragile present:
193
undisclosed members of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 
sculpture collective trenchantly and stubbornly repaired the soldier, 
placing it defiantly back, according to The Herald (6 May, 2016). The 
greatest irony is possibly one of the memorial’s inscriptions, which 
reads: “The greatness of a nation consists not so much in the number 
of its people or the extent of its territory, as in the extent and justice 
of its compassion.” Little compassion, it should be said, has been 
shown to those living in Korsten or New Brighton and their history 
of displacement and dispossession, brought on originally by these 
otherwise innocent beasts and their pest-ridden fodder.
Looking at an old apartheid-era map, one would see the outline of the 
Ciskei to the East of Port Elizabeth and its Horse Memorial. No longer 
delineated by cartographers, this place, a former ‘Bantustan’, is the seat 
of Sikhumbuzo Makhandula’s attention. To be more precise, in his video 
titled Isigidimi, Makandula visits Ntaba kaNdoda, a modernist-inspired 
monument created by the Honourable Chief Lennox Sebe as part of a 
grand plan to create a distinct Ciskeian identity which had not existed 
until then, and one that was needed to legitimate independence in 1981. 
Franco Frescura, ten years after this date (1992, n.p.) writes: 
laboratory research. His few experiences convinced him that in South Asia, barefooted 
Indians became infected with the plague from contaminated earth” (2007, 281). Simpson’s 
approach to the disease was basically a sanitarian one. He blamed local populations for 
the spread of the disease, and “showed neither sympathy for nor understanding of the 
structural causes of overcrowding and squalid housing” (ibid.). In conjunction with Dr 
Alfred John Gregory, his junior colleague, he advocated the establishment of segregated 
locations for the poorer class of Europeans and people of colour. “Simpson paternalistically 
proclaimed the need for ‘ethnic zoning’ throughout British possessions in Africa and Asia 
and recommended a neutral belt of open unoccupied country of at least 300 yards in 
width between the European residences and those of the Asiatic and African” (ibid., 282). 
Fuelled by Simpson’s opinion, Cape Town applied the standard control measures 
employed in most other sites, with the difference that Black Africans were taken as the 
major target of these measures, especially vector control or vaccination. Public health 
officials showed little regard for Black African possessions, ordering most of their goods 
burned as opposed to sanitized (ibid., 285) when forcefully removing the Black African 
population, living mostly in District Six and One, to a site in Uitvlugt (today known as 
Ndabeni). In addition to crippling travel restrictions, Black Africans were forced to take 
Haffkine’s vaccine, which “was said to have been of dubious value and to have caused 
significant side effects” (ibid., 289). According to a report in the Cape Times of April 4, 
Gregory was asked if it was true that several people who had been inoculated had had to 
have their arms amputated!
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When the Ciskei opted for ‘independence’ in 1981 under the South 
African Government’s ‘Bantustan’ policy, it did so with the consent 
of only a small minority of its population and against the specific 
recommendations of its appointed consultants. In the process, it 
inherited a legacy of poverty unequalled in modern-day southern 
Africa. The Ciskei is also unique among South Africa’s rural 
‘homelands’ in that it has absolutely no basis upon which to claim a 
separate ethnic, cultural or linguistic identity, no separate Ciskeian 
identity, no separate Ciskeian culture, nor is there a Ciskeian 
language. Instead its people are intrinsically bound within the larger 
Xhosa identity.
Ntaba kaNdoda formed part of Sebe’s plan to invent that identity which 
involved the creation of an annual holy day, one which Frescura likens 
to the Swazi first-fruits celebration. An audience was guaranteed on 
this day by members of the Ciskeian Civil Service who were obliged 
to attend under the threat of dismissal. The national shrine cost 
approximately R860 000 and was funded by compulsory deductions 
made from the salaries of civil servants. In addition to the phallic 
monument, conceived by Sebe following a somewhat telling visit to 
Mount Massada in Israel, a ‘Hero’s Acre’ was incorporated where the 
bones of Chief Maqoma, a Xhosa leader who opposed white colonial 
rule, were reinterred after having been ‘found’ in an unmarked grave 
on Robben Island. 
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Figure 7.4. Makhandula, Sikhumbuzo. Still from Isigidimi (06’02”). [Short film]. 
2016. Photograph: Carlos Marzia Studio.
Over the course of his six-minute video, Makhandula traverses the 
indoor and outdoor spaces of the hauntingly deserted and divisive 
Ntaba kaNdoda monument, providing views of this nationalist and 
fracturing ruin and wound. Throughout, Makhandula personifies 
a messenger from another world, performing what appears to be 
a cleansing ritual. Dressed as ‘The Messenger’ in a long tunic and 
conical-looking hat, he treads carefully, burning incense in a thurible 
as he traverses the space methodically and rhythmically. Makhandula’s 
mock performance serves to evoke devotion and sacrifice. The 
repeated motion of the burner recalls the hypnotisation of the 
masses, a common denominator amongst nationalist and fracturing 
monuments worldwide, erected to celebrate the forefathers, pioneers 
and heroes of the nation. Ntaba kaNdoda, now an abandoned carcass, 
like those of other monuments of division, still occupies the landscape 
and the Eastern Cape’s visual horizon, despite the fact that Sebe’s bust 
has been dethroned. These are the persistent physical marks, etched 
into the landscape, of a past with no immediate undoing.
Visitors to the South African pavilion at the Venice Biennale in 2015 
would have encountered an anti-monumental work by Haroon 
196
Exchanging Symbols
Gunn- Salie. It is no coincidence I have chosen a work from a biennial 
as the last, for my intention is to also bring this analysis full circle, 
evoking and summoning the ghost of Matsoso and the parallel history 
of biennials as one which like the monuments that surround us, remains 
largely unchanged. But I digress … The unsuspecting Italian visitor, on 
entering the first section of the pavilion would have encountered a set 
of dismembered aged hands, the one clenched, the other holding a 
walking stick, placed centrally on a high wall, with intent and purpose 
above eye level. On busy days, foreign and unsuspecting visitors were 
likely to walk unawares beneath the red (blood soaked) hands of Jan Van 
Riebeeck, possibly even taking an obligatory selfie shot and posting it 
to social media. Cast by Haroon Gunn-Salie and Bevan Thornton on 
Freedom Day in 2015 (Dunbar-Curran 2015), the ghostly amputated 
hands are a direct impression (from the Latin imprimire, to imprint) of 
the Jan Van Riebeeck statue located in Cape Town’s CBD. The slightly 
outstretched hands as seen on location, proudly and affectedly take 
in and hold the view of a buzzing Adderley Street and awe-inducing 
Table Mountain. 
Figure 7.5. Gunn-Salie, Haroon & Bevan Thornton. Soft Vengeance  
(Jan van Riebeeck). [Reinforced urethane cast]. 2015 
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Unbeknownst to many visitors, the original statue was commissioned 
by arch-colonialist Cecil John Rhodes in 1896 as a gift to the City 
of Cape Town. “With his back to the shoreline, left fist clenched in 
determination, (Riebeeck) stands gazing on Table Mountain as if 
asserting a claim to the land”, writes Leslie Witz (2003, 43), establishing 
a significant parallel between the pose witnessed in the statue and a 
mid-19th century canvas titled Arrival of Van Riebeeck 1652 by Charles 
Davidson Bell where Van Riebeeck is portrayed “as part of British 
colonial identity”. According to Phillida Brooke Simons, this painting 
is one of several works Bell based on extracts from the journal of 
Van Riebeeck. According to Brooke Simons (1998, 93), “(i)t shows the 
Dutch commander with his henchmen, all of them hatted, helmeted 
and flag-flying, greeting a group of scantily clad Khoikhoi with Devil’s 
peak in the background”. 
Figure 7.6. Bell, Charles. The Landing of Van Riebeeck, 1652. [Oil on canvas].  
79,5 x 92 cm. 1850
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Witz (2003, 42) tells us that Bell was a draughtsman who arrived in 
Cape Town from Britain in 1830. He partook in several expeditions 
to the interior and took up several clerical posts within government, 
eventually becoming surveyor general. About the aforementioned 
painting, Witz (42) critically writes:
Bell’s painting, particularly of the landing, blends his background of 
draughtsmanship – the attention to ethnographic detail and the need 
to pinpoint people into carefully defined locations – with the English 
picturesque tradition and the Dutch historical movement of the 
nineteenth century. In the English tradition, broad landscapes were 
observed from a distance, with an emphasis on re-creating images 
on the “middle plane,” situated between a shadowy foreground and a 
background receding in the distance. It is in this middle plane that 
the historical event is located and Van Riebeeck appears, attired in a 
long flowing English-style jacket, carrying a walking stick with a large 
silver top, accompanied by Cromwellian-type soldiers with guns and 
an enlarged version of the Company flag. Set slightly farther aback, 
and blending into the background of trees and mountains, are a group 
of local Khoi inhabitants dressed in what appear to be tattered rags, all 
but one of them seated as they greet Van Riebeeck and his colleagues. 
The stark contrast of the apparel, the spatial location of the two parties, 
and the portly pose of Van Riebeeck as opposed to the almost humble 
greeting of the Khoi group turn the landing into an archetypical first 
encounter (…) Van Riebeeck, in his English guise of a rural landlord, is 
reinforced as the initiator of the civilizing mission in southern Africa.
To this reading, I would add another historical parallel, between Bell 
and his contemporary Delacroix, namely his Orpheus Comes to Civilize 
the Savage Greeks and Teach Them the Arts of Peace. To my mind, the 
similarity of the mountain in the backdrop is striking, establishing a 
bridge that connects the two creations across space, highlighting the 
colonising and “civilizing” ideology in which they both commune. Both 
present a balanced group of figures involving a ‘hero’ bathed in light. In 
the case of Van Riebeeck, not only does the sun shine where he steps, 
illuminating the path before him, thus suggesting the righteousness of 
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his mission, but Van Riebeeck’s garments and those of the henchmen 
closest to him, presented as a pyramidal grouping with Van Riebeeck 
at the summit, radiate a golden, warm light. 
John Tweed, the sculptor of the Van Riebeeck statue on Adderley 
Street, like Bell, appears to have drawn on the same sources and 
ideology, in his portrayal of a rather contrived and academic rendering 
of Van Riebeek. Ironically, Bell, Tweed and others after them, in their 
making of the myth and topos of the landing and Van Riebeeck as one 
of the ‘first fathers’ of the ‘nation’, were more than likely to have used 
a portrait from the Rijksmuseum collection, mistakenly identified as 
being that of Van Riebeeck, but in fact one of another Dutchman, a 
man presumed to be Bartholomeus Vermuyden. 
Figure 7.7. Delacroix, Eugene. Orpheus Civilizes the Greeks. [Brush and 
watercolour and white body colour over graphite]. 1842.  
Photograph: Yale University Art Gallery
Despite the irony of this mistaken identity perpetuated through time, 
of one thing we can be sure, with Van Riebeeck began a long history of 
theft and land dispossession. According to Petrus Deport and Tshepo 
Lephakga (2016, n.p.) from the University of South Africa:
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Jan van Riebeeck and the Dutch East India Company were not 
philanthropists out to uplift the indigenous people; they were, like all 
capitalists and traders, out to make money by whatever means necessary. 
The VOC was a mercantile capital-driven company, uniting a number 
of Dutch commercial undertakings, backed by the Dutch government 
and military that developed into one of the largest and most profitable 
commercial companies of the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries. Their mercantilist mentality was what characterised this 
first systematic strategy of accumulation by European powers in South 
Africa. Accordingly, this mercantilist mentality dictated that the VOC 
was allowed to trade on the land they occupied and that if their economic 
interests were threatened by any of the indigenous people, they could use 
whatever means necessary to protect their interests.
As Lianne van Kralinger (2017, 249) has stated, Van Riebeeck was in 
fact commanded to annex the best and fattest portions of land for the 
company: “You shall after landing inspect the most convenient spots 
for lands and pastures, and erect signs of having taken possession.” 
It was with Van Riebeeck that a painful and shameful history of 
“accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2004) begun and rent on 
local populations.
But let us return our attention to Gunn-Salie and his Venice installation, 
now that the ideological, dialogical, and diachronical footing of this 
monument of discontent has been given. In putting up the severed 
hands of Van Riebeeck, I posit Gunn-Salie wishes us to consider this 
monument from the past as still active in the present, and part of what 
Natalia Kryzanowska (2016, 469), drawing on Gramsci, calls a form and 
agent of ‘spatial hegemony’ whereby domination and rule are achieved. 
The Van Riebeeck monument thus becomes, not only for Gunn-Salie, 
who was born in Cape Town, but many other like-minded individuals, 
a “key foci of struggle” (Kryzanowska 2016, 469) between a different 
and opposing interpretation of a past whose elements are embodied 
in/through the monument itself. Zubeida Jaffer (2015, n.p.), a writer-
in-residence based at the University of Free State, in an opportune 
opinion piece published at the height of the #RhodesMustFall 
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movement in 2015, offers a counter-narrative to the one provided 
by the apartheid history text books, which still prevails in certain 
circles today. Jaffer evokes the counter-memory of Autshumato (from 
the Goreinghaikona) when recalling the 1652 landing. It was he who 
encountered the European delegation and lead the first of the two 
Khoi-Dutch wars, together with Gogosa and Doman, leaders of the 
Gorinhaiqua, aided by the Goranchouqua, “whom the Dutch called the 
‘Tobacco Thieves’.” Jaffer (my emphasis) states, 
“Van Riebeeck continues to be presented as one whom we should 
value. His statue occupies centre stage at the foot end of Adderley 
Street, the main street in our city. He spent eight years of his life on 
these shores and we hold him up as an example to our children who 
know nothing about Autshumato, the great KhoiSan leader.” 
By presenting Van Riebeeck’s dismembered hands, Gunn-Salie aligns 
himself with this divergent decoding of the monument, articulating 
though his installation, in particular the degree of elevation and 
angle of interaction, how apartheid and settler colonialism continue 
to manipulate and condition social reality, even though we are led 
to believe that these colonial corpses are dead. Like these surreal, 
ghostly hands that eerily reach out to spectators from behind the wall, 
apartheid too remains undead, conducting and orchestrating reality 
invisibly, from ‘behind’ the institution’s impeccable white walls. 
Undressed, unhealed and largely untouched, South Africa’s wounds 
remain discernible to the seers of monuments and effigies and the 
power they silently but effectively wield. This too is the case in 
Spain, where communities still aspire redress and acknowledgement. 
Although distinct and distant in many ways, I believe the shared pain 
and historic trauma inflicted on the peoples of Spain and South Africa 
– embodied and consistently evoked by uniquitous monuments – 
justifies some parallel.
Until March 17, 2005, a seven-metre-tall bronze esquestrian statue of 
General Franco (horses again!) was to be found undisturbed on Juan 
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de la Cruz Square in Madrid, Spain. This image, like many others 
commissioned before it formed part of an extensive propaganda 
machine, “designed and implemented in an effort to legitimize (Franco’s) 
rule” (Hadzelek, 2012:154). Along with it, newsreels, public displays such 
as posters, busts, and statues were erected all over Spain from the early 
days. According to Hadzelek, citing Jesus de Andrés as her source, the 
first was installed in Salamaca in October 1937. Iconography was a sign 
of Franco’s obsession with his own image and reflects the cult of the 
leader essential to fascist ideology. “What sets Spain aside”, she writes, 
“is the persistence of the iconography in the public sphere for decades 
after the dictator’s death, as well as its society’s inability or lack of 
willingness to, until recently, seriously address the human rights human 
abuses of the Franco era” (Hadzalek 2012, 155).
Following the Spanish Law of Historical Memory passed in 2007, which 
called for the removal of all Francoist symbols from public buildings 
and spaces, on the above date, an understated and unpublicised 
removal of the caudillo, mounted on his horse, took place. Hadzelek 
2012, 160) relates the event of the toppling as having taken place: 
(…) in the early hours of the morning, starting at 2 am, supposedly 
to avoid disturbing the traffic. To pre-empt confrontation, there was 
heavy police presence and the spectators were told to disperse. Except 
for a few shouts and fascist salutes, it was uneventful. Until the next 
day, that is when people started gathering around the empty pedestal 
and adorned it with flowers and a Spanish flag, some praying on 
their knees. A demonstration of protest of the removal, organized by 
the Spanish fascist party Falange, was attended by approximately 
700 people who assembled in front of a large portrait of Franco that 
had been placed in front of the empty pedestal. One of the iconic 
images of Franco as crusader was beamed onto the scaffolding that 
the authorities had placed there, projecting a virtual presence of 
Franco where the physical monument of him had stood before. This 
demonstration was reported in major international media outlets, 
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complete with the image of the fascist salute, and was followed by a 
heated debate in the Spanish media.
I have intentionally chosen the example of Spain to evoke and establish 
an analogy with our fragile present in South Africa. Perhaps South 
Africa, like Spain, will take 32 years or more to pass its own ‘Law of 
Historical Memory’, calling for the removal of all settler monuments 
from public buildings and spaces. Until then, civil society will continue 
to dispute the overwhelming presence of the patriarchal white pioneer 
and statesman, and the disavowal this signifies of people’s pain and 
dispossession, glorified on campuses, hilltops, in public gardens and 
squares. Only when such a law is set in place and enforced will the 
doors of history be opened. Until then, South Africa, like Spain, will 
have traded justice, rehabilitation and compensation of victims for the 
‘spirit of reconciliation’ and a ‘peaceful’ transition. By setting aside the 
immediate past and moving forward, the Spanish nation has slowly 
come to see this political and social compromise as a ‘pact of forgetting,’ 
associating amnesty laws of the 1970s with amnesia (amnesia), silence 
(silencio), forgetting (olvido) and disremembering (desmemoria) (ibid., 
163). The Spanish example, together with the artists analysed, urges 
South Africans to take a different path, a revolutionary path, the 
path of remembrance and justice. Until then, history will be lost and 
occluded, and monuments made markers of untruth. 
I end with Jules Michelet’s edict, “the Revolution has for her monument: 
empty space.” As I write this, a number of Confederate statues in the 
US are being removed from their plinths. There is clamour, there is 
contestation, there is tension, but revolution and the uprising of the 
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In her chapter on Creating Heritage, Manipulating Tradition: Art and 
Material Culture in South Africa’s Rainbow Nation, Anitra Nettleton 
contends, 
... in South Africa, with its British colonial and apartheid legacies of 
not only racial but also ethnic separation of people, language has, 
for at least the past 100 years, been used to encourage particularist, 
separate identities, separate imagined communities which not even 
the protracted liberation struggle managed to eliminate (2008, 108). 
As a result, she goes on, “the tactic of the post-apartheid government has been to celebrate various interacting cultures, to embrace the ‘rainbow’ nation concept” (Nettleton 2008, 108). 
However, recent calls for the removal or demolition of colonial and 
apartheid statues and monuments, seen as reflecting one of the many 
cultures on the South African landscape, have challenged and pushed the 
official narrative about the rainbow nation’s notion of memorialization, 
heritage preservation, and indeed the state’s reconciliation and social 
cohesion agenda. In response to the debates around the activities of the 
recent #RhodesMustFall Movement, Achille Mbembe (2015) observed that 
“the debate should have never been about whether or not colonial and 
apartheid monuments should be brought down”. All along, he continues, 
“the debate should have been about why it took so long to do so”.
My research on the identification and construction of statues and 
monuments in honour of anti-apartheid struggle heroes and heroines 
by the African National Congress (ANC), especially those at the 
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Groenkloof nature reserve in Tshwane, tells another story which 
seems to be a deliberate attempt to counter colonial statues or pre-
1994 imagery.1 The emerging struggle icons’ statues, as well as the 
era in which they are constructed have given them the appearance of 
new imageries for the new dispensation, but only to a certain extent. 
While the statues represent anti-colonial and anti-apartheid heroes 
and heroines, the imagery is still largely colonial in nature (Gamedze 
2015). Here, struggle icons statues are constituted by a group of 
bronze statues representing anti-colonial and anti-apartheid activists 
such as Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, as 
well as Zulu chiefs, and missionaries. The project was conceived and 
implemented by Dali Tambo, son of struggle icon Oliver Tambo, with 
the stated aim of reflecting on South Africa’s struggle for liberation 
dating back to the 1600s. The over 70 struggle heroes and heroines 
statues are intended to tell the story of South Africa’s three centuries 
of colonial domination (1650-1950) and four decades of apartheid rule 
(1950-1990) through remembering and honouring the many activists 
who paid a price for the country’s freedom. 
The example of the newly constructed statues, among others, sends 
a strong message to heritage practitioners about the present cultural 
landscape. Indeed, the inventive and innovative reservation of a park 
for the statues commemorating struggle icons is a good example of 
shifting nature of cultural heritage resources. It demonstrates that 
in Africa and South Africa in particular, the imagery of the society 
is not static (Prashad 2001; Mbembe 2015; Sajnani 2015). It is always 
changing, especially in response to changes on the socio-cultural and 
political landscape. 
The main argument in this chapter is that the Groenkloof struggle 
icons’ statues provides us with the opportunity to understand the 
socio-cultural transfigurations that South Africa and Tshwane have 
been going through since 1994. Put differently, the anti-colonial and 
1 Imagery here can be understood as a visually descriptive or figurative language, especially 
in literary work. It also refers to visual images collectively (cf. Page 1997)
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anti-apartheid heroes and heroines statues allow us to comprehend 
the shifting nature of the imagery of success and power in South Africa. 
This practice can also be witnessed in willingness of the ruling ANC 
to construct statues and monuments in different parts of the country 
in honour of struggle heroes and heroines. More recent examples of 
some of these statues are those of former President Jacob Zuma at 
the Groot Marico capture site, in the North West Province, and that of 
Oliver Tambo at the O.R. Tambo international airport in Johannesburg. 
As some of my informants note this practice of constructing post-
apartheid statues has become one of the most notable means of 
addressing past cultural imbalances.
This chapter examines the rationale behind the newly constructed 
anti-colonial and anti-apartheid statues at the Groenkloof nature 
reserve. In doing this, the chapter aims to show that while the statues 
are largely a replication of existing colonial imagery, they have become 
one of the embodiments of the ANC’s response to the cultural imbalance 
on the South African and Tshwane landscape. To unpack this, I divide 
the chapter into four sections. First, I present a historical background 
to Pretoria and colonial imagery; second, I highlight the decline of 
the colonial imagery in Pretoria; third, I examine the emergence of 
the post-1994 imagery and lastly, I highlight the rationale behind the 
newly constructed statues.
Pretoria (Tshwane) and colonial statues
For a better understanding of the motivations behind the emergence 
of struggle heroes and heroine statues at the Groenkloof Nature 
Reserve, I will begin with a brief history of Pretoria and colonial statues 
in the city in order to establish a context for my argument.2 Pretoria, 
2 The Groenkloof Nature Reserve is located adjacent to Fountains Valley at the southern 
entrance into Tshwane (Pretoria). It was one of the first game sanctuaries in Africa. The 
reserve of about 600 hectares is managed by the Department of Nature Conservation of 
the Republic of South Africa. The reserve is home to the newly constructed struggle 
heroes’ and heroines’ statues, also known as the National Heritage Monuments (www.
nhmsa.gov.za accessed July 2016). The site visit was organised by the author in an attempt 
to get the public’s perceptions about the Groenkloof Nature Reserve’s struggle icons 
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the administrative capital of South Africa was founded in 1855 by 
Marthinus Pretorius, the then leader of the Voortrekkers who named 
it after his father Andries Pretorius, and chose a spot on the banks of 
the Apies River to be the capital of the South African Republic (Raper 
1987; Bodel 1989). Prior to this, oral history holds that the area used to 
be called Tshwane, probably named after a local chief, Tshwane. The 
meaning of the name Tshwane is not very clear, but it is associated 
with the term Tshwana, which means “we are same” (www.sahistory.
org.za,). Other sources (Allen & Hannes 2007) associate the name 
Tshwane with the colour “black” in Sotho, as in black cow or “Kgomo e 
Tshwane” while still, others say it means “little Monkey”. 
Following the arrival of the Voortrekkers, and successive Europeans, 
Pretoria slowly but steadily developed to become one of the most 
important colonial administrative centres in Southern Africa and 
South Africa, and has maintained its status until present day. The 
history of colonial statues in Pretoria dates back to the arrival of the 
Voortrekkers and the establishment of Boer Republics. However, I 
will start from 1938 with the Voortrekker Monument because of the 
important place it occupies in South African history. In her study 
on History After Apartheid: Visual Culture and Public Memory in a 
Democratic South Africa, Coombes explains that: 
On 16th December 1938, the foundation stone of this central monument 
to apartheid was laid on a hill outside Pretoria. It was also the occasion 
of an elaborate reconstruction of the foundational event of Afrikaner 
nationalism – the Great Trek of 1838. That year, a party of Boer men 
statues. It included five postgraduate students currently on internship at the Human 
Sciences Research Council, two heritage managers from the City of Tshwane as well as 
three researchers and two members of the public. The age range for the participants was 
20-55 years old. Of the 12 participants in the group, seven were women and five were 
men. In terms of racial composition, 11 of the participants were black South Africans 
while the remaining one was a white South African. In terms of their professional 
background, seven were fully employed while the others were either students or private 
consultants. Most of the visitors were residents of black townships on the outskirts of 
Pretoria such as Mamelodi and Attridgeville. The site visit was in addition to several 
other visits to the site by the author, in which he spent time observing how visitors 
behave at the site, talking to some of them and also documenting their experiences. 
However, in 2019, the statues were removed and taken to Maropeng at the Cradle of 
Humankind in Magaliesberg as there is more room to display what will eventually be 
about 400 life-sized bronze statues.
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and women, and children, (known as the Voortrekkers or Pioneers), 
dissatisfied with British rule in the Cape and its inconvenience corollary 
of slave emancipation, set off in a convoy of ox-wagons on a gruelling 
journey from Cape Town to form independent republics in what were 
to become the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. One hundred years 
later, twelve replica ox wagons, complete with costumed Voortrekker 
families, set out from various parts of the country to restage that fateful 
journey and finally arrived (nearly four months later) at two of the most 
historically significant destinations – the city of Pretoria and the site of 
the battle of Blood River (the Ncome River) (2003, 26).
The laying of the foundation stone of the Voortrekker Monument 
was preceded by a countrywide symbolic Ox-Wagon Trek, organised 
by the Afrikaans Language and Cultural Organisation (ATKV) (Peters 
2012). The Trek was punctuated by festivals in almost every centre 
through which the trekkers from Cape Town passed. The story 
narrated in the Voortrekker Monument starts with the artists who 
were involved in the sculpture work. It indicates that Hennie Potgieter 
designed and sculpted the buffalo head above the main entrance as a 
symbol of protection against enemies. Moreover, a Voortrekker leader 
is depicted on each side of the four corners of the monument to 
symbolize guard of honour. In front of the monument, on either side 
of Anton van Wouw’s mother and children statue are four wildebeest 
mounted on bas relief against the wall to symbolise the danger posed 
by Africans to the mother and her children (Coombes 2003, 38). Also 
represented on the monument, is a marble frieze that tells the story 
of the Great Trek of 1835-1852 in 27 panels. Basically, what is portrayed 
on the panels is the history and different aspects of the way of life of 
the trekkers. Coombes argues that:
Historically, then, the Voortrekker Monument is of critical significance 
for the foundational myths of Afrikaner nationalism – in particular the 
idea of the Trek as the moment of emergence of the Afrikaner as the 
founding ethnic group of a new nation, the white tribe, and the divine 
right of the Trekkers to the land. These myths are embodied through the 
structure of the monument itself – first through the seductive resolution 
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provided by the narrative of encounter and conquest represented by the 
interior frieze, and second through the fact that the edifice houses what 
amounts to a cenotaph on its lower level, replete with eternal flame to 
the memory of Trekkers killed en route. (Coombes 2003, 28)
The above extract illustrates the fact that one of the rationales behind 
the Voortrekker Monuments is the recognition and preservation of the 
memories of the Voortrekkers. Preservation of the memories of heroes 
and heroines through statues and monuments was, and still is not 
unique to South Africa and Pretoria. Colonial statues and monuments 
were common across Africa during the colonial and apartheid era. As 
Larsen has noted in the case of Kenya, they were used as cultural tools 
in the project of colonialism until the achievement of independence in 
the 1960s (Larsen 2013). In the same vein, this use of symbols continues 
with the ANC government’s position to undermine the power of the 
dominant class. The Groenkloof nature reserve statues in honour of 
struggle or anti-colonial and anti-apartheid heroes and heroines must 
be seen in this context.
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Figure 8.1. Voortrekker Monument, Pretoria. Photograph: Mathias A. Fubah, 
August 2016
I therefore argue that the interest in struggle heroes and heroines 
statues and monuments by the ANC government is not about reducing 
the level of domination of the cultural landscape by colonial and 
apartheid symbols, but rather working to subvert pre-1994 imagery 
by eliminating any relations of domination that exist between the two 
symbols – the colonial and apartheid on the one hand, and the post-
apartheid on the other hand.1 
At a site visit to the Groenkloof nature reserve struggle heroes and 
heroines statues in June 2017, some of the discussions between students, 
heritage practitioners and researchers centred on the question of the 
iconography of struggle heroes and heroines statues at the park.2 Many 
of the participants agreed that it was important for the statues to be 
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constructed because they represent the symbols of the new South 
Africa. Many argued that the symbols of the colonial and apartheid era 
were no longer needed since the system had collapsed in 1994. 
Right from the beginning of the deliberations, there was disagreement 
between students and heritage practitioners on what constitutes the 
imagery of the new dispensation. To most of the participants, statues 
and monuments such as the Voortrekker Monument that have been 
there since 1949 are largely seen in present day as an extension of the 
pre-1994 cultural iconography. 
Since the inauguration of the Voortrekker Monument, various cultural 
organisations have hosted festivals on the site. In 1959, for example, 
the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK) presented “Die 
Wonder van Afrikaans”, a language festival which was attended by more 
than 60,000 people (Peters 2012). One of the results of this festival was the 
creation of the popular film Doodkry is min, which portrays the history 
of the language. Additionally, at the 150th anniversary of the Great Trek 
in 1988, the FAK and the Afrikanervolkswa organised a small symbolic ox 
wagon trek during which several small monuments were constructed 
across the country and various memorabilia were manufactured. 
Figure 8.2. Tambo, Dali. Cross-section of struggle heroes and heroines statues 
installed in 2015 at the Greonkloof nature reserve. Pretoria. 
Photograph: Mathias A. Fubah, January 2016
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This colonial and apartheid notion of statues and monuments created 
the impression that tangible heritage of European origin was the 
only acceptable symbol. The acceptable notion of heritage was one 
that ignored and avoided the history of black South Africans, except 
to display it as part of archaeological and natural history exhibitions 
(Kayster 2010). Moreover, the South African Cultural History Museum 
in Pretoria, for example, exhibited Greek, and Egyptian artefacts, 
European costumes and silver as well as Japanese ceramics and 
costumes. The inclusion of Japan pointed to an acceptance by the 
apartheid regime and other whites that Japan had a higher level of 
civilisation than the black Africans who were excluded. By doing this, 
the colonial and apartheid social actors conveyed the message that, 
culture, art, history and the construction of statues and monuments 
in honour of heroes and heroines came from Europe (Kayster 2010, 
3). In fact, colonial statues and monuments, such as the Voortrekker 
Monument for example, were presented as more superior to those of 
the African population (if any), and therefore deserving of a place on 
the South African cultural landscape (Crooke 2005, 131).
From the 1970s, the separation was marked by “native” section being 
moved to a cultural village venue near the Pretoria Zoo, and then 
relocated to the present African Window section.3 By doing this, the 
colonial and apartheid social actors vividly demonstrated the distinction 
between what was “perceived as primitive and civilized of culture and 
nature” (Gore 2005, 75). Similarly, statues and monuments in honour 
of colonial and apartheid heroes and heroines were presented as 
progressive in contrast to the differentiated representations of black 
warriors and clothed Afrikaners. primitive and Seen from the context 
of the political atmosphere at the time, this practice was interpreted 
as the expression of colonialism and apartheid where the belief was 
that high attainment and ability was of European or Western origin, 
whereas black history was absent and not deserving of any attention 
on the cultural landscape.
3 Nettleton Anitra, observation, September 2017.
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Figure 8.3. Voortrekkers leaving the Cape Colony, Voortrekker Monument, 
Pretoria, 1835. Photograph: Mathias A. Fubah
The decline of colonial statues and monuments 
in Pretoria/Tshwane
Following Fanon and Gramsci, we can argue that hegemonic culture 
such as the colonial and apartheid statues and monuments that were 
promoted and preserved in South Africa are constituted first and 
foremost following the values that serve and justify the privileged 
classes, and they are thus privileged because of their relation to the 
political system in place (Fanon 1963; Gramsci 1971). When the political 
system changes, as was the case in South Africa in 1994, fundamental 
changes occurred in the society, as in the case of the newly constructed 
cultural heritage resources such as Freedom Park, and the struggle 
icons statues at the Groenkloof nature reserve in Tshwane. As new 
cultural heritage resources in honour of anti-colonial and anti-
apartheid icons become dominant, new classes are formed, class 
relations shift, and the new class(es) that rise to power then construct 
new imageries, aesthetics, values, and ultimately ideology, that justify 
their hegemony (Prashad 2001; Sajnani 2015).
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Writing about Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of the Archive, 
Achille Mbembe (2015) notes, 
 … the decolonisation of buildings and public spaces includes a change 
of those colonial names, iconography, i.e., the economy of symbols 
whose function, all along, has been to induce and normalize particular 
states of humiliation based on white supremacist presuppositions. 
Such names, images, and symbols, Mbembe (2015) goes on, “have 
nothing to do on the walls of a public university campus more than 
20 years after apartheid”. In his study on HipHop Origin as Organic 
Decolonization, Sajnani (2015) notes that “HipHop culture, at its 
origins, is an organic decolonization of local urban space by internally 
colonized people in post-industrial 1970s New York”. Similarly, the 
newly constructed struggle heroes and heroine statues can be 
interpreted as an organic decolonisation of the local Tshwane space 
by the ANC government, except that they have been erected by the 
privileged class and in memory of members of a largely elite section of 
the political class However, while the New York case talks of HipHop 
culture as a new invention that was meant to subvert the dominant 
culture at the time, Dali Tambo’s struggle heroes and heroines statues 
at Groenkloof remain a continuation of the pre-1994 colonial symbols, 
both in styles and material forms, for example. According to Gamedze 
(2015), the newly constructed statues are not an act of liberation, but 
one of assimilation. The use of bronze as was the case with the colonial 
and apartheid imagery, she continues, does not make much meaning 
to previously marginalise South Africans. As she maintains:
Bronze symbolises a regime, a triumph over Bronze, of recent, has 
had a mobilizing effect, it spurs action within people who look at 
bronze figures and do not see themselves reflected back. Bronze can 
collect masses, can put institutions at a standstill, bronze can insult a 
black South Africa which is in a process of trying to re-imagine itself. 
Bronze has acted as the anti-imagination of a decolonized South 
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Africa, and its continued use in the colonial style cannot ever be read 
as a project that attempts to create a space for all South Africans to 
memorialize anything whatsoever.4
The above extract elucidates the fact that in trying to remember and 
preserve the memories of anti-colonial and anti-apartheid heroes and 
heroines, Dali Tambo has directly put them once again under the canopy 
of the same western artists who denied them the right to cultural 
representation.3 While most of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid 
heroes and heroines may have lived and died without ever interacting 
freely with a bronze statue, they are now commemorated using this this 
material that many consider to represent a regime and a triumph over 
land to the neglect of what they might have used and valued as their 
own imagery. In a process of decolonisation, Gamedze (2015) notes:
Our imagination of public symbolism surely needs to originate here, 
using our own image-makers and artists’ skill sets and disciplines, in a 
process that takes as departure point a democratic conceptualisation 
of who and what needs to be memorialized, and how we would like to 
see that done.
In essence, while the Groenkloof nature reserve struggle heroes and 
heroines site might be seen as a step towards addressing cultural 
imbalance on the South Africa landscape, it remains old-fashioned 
and repulsive in terms of the imagery since black South Africans to 
the site are reminded through the bronze statues of a past that they 
are struggling to forget. According to Dali Tambo, the project initiator, 
it is a tourist site. Heritage tourism, he continues, “is a massively 
growing aspect of international tourism, with the educated middle 
classes seeking otherness …” (cited in Gamedze 2015). However, the 
“otherness” that Dali Tambo mentions here only takes the tourist to 
the pre-1994 gaze. 
4 While bronze is considered to represent a regime, a triumph over land and is also 
Western, it should also be noted that bronze is very much African (Cf. Layiwola and 
Olorunyomi, 2010). 
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The resources associated with such landscapes enabled white South 
Africans to enjoy exclusive rights and privileges in such spaces and 
in the society. A white South African who accompanied the author 
and a group of students and heritage practitioners to the Groenkloof 
Nature Reserve recalled with regret the good old days when statues 
and monuments meant a lot and could attract crowds of people from 
the population group that they represented. As she explained to us 
during the discussions at the site, she remarked:
• I feel sorry that even with the huge sum of money that has been 
invested here, the population is not aware, not many people 
come to view the statues, yet they are constructed in the name of 
heroes and heroines of majority of the population. In the past, the 
colonial and apartheid statues and monuments that some people 
are calling for their removal meant a lot and I am certain they still 
do in present day South Africa, especially to those they represent.5
What this colleague failed to realize was that, while huge sums of 
money have been invested in the Groenkloof struggle heroes and 
heroines statues, the project is largely a process of replicating the pre-
1994 iconography because the forms and aesthetics of the statues have 
not changed much. As one of the students who participated in the 
trip observed “most of us are happy seeing this, but I am concerned 
because the statues give only a partial picture of the people they 
represent.” Apart from their heads that show that this is comrade 
Mandela, or Mbeki, or Tambo, the rest of the image, is not in any way 
different from the pre-1994 statues and monuments.6
The emerging struggle icons statues and 
monuments in Pretoria/Tshwane
If in the 1960s, 70s and 80s the apartheid regime portrayed statues 
and monuments in honour of their heroes and heroines as some of the 
5 It is important to note here that artists for the Greonkloof Nature Reserve statues were 
mostly white South Africans.
6 Margaretta, personal communication. June 2017.
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resources that could give status and success to the government, then 
the 1990s and 2000s were the in which these symbols started to be 
undermined. Three reasons account for this. The first is that the ideology 
that presented the apartheid cultural landscape or imagery as ideal was 
not true.4 Second, these colonial and apartheid symbols were considered 
outdated because they have persisted “well beyond the advent of 
democracy” (Kros 2015, 151). In fact, similar changes were experienced by 
most African postcolonial societies in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s 
(Coombes 2011; Larsen 2013; Mbembe 2015; Swartz 2017). For example, 
Larsen (2013) noted that the lifting of colonial rule in Nairobi (Kenya) 
was followed by a symbolic restitution of the cultural landscape for the 
“expression of resistance and the inscription of new voices” (2013). 
In Zimbabwe, independence was followed by the removal of the statues 
of colonial authorities such as Cecil John Rhodes, Alfred Beit and 
many others, since they were seen as offensive to Africans (Samwanda 
2013). Similar observations have been made about colonial statues and 
monuments in West Africa, most notably, in Mali (Arnoldi 2007). Given 
this trend, South Africa with a similar colonial history cannot be an 
exception, even though it achieved its independence 30 years later. 
Third, when South Africa achieved its democracy in 1994, social 
transformation was made one of the priorities of the government. The 
constitution for example, declared equal rights for all citizens, and one 
can add equal cultural representation on the landscape. Because the 
cultural landscape and associated cultural spaces are platforms where 
national ideals such as those enshrined in the new constitution are 
given material form, the landscape became a space where the ANC 
government had to persuade the population to support its policies 
(Kayster 2010). Accordingly, on Heritage Day 1997, former President 
Nelson Mandela used the opportunity to criticise the cultural landscape 
as one which reflected colonial and apartheid points of view (Kayster 
2010, 3). In line with the country’s new constitution, Mandela demanded 
a change of the old iconography. Indeed, he emphasised that the cultural 
representation had to change in order to reflect the democratic ideals 
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and experiences of the majority of the population, rather than focusing 
on a privileged few as had been the case (Kayster 2010, 3). 
Early in 1992, the South African History Workshop at the University of 
the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg held a conference under the theme, 
“Myths, Monuments, Museums” with the aim of charting the future 
of historical statues and monuments in the country and Tshwane 
(Coombes 2003). Some of the debates at the conference centred 
on whether or not public sculpture set up over the long apartheid 
years to commemorate key moments and figures in the Afrikaaner 
nationalist canon should be removed (Coombes 2003, 3). Following 
the deliberations, it was decided that some statues, such as those of 
Hendrick Verwoerd, “the man considered by many to be the major 
architect of apartheid be destroyed, while many of the symbolically 
laden such as the Voortrekker Monument and the Taalmonument” 
(Afrikaans Language Monument) outside Paarl in the Western Cape 
should survive (Coombes 2003, 20).
Despite the above debates, many perceived Nelson Mandela’s 
Heritage Day pronouncement as a wake-up call and museums and 
heritage institutions and practitioners noted that what the cultural 
landscape represented and the way in which it was represented was 
“opposed to the new human rights culture of the new South Africa” 
(Dubin 2006). According to Anziske Kayster, President Mandela’s 
speech showed vividly that the post-apartheid government proposed 
and desired transformation of the South African cultural landscape. 
Transformation in this case encompasses “inclusion, assimilation, 
participation, collaboration and sometimes eradication” (Kayster 
2010, 4). It is a process of “constructing new ways of thinking, doing 
and understanding” (Kayster 2010, 4).
However, the call for transformation of the cultural landscape has 
less to do with the fascination with the new imagery than with 
fundamental changes that have been happening in South Africa since 
the 1990s. Not only have these changes supposedly swept away the 
colonial and apartheid ideologies that in the past served as cultural 
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tools for self-confidence and control of the population by the white 
minority government; it has also greatly hampered the influence these 
resources had, as many are now openly challenged, destroyed or even 
removed as in the case of the Rhodes statue at the University of Cape 
Town in 2015. This is how unimportant some colonial and apartheid 
statues and monuments have become, not only for the previously 
marginalised who are calling for their complete removal but also for 
some of the population groups represented by these statues who feel 
South Africa needs a new cultural identity.
Struggle icons statues and monuments in 
Pretoria/Tshwane: A new imagery 
In present day South Africa and Tshwane, most of the previously 
marginalised population groups are fascinated, (though with 
reservations) by the ANC’s efforts in remembering and commemorating 
the lives of struggle heroes and heroines through statues and 
monuments. Most of the twelve participants that accompanied the 
author to the Groenkloof nature reserve statues in June feel they relate 
to the statues in one way or another. Indeed, most of them, and visitors 
to the site, feel those represented by the statues are role models for 
most South Africans aspiring to leave a legacy. For instance, in one 
of the visits to the site, I was astonished by the extent to which the 
statues have impacted on the lives of black South African visitors. On 
most occasions, I met visitors, most of them black South Africans who 
spent many hours not only moving from one statue to the other, but 
also reading the accompanying literature or explanatory information. 
In fact, most of those that I spoke to referred me to a Facebook and 
Instagram page, which I wasted no time subscribing as one of their 
followers (Figure 8.4).
Chapter 8 | Struggle heroes and heroines statues
227
Figure 8.4. Photograph of a visitor to the Groenkloof National Heritage Monuments 
Park taken next to one of the statue with an Instagram display
The esteem that most of these participants and visitors showed in the 
struggle heroes and heroines statues and monuments, was manifested 
in the type of stories and issues they discussed. For instance, most of 
them told me that if it were in the 1970s and 1980s, none of them would 
have come any closer to a statue or monument because the spaces that 
historical statues and monuments occupy were “no go areas”. Instead, 
in present day, one of them observed, we are not only viewing statues 
and chatting in a park without any restrictions, but anyone can kiss and 
comment about the statues. One of the participants, Tembileli maintains:
Under the pre-1994 system of government, some of us would have only 
come here as security officers or cleaners. Those are the type of jobs 
that were designed for black South Africans: to guard and clean the 
surroundings of Paul Kruger’s statue at Church Square while our bosses 
drink coffee, smoke cigarette and stroll around. But as you can see, 
most of these heroes and heroines represented by the statues sacrificed 
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their lives so that we can also drink cold drink, smoke cigarette freely 
and stroll around their own statues not as security guards or cleaners 
but as professionals in our different fields.7
As a matter of fact, most of the stories narrated by the participants 
and visitors at the site centred on their achievements resulting 
from the sacrifices of these icons. This fascination with the new 
imagery of anti-colonial and anti-apartheid heroes and heroines 
raises a number of questions, the answers to which might help us 
understand the rationale behind the new cultural representations 
on the South African and Tshwane landscape. Notable among these 
questions is, what makes the struggle heroes and heroines statues and 
monuments at the Groenkloof site attractive to South Africans? And 
what kind of message does the interest in these struggle heroes and 
heroines statues and monuments convey? Four suggestions, which 
are not definitive, attempt to answer these questions.
First, Chief Tshwane, whose statue is constructed at the site, is a famous 
leader of those who, according to oral history, inhabited the area now 
known as Tshwane before the Boer trekkers arrived in the mid-1800s 
(Figure 8.5). According to the explanatory information on the statue, 
Chief Tshwane was the son of Chief Mushi, a Ndebele king who led his 
people from Maponong to what later became known as the Transvaal, 
settling first in the east of the city at the origin of the Moretele River.5 It 
is believed Chief Mushi moved to the region in the early 1800s and first 
settled at Mokgapane (Mooiplaas, east of Pretoria) before moving to what 
is now Pretoria and gave an area near the present-day Apies River to his 
son, Tshwane. Some people therefore believed that the African name 
for the Apies River is Tshwane River, in honour of Chief Mushi’s son. The 
name Tshwane disappeared from the records following the founding 
of Pretoria in 1855. Hence, the South African government’s move to 
change the name to Tshwane in 2005 and later to construct statues and 
monuments in honour of Chief Tshwane remains a fascination for those 
who believe and appreciate historical facts.
7 Molera Stanle, personal communication, June, 2017.
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Figure 8.5. Chief Tshwane. National Heritage Monument Park, Pretoria. 
Photograph: Mathias A. Fubah, June 2017
Second, most South Africans are likely to be attracted to the 
Groenkloof Nature Reserve site because the mere presence of struggle 
heroes and heroines statues there, is a recognition and preservation 
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of their memories. But, it also points to the fact that, like the Afrikaners 
who constructed statues and monuments such as the Voortrekker 
Monument in honour of their heroes and events in the past, the ANC 
and most South Africans see the statues and monuments of struggle 
heroes and heroines as a means of remembering their own past. 
This is a means of ensuring continuity with both ancestors as well as 
descendants of these icons and the new dispensation. It builds on and 
reminds viewers of the significance of the sacrifices and achievements 
of these struggle icons for present and future generations. As a matter 
of fact, it is through the construction of statues and monuments 
especially those of struggle heroes and heroines that the ANC can 
convince themselves that they are in control, since many South 
Africans believe one way of achieving symbolic restitution is through 
such practices (Swartz 2017). As a result of this belief, the notion of 
statues and monuments in honour of struggle heroes and heroines 
has become a common practice across South Africa since most people 
believe they “belong to the people.”8 At least, this was the view expressed 
by one of the visitors that I talked to at the site, who maintained that: 
“through these statues and monuments, the souls of anti-colonial and 
anti-apartheid heroes and heroines have been resurrected.”
Third, struggle heroes and heroines statues and monuments are also 
popular in the eyes of the ANC leadership and South Africans because 
they contribute in giving a voice to the formerly marginalized groups 
(Sherriff 2014). For example, Gavin Jantjes has written on the one-
sidedness of statues and monuments across South Africa during the 
colonial and apartheid era. In his introduction to the Visual Century 
project, he describes the evolution of South African art, including statues 
and monuments from 1907 onwards. He demonstrates how the harsh 
political circumstances of the 20th century, colonial, union, and apartheid 
rule often eroded facts and shaped cultural fictions (Jantjies 2011). As a 
result of these fictions, the majority of South Africans were rendered 
voiceless until 1994. It is no wonder that efforts towards reversing these 
fictions have become one of the main preoccupations of the government.
8 Tembileli, Personal communication, Pretoria, June 2017.
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Fourth, the ANC leadership and most South Africans see statues and 
monuments in honour of struggle heroes and heroines as an instrument of 
defence. For instance, a number of studies on Africa and South Africa have 
reiterated the fact that the construction of statues and monuments across 
the country, today, as in the past is essentially a political phenomenon 
(Dubow 1997; Coombes 2003; Nettleton 2008). This holds true, especially 
for the struggle icons statues and monuments at the Groenkloof nature 
reserve, since statues and monuments have formed part of an aesthetic 
practice that have played a crucial role in defining and shaping South 
Africa’s cultural landscape since the colonial era (Leibhammer & Bila 2011). 
Leibhammer and Bila have noted that all these were clearly spelt out in 
the “treaty of Vereenging (1902), the proclamation of the Union of South 
Africa (1910) and the Native Land Act (1913) that saw black South Africans 
forfeit all their residual (Maylam 2001). 
As a result of these restrictive policies by the apartheid government, 
the ANC regime and many black South Africans see the whole notion 
of identifying and constructing statues and monuments such as those 
at the Groenkloof nature reserve as an instrument in the counter-
hegemonic project. 
Across Tshwane and South Africa, the ANC’s interests and obsession 
with struggle icons statues and monuments fits into the country’s 
mode of symbols as objects of status and prestige for political elites. It 
also shows the ambition of the ANC to outshine pre-1994 statues and 
monuments in what Arjun Appadurai calls “the tournament of values” 
(1996). By tournament of values, we should be understood as referring 
to the complex ways in which the pre-1994 regimes perceived statues 
and monuments, and portrayed them as instruments of power and 
authority, as well as a means of controlling the population. In the same 
vein, the ANC government sees struggle icons statues and monuments 
as an opportunity for them to make their voice heard in the wider 
South African community. As a mark of this tendency, the ANC has 
taken upon themselves the task of constructing struggle icons statues 
and monuments not only in Tshwane and South Africa, but also beyond 
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the country. One notable example of this was in Rhamala, Palestine 
where the statue of struggle icon and former President Nelson 
Mandela was recently unveiled by the premier of Gauteng Province. 
Additionally, there was also the unveiling of the Deville Wood Memorial 
in Paris in honour of the members of the South Africa Native Labour 
Corps who died during the First World War in Paris but were never 
honoured in the same manner as their white colleagues.
Prior to 1994, with the exception of Nelson Mandela, whose statue was 
installed in London in the 1980s and one recently unveiled, ANC heroes 
and heroines, whether within or out of the country did not have such 
privileges. Undoubtedly, by identifying and constructing statues and 
monuments in honour of struggle icons, the ANC was further extending 
the pre-1994 practice of obsession with objects of status and prestige. 
This, however, is not to suggest that statues s of status and prestige such 
as the Benin bronzes, for example) were not part of pre-colonial Africa. 
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has presented an overview of the historical and 
contemporary symbols of status and monuments in South Africa and 
Tshwane. The chapter has shown that while the colonial and apartheid 
era statues and monuments were constructed exclusively in honour of 
heroes and heroines of the time, post-apartheid statues and monuments 
are also largely in honour of anti-colonial and anti-apartheid heroes 
and heroines. Using the example of the Vootrekker Monument and 
the newly constructed Groenkloof nature reserve struggle heroes 
and heroines statues, the chapter highlights the shifting nature of 
the imagery of success and power in South Africa and Tshwane. The 
chapter further shows that, while the Groenkloof nature reserve anti-
colonial and anti-apartheid statues are intended to address the issue 
of cultural imbalance on the South African landscape, the styles and 
material forms are western, making the statues to look like a replication 
of the pre-1994 symbols. The fascination with the newly constructed 
statues and monuments is supported by four major reasons. First, the 
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fact that the founding chief of Tshwane, chief Tshwane is represented 
at the new site, thereby disrupting the apartheid founding myth of 
Pretoria. Second, the fact that the memories of those who fought 
for South Africa’s freedom is recognised and preserved. Third, the 
fact that struggle heroes and heroines statues and monuments have 
contributed in giving a voice to the ANC leadership and most South 
Africans, something that they could only dream of in the past. Fourth, 
the fact that struggle heroes and heroines statues and monuments 
present themselves as instruments of defence against the continuous 
domination of the cultural landscape by pre-1994 symbols.
By constructing statues and monuments in honour of struggle heroes 
and heroines across South Africa and Tshwane, the ANC leadership is 
slowly, but steadily disrupting the old symbols, thereby ushering in new 
classes, new relations, new cultural representations and eventually a new 
ideology that will help support its leadership and policies. Indeed, through 
the actions of the ANC and many South Africans, we can ascertain that 
hegemony is never a permanent state of affairs and it is never uncontested 
(Gramsci 1971). For example, Stuart Hall, one of the founding figures of 
cultural studies, has pointed out that “people are simultaneous makers 
and consumers of culture, participating in that culture according to their 
place in economic and political structures” (Hall, 1980). And that people, 
through “processes of encoding and decoding, shape culture and that 
organisations such as the church, the state,” and we may also say the ANC 
(in the case of this paper), encode certain ideas in the mass media, which 
audiences then decode (Hall 1980). To this end, the Groenkloof struggle 
heroes and heroines statues can be interpreted as both a continuation 
of the pre-1994 imagery as well as a departure from it in terms of the 
initiator of the project, the faces and personalities represented and the 
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